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Humans generally interact, communicate, and form social structures using natural
language. Due to the high dimensionality of language, much of the wealth of
information from these interactions has been barred from the economic profession.
However, recent technological advancements lead to increasing use of text as an
underlying datasource in economic and financial applications. This trend has been
further accelerated by Nobel laureate Robert J. Shiller’s presidential address to
the American Economic Association "Narrative Economics", in which he argues
for more elaboration on narratives – stories that a ect individual decisions and
collective actions – by the economic scientific community. Addressing this gap
in the literature, research has been published utilizing textual information to
quantify latent variables such as uncertainty, forecasting macroeconomic variables
in real time, and asset price predictions.
In conjunction with the rise of natural language processing applications, there has
been a shift in perspective on monetary policy with regards to central bank trans-
parency and communication. Transitioning from the presumption that monetary
policy is limited to interest rate actions, communication has advanced to become
a key tool in the central banker’s toolbox. Ever since, words are used to anchor
expectations and self-enforce the central banks’ desired equilibrium path. As a
result, research on monetary policy has been relentless in the pursuit of adopting
novel techniques as well as incorporating new unstructured data sources such as
news-articles, press conference statements, and speeches. This string of literature
is regularly complemented by an extension of the traditional empirical toolbox,
borrowing novel techniques from the field of machine learning.
The here presented cumulative dissertation consists of four essays that touch on
all these fields, namely text as data, monetary policy, and machine learning. My
primary focus is on the European Central Bank (ECB), but the methodology and
ideas can be extended to other central banks as well.
Throughout this thesis, textual information is incorporated from di erent data
sources, analyzed using di erent techniques in order to approximate di erent la-
tent variables. As a result, text is employed as a dependent variable at times and
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as an independent variable at other times. Specifically, the first essay leverages
the relative frequency of terms used in ECB press statements as anecdotal evi-
dence for the diversity of the central banks’ communication with regard to their
topics, whereas the second essay counts positive and negative terms in speeches
to approximate the latent variable of central bank loss. The third essay examines
the impact of linguistic complexity on financial market participants by conducting
a readability test on the ECB’s introduction statements, and the final essay dives
into computational linguistics to develop a novel central bank-specific language
model for better quantifying monetary policy communication. The following is a
brief summary of the four essays included in this thesis.
My first essay analyzes rule-based monetary policy in the euro area before and
after the financial crisis. Jonas Gross and I argue that the environment in which
policymakers operate is far more complex than traditional model-based analy-
sis of policy rules permits. We complement this view with evidence from ECB
press conferences, demonstrating that the central bank discusses a wide range of
topics beyond the traditional Taylor-rule variables. Since each variable has the
potential to be relevant in understanding the central bank’s reaction function,
we combine a literature review with natural language processing to identify a set
of potential determinants. The traditional approach of selecting a single interest
rate response function is then contrasted by applying a Bayesian model averaging
approach to these determinants. We account for model uncertainty by including
a large number of determinants and estimating a total of 33.000 di erent model
combinations.
Our results suggest that in contrast to the ongoing criticism, the ECB primarily
reacts to inflation in its interest rate decision. In fact, our analysis finds that in-
flation is a significant variable in almost all of the examined model combinations.
Furthermore, we find that the ECB reacts to changes in economic activity deter-
minants such as unemployment and production as well. These economic activity
indicators were a priority for the ECB prior to the financial crisis but have since
declined in relevance, suggesting that inflation is the sole driver of monetary pol-
icy decisions in the post-crisis period. Finally, we assess our findings with textual
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evidence from the ECB press conferences, where, in accordance with the previous
results, we find the same shift.
My second essay focuses on the ECB’s objective itself, quantifying the central
bank’s satisfaction with current economic conditions through textual analysis.
By maximizing an implied objective function, the ECB is assumed to pursue
inflation targeting with a subordinate focus on supporting the general economic
policy of the European Union. I compute the central bank’s sentiment using the
ECB’s public communication by counting the number of positive and negative
words in speeches, allowing me to quantify the objective. Assuming a typical
functional form for the objective allows me to estimate the optimal levels with
respect to inflation and economic activity, i.e. the bliss points in which the central
banks communication is the most positive.
Using a dictionary approach to estimate the sentiment index yields several in-
teresting results. The most surprising is, unquestionable, a concave inflation
objective with an implied inflation target beyond the banks’ mandate and best
described as ’above, but close to 2%’. Deviations from this bliss point appear
to lower the satisfaction, and hence the optimistic language in speeches. With
respect to the subordinate objective, I find a convex objective towards output
growth and a linear objective towards the unemployment rate. Furthermore, my
results suggest that deviations from the primary objective, the inflation rate, ap-
pear to have no greater e ect on the speeches’ language than deviations from
either of the subordinate objectives. In fact, in contrast to inflation, both out-
put and unemployment are consistently significant variables. Finally, contrary
to findings in the United States, financial market conditions have no significant
influence on the ECB’s sentiment.
In the third essay, Bernd Hayo, Kai Henseler, Marc Ste en Rapp, and I inves-
tigate the impact of central bank communication on financial markets. We are
particularly interested in the communication’s complexity and how it a ects fi-
nancial market trading. To examine this relationship empirically, we employ
high-frequency data from European stock index futures during the introductory
statement of the ECB’s press conferences. A readability test on the introductory
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statement during the press conference determines the statements’ linguistic com-
plexity. In conjunction with the central banks’ unique communication design,
we are able to separate the e ect of verbal complexity on trading during the
introductory statements and the subsequent Q&A session. Our sample contains
announcements of novel Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures (UMPM),
enabling us to investigate whether the content of the introductory statements
interacts with the reaction of traders to its linguistic complexity.
We find that the Q&A sessions are – in terms of linguistic complexity – less
complex and thus more comprehensible. When UMPM are announced, contem-
poraneous trading volumes are negatively correlated with complexity, resulting
in a temporal shift of trading towards the less complex Q&A session. This shift
is first indication that financial markets respond to linguistic complexity in a
context-specific manner. This line of reasoning is strengthened further by the
observation that events containing UMPM are less similar in terms of wording
to previous statements. As a result, we believe that financial market traders are
underreacting to novel complex information in introductory statements regard-
ing UMPM. The subsequent discussion and clarification of the cognitively costly
content during the Q&A session mitigates this e ect, shifting trading from the
introductory statement phase to the Q&A phase of the ECB’s press conference.
The final essay concerns the quantification of central bank communication, i.e. it
explores how text in monetary policy can be e ectively summarised and analysed.
Martin Baumgärtner and I propose a novel language model, build on machine
learning, as a tool to quantify central bankers qualitative information.
The necessity and feasibility of measuring central bank communication in this
manner stems from two major developments in the fields of monetary policy and
machine learning over the last two decades. On the one hand, central bankers’
communication, as well as its analysis, has increased substantially. This progress
necessitates some form of quantification of the qualitative components, a research
topic dominated by dictionary approaches. On the other hand, advances at the in-
tersection of linguistics and computer science enabled the use of machine learning
to train language models capable of adequately capturing the languages multidi-
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mensionality and context-dependence. The resulting models are regularly open
source. However, the technical jargon of central bankers renders them generally
unsuitable for use in the field. This essay aims to apply computational linguistics
research to monetary policy by developing a language model exclusively trained
on central bank communication.
To accomplish this, we gather a large and diverse text corpus, which we use to
compare a number of state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms. Choosing the
most promising, we develop a central bank specific language model.
Several applications are presented to showcase the broad applicability of our lan-
guage model. First, we propose a novel technique for comparing central banks,
a rming that similarity is driven by mutual objectives. Next, we construct a
time-series index that reflects the ECB’s willingness to act as a lender of last re-
sort. The index suggests that communication similar to Mario Draghi’s ’whatever
it takes’ speech can calm financial markets during times of high uncertainty. The
third application emphasizes the presence of prejudices even in central bankers’
technical language. We demonstrate how social patterns, such as occupational
gender distribution, are reflected in their communication. The final application is
a forecasting exercise that suggests that speeches may be more accurate predictors





Menschliche Interaktion, Kommunikation, sowie die Bildung sozialer Strukturen
ereignen sich in der Regel mittels natürlicher Sprache. Durch die hohe Dimen-
sionalität der Sprache war ein Großteil der reichhaltigen Informationen, die sich
aus diesen Interaktionen ergeben, den Wirtschaftswissenschaften bisher vorent-
halten. Jüngste technologische Fortschritte führen jedoch zu einer zunehmenden
Verwendung von Text als Datenbasis in ökonomischen Anwendungen. Diese
Entwicklung wurde durch die Rede des Nobelpreisträgers Robert J. Shiller vor
der American Economic Association "Narrative Economics" weiter beschleunigt,
in der er sich für eine stärkere Berücksichtigung von Narrativen – Geschichten,
die individuelle Entscheidungen und kollektive Handlungen beeinflussen – durch
die wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft einsetzt. In den letzten Jahren
wurden Forschungsarbeiten verö entlicht, die textbasierte Informationen nutzen,
um latente Variablen wie Unsicherheit zu quantifizieren, makroökonomische Vari-
ablen in Echtzeit zu prognostizieren und Vermögenspreise vorherzusagen.
Zur selben Zeit hat sich die Sichtweise der Geldpolitik im Hinblick auf die
Transparenz und Kommunikation der Zentralbank gewandelt. Statt Geldpolitik
auf Zinsmaßnahmen zu beschränken, ist die Kommunikation zu einem wichti-
gen Instrument im Werkzeugkasten der Zentralbanker geworden. Heute werden
Worte verwendet, um Erwartungen zu verankern und den von den Zentralbanken
gewünschten Gleichgewichtspfad zu unterstützen. Infolgedessen hat die Er-
forschung der Geldpolitik unermüdlich neue Methoden zum Messen von Text
und neue unstrukturierte Datenquellen wie Nachrichten, Pressekonferenzerk-
lärungen und Reden in ihre Forschung einbezogen. Die Literatur wird dabei
laufend durch eine Erweiterung der traditionellen empirischen Instrumente aus
dem Bereich des maschinellen Lernens ergänzt.
Die hier vorgelegte kumulative Dissertation besteht aus vier Aufsätzen, die
sich auf alle diese Bereiche beziehen, nämlich Text als Daten, Geldpolitik und
maschinelles Lernen. Mein Hauptaugenmerk liegt auf der Europäischen Zen-




In dieser Dissertation wird Text aus unterschiedlichen Quellen einbezogen und
mit unterschiedlichen Techniken analysiert, um unterschiedliche latente Variablen
zu ermitteln. Infolgedessen wird der Text manchmal als abhängige Variable und
manchmal als unabhängige Variable verwendet. Der erste Aufsatz zählt die
relative Häufigkeit von Begri en in EZB Presseerklärungen, um die Vielfalt
der Kommunikation der Zentralbank in Bezug auf ihre Themen anekdotisch zu
belegen, während der zweite Aufsatz sich auf positive und negative Begri e in
Reden konzentriert, um die latente Variable des Zentralbankverlustes zu appro-
ximieren. Im dritten Aufsatz werden die Auswirkungen sprachlicher Komplexität
auf Finanzmarktteilnehmer untersucht, und der letzte Aufsatz wendet sich an die
Computer-Linguistik zur Entwicklung eines neuartigen zentralbankspezifischen
Sprachmodells zur besseren Quantifizierung der geldpolitischen Kommunikation.
Im Folgenden finden Sie eine kurze Zusammenfassung der vier Aufsätze dieser
Dissertation.
Mein erster Aufsatz analysiert die regelbasierte Geldpolitik im Euroraum vor
und nach der Finanzkrise. Jonas Gross und ich argumentieren, dass das Um-
feld, in dem geldpolitische Entscheidungsträger agieren, weitaus komplexer ist,
als es traditionelle modellbasierte Analysen der geldpolitischen Regeln erlauben.
Wir ergänzen diese Sichtweise durch Erkenntnisse aus EZB-Pressekonferenzen,
die zeigen, dass die Zentralbank ein breites Spektrum an Themen jenseits der
traditionellen Taylor-Regel-Variablen diskutiert. Da jede Variable das Potenzial
hat, für das Verständnis der Reaktionsfunktion der Zentralbank relevant zu sein,
kombinieren wir eine Literaturanalyse mit der Auswertung von Pressekonferen-
zen, um eine Reihe potenzieller Einflussfaktoren zu ermitteln. Der traditionelle
Ansatz einer einzigen Zinsreaktionsfunktion wird dann durch die Anwendung von
Bayesian Model Averaging auf diese Determinanten gegenübergestellt. Da wir
eine große Anzahl von Determinanten mit einbeziehen, schätzen wir insgesamt
33.000 verschiedene Modellkombinationen.
Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die EZB entgegen der anhaltenden
Kritik bei ihren Zinsentscheidungen in erster Linie auf Änderungen in der In-
flation reagiert. Die Inflationsrate stellt in fast allen untersuchten Modellkom-
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binationen eine signifikante Variable dar. Darüber hinaus stellen wir fest, dass
die EZB auch auf Veränderungen bei Konjunkturindikatoren wie Arbeitslosigkeit
und Produktion reagiert. Wir stellen jedoch eine Verschiebung der Gewichtung
im Laufe der Zeit fest. Konjunkturindikatoren hatten vor der Finanzkrise für die
EZB Priorität, haben aber seitdem an Bedeutung verloren, was darauf hindeutet,
dass die Inflationsrate die einzige treibende Kraft für geldpolitische Entschei-
dungen seit der Krise ist. Abschließend bewerten wir unsere Ergebnisse anhand
von Textdaten aus den EZB-Pressekonferenzen, wo wir in Übereinstimmung mit
den vorherigen Ergebnissen die gleiche Verschiebung feststellen.
Mein zweiter Aufsatz konzentriert sich auf die Zielsetzung der EZB und quan-
tifiziert die Zufriedenheit der Zentralbank mit den aktuellen wirtschaftlichen Be-
dingungen anhand einer Textanalyse. Es wird angenommen, dass die EZB durch
die Maximierung einer impliziten Zielfunktion ein Inflationsziel verfolgt, dem die
Unterstützung der allgemeinen Wirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union un-
tergeordnet ist. Ich berechne die Zufriedenheit der Zentralbank anhand der öf-
fentlichen Kommunikation der Zentralbank, indem ich die Anzahl der positiven
und negativen Wörter in den Reden zähle. Dies ermöglicht es mir die Zielfunk-
tion zu quantifizieren. Unter Annahme einer typischen funktionalen Form kann
ich dann die optimalen Niveaus in Bezug auf Inflation und Wirtschaftstätigkeit
ermitteln, d.h. die Werte, bei denen die Kommunikation der Zentralbank am
positivsten ist.
Die Verwendung eines Wörterbuchansatzes zur Schätzung des Zielfunktion führt
zu mehreren interessanten Ergebnissen. Das überraschendste Resultat dürfte
die konkave Inflationszielfunktion mit einem impliziten Inflationsziel von ’über,
aber nahe 2%’ sein. Bei Abweichungen von dieser Inflationsrate wird die Sprache
in den Reden pessimistischer. In Bezug auf das untergeordnete Ziel stelle ich
eine konvexe Zielfunktion im Hinblick auf das Produktionswachstum und eine
lineare Zielfunktion im Hinblick auf die Arbeitslosenquote fest. Darüber hinaus
deuten meine Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Abweichungen vom primären Ziel, der
Inflationsrate, keinen größeren Einfluss auf die Sprache der Reden haben als
Abweichungen von einem der Sekundärziele. Im Gegensatz zur Inflation sind
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vielmehr sowohl die Produktion als auch die Arbeitslosigkeit durchweg
signifikante Variablen. Abschließend lässt sich feststellen, dass die Finanz-
marktbedingungen im Gegensatz zu den Ergebnissen in den Vereinigten Staaten
keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Reden der EZB haben.
Im dritten Aufsatz untersuchen Bernd Hayo, Kai Henseler, Marc Ste en Rapp
und ich die Auswirkungen von Zentralbank-Kommunikation auf die Finanzmärkte.
Wir interessieren uns insbesondere wie die Komplexität dieser Kommunika-
tion den Finanzhandel beeinflusst. Um ebendiese Beziehung empirisch zu
analysieren, verwenden wir Hochfrequenzdaten von europäischen Aktienindex-
Futures während der Einführungsstatements der EZB-Pressekonferenzen. Ein
Lesbarkeits-Test bestimmt die sprachliche Komplexität dieser Statements. In
Verbindung mit dem einzigartigen Pressekonferenz-Konzept der EZB sind wir
in der Lage, die Auswirkungen von erhöhter sprachlicher Komplexität auf den
Handel zu messen, sowie die E ekte zwischen der einleitenden Erklärung und der
anschließenden Q&A-Runde zu trennen. Da unsere Stichprobe Ankündigungen
unkonventioneller geldpolitischer Maßnahmen (UMPM) enthält, sind wir in der
Lage zu analysieren, ob der Inhalt der Erklärungen mit der Reaktion der Händler
auf ihre sprachliche Komplexität zusammenhängt.
Wir stellen fest, dass die Q&A-Runden – in Bezug auf die sprachliche Kom-
plexität – weniger komplex und damit verständlicher sind. Nur wenn UMPM
angekündigt werden, korrelieren die Handelsvolumina negativ mit Komplexität,
was zu einer zeitlichen Verschiebung des Handels in Richtung der weniger kom-
plexen Q&A-Runde führt. Diese Verschiebung ist ein erster Hinweis darauf, dass
die Finanzmärkte auf sprachliche Komplexität kontextspezifisch reagieren. Diese
Argumentation wird durch die Beobachtung verstärkt, dass Pressekonferenzen,
die UMPM enthalten, vom Wortlaut her weniger Ähnlichkeiten mit früheren
Konferenzen aufweisen.
Infolgedessen glauben wir, dass die Finanzmarkthändler auf neuartige kom-
plexe Informationen in einleitenden Erklärungen zu UMPM reagieren. Die
anschließende Diskussion und Erläuterung des kognitiv kostspieligen Inhalts
während der Q&A-Runde mildert den E ekt ab und verlagert so den Handel von
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der Phase der Einführungsstatements in die Q&A-Phase.
Der letzte Aufsatz befasst sich mit der Quantifizierung von Zentralbank-
Kommunikation, d.h. er untersucht, wie geldpolitische Texte e ektiv zusammen-
gefasst und analysiert werden können. Martin Baumgärtner und ich schlagen ein
neuartiges Sprachmodell vor, das auf maschinellem Lernen aufbaut.
Die Notwendigkeit und Durchführbarkeit, die Kommunikation von Zentralbanken
auf diese Weise zu messen, ergibt sich aus zwei wichtigen Entwicklungen im Be-
reich der Geldpolitik und des maschinellen Lernens in den letzten zwei Jahrzehn-
ten. Zum einen hat die Kommunikation der Zentralbanker, sowie deren Analyse,
erheblich zugenommen. Dieser Fortschritt erfordert eine Art von Quantifizierung
der qualitativen Komponenten, ein Forschungsthema, das von Wörterbuchan-
sätzen dominiert wird. Andererseits ermöglichten Fortschritte an der Schnittstelle
zwischen Linguistik und Informatik den zunehmenden Einsatz von maschinellem
Lernen. Die so trainierten Sprachmodelle können die Mehrdimensionalität und
Kontextabhängigkeit von Sprache adäquat erfassen. Die daraus resultierenden
Modelle sind in der Regel frei zugänglich. Aufgrund des Fachjargons der Zentral-
banker sind sie jedoch für den Einsatz in der Praxis im Allgemeinen ungeeignet.
In diesem Aufsatz wenden wir Computer-linguistische Forschung auf die Geld-
politik an, indem wir ein Sprachmodell entwickeln, das ausschließlich auf die
Kommunikation von Zentralbanken trainiert ist.
Zu diesem Zweck erstellen wir einen umfangreichen und vielfältigen Textkorpus,
mit welchem wir eine Reihe von modernsten Algorithmen für maschinelles Ler-
nen vergleichen. Wir wählen den vielversprechendsten aus und entwickeln ein
zentralbankspezifisches Sprachmodell.
Anhand mehrerer Anwendungen wird die breite Anwendbarkeit dieses Sprach-
modells aufgezeigt. Zunächst schlagen wir eine neue Methode zum Vergleich
von Zentralbanken vor, die verdeutlicht, dass die Ähnlichkeit durch gemein-
same Ziele bedingt ist. Anschließend konstruieren wir einen Zeitreihen-Index,
der die Bereitschaft der EZB widerspiegelt, als letzte Refinanzierung-Instanz zu
agieren. Der Index deutet darauf hin, dass eine ähnliche Kommunikation wie
Mario Draghis "whatever it takes"-Rede die Finanzmärkte in Zeiten großer Un-
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sicherheit beruhigen kann. Die dritte Anwendung unterstreicht das Vorliegen von
Vorurteilen, selbst in dem technischen Jargon von Notenbankern. Wir zeigen,
wie sich soziale Muster, z.B. die Verteilung der Geschlechter im Beruf, in der
Kommunikation der Zentralbanker widerspiegeln. Die letzte Anwendung ist eine
Prognoseübung, welche darauf hindeutet, dass Notenbankreden möglicherweise
genauere Vorhersagen ermöglichen, als die bisherige Forschung vermuten lässt.
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This paper analyzes the monetary policy of the European Central Bank
(ECB) both before and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis
in 2008. In the literature, researchers typically select one Taylor rule-
based model to analyze monetary policy of central banks and to derive
determinants for the interest rate setting. However, uncertainty about
the choice of this respective model is typically neglected. In contrast, we
apply a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to extend the Tay-
lor rule to account for model uncertainty driven by heterogeneity in the
ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing Council. Our results suggest
the following: First, the ECB focuses on the inflation rate when setting
interest rates. Second, economic activity indicators were in the focus of
the ECB before the financial crisis. Third, over the last decade, the role
of economic activity decreased, indicating that inflation is the main driver
of monetary policy decisions in the post-crisis period. Fourth, when set-
ting interest rates, central bankers appear to consider more than one model.
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1 WHAT IS ON THE ECB’S MIND?
1.1 Introduction
“The challenge for monetary policy in practice is to retain the virtues
of rule-based policy-making, while taking into account the complex, un-
certain and constantly evolving environment facing monetary policy-
makers.”
— European Central Bank (2001, p. 38)
Due to its pivotal role in monetary policy, the interest rate setting of central
banks is one of the most debated topics in the field of macroeconomics. When
setting its interest rates, the ECB advocates a rule-based approach while retaining
room for discretionary interventions. Generally, researchers apply the so-called
Taylor rule in order to analyze the interest rate setting (see Taylor, 1993). The
Taylor rule proposes that inflation and economic activity can well approximate
the short-term interest rate. Various studies suggest that this simple rule is a
powerful tool to approximate central bank interest rates under special conditions
(see e.g. Sturm and Wollmershäuser, 2008).
However, there are various reasons why applying a standard Taylor rule yields
misleading policy implications. First, it seems far-fetched to restrict decision-
makers to a monetary policy rule that captures su cient information about the
real economy in only two variables. Vítor Constâncio, former vice president of
the ECB, argues that
“the environment in which monetary policy-makers have to act is
much more complex than what is assumed in model-based analysis of
policy rules. [...] A simple rule that responds to one or two macroeco-
nomic variables and ignores all other indicators of price developments
is not able to account for the complexities of the real world.”
— Vitor Constancio (2017)
Second, monetary policy decisions are based on incomplete information and un-
certainties about the actual state of the economy. Hence, central bankers might
analyze a variety of di erent economic variables and indicators – besides the infla-
tion rate and economic activity – to obtain more accurate information about the
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state of the economy (see Milani, 2008; Lee, Olekalns, et al., 2013; Lee, Morley,
et al., 2015).
Third, in reality, central bankers might have more than one model in mind of how
the economy functions. The interest rate setting body of the ECB, the Governing
Council, consists of the presidents of the euro area national central banks and the
Executive Board. These central bankers have di erent backgrounds that might
a ect their attitudes towards relevance of certain variables such as inflation and
economic activity and the importance of indicators such as bond yields to a ect
those variables. Although we remain agnostic about the source of heterogene-
ity, central bankers di er with respect to their social, political, and academic
backgrounds. However, aside from potential heterogeneity between the di erent
members of the Governing Council, it can further be assumed that heterogeneity
exists within each central banker, i.e., that more than one reaction function is
in her mind. Such heterogeneity leads to di erent concepts about the transmis-
sion of shocks and the interaction of economic agents that might yield deviating
policy implications and interest rate recommendations. Therefore, we argue that
the standard Taylor rule should be extended to draw more precise inferences for
monetary policy.
We contribute to the current monetary policy literature by shedding light on the
ECB’s monetary policy decisions and analyze the potential shift of priorities due
to the global financial crisis in 2008. Our analysis focuses on the following two
key factors: Firstly, uncertainty about the form of the central bankers’ reaction
functions, and secondly, uncertainty about the magnitude of the coe cients in-
cluded in the specific reaction functions. We base our analysis on real-time data
and insights derived from textual analysis of ECB press conference statements.
Employing an empirical Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach allows us to
consider variables besides the ones included in the classical Taylor rule, and to
evaluate ≥33,000 model combinations of potential monetary policy determinants.
We consider a variety of variables and evaluate all model combinations with
respect to the observed data to determine the most likely models. Thereby, we
derive the ECB’s most likely interest rate determinants. Applying BMA in the
context of the ECB’s monetary policy is – to the best of our knowledge – a novel
3
1 WHAT IS ON THE ECB’S MIND?
approach and addresses a gap in the current literature.
Our key findings are as follows: First, the ECB focuses its decisions mainly on the
inflation rate measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).
Second, economic activity seems to be a key priority for the central bank before
the financial crisis. Third, our results suggest that the importance of economic
activity for the ECB’s monetary policy decisions decreased over the last decade.
Fourth, when setting interest rates, central bankers from the ECB tend to consider
more than one model. This finding supports the necessity to use model averaging
techniques in order to take model uncertainties in the context of monetary policy
into account.
Our paper is structured as follows: In section two, we identify the variables poten-
tially influencing the ECB’s monetary policy by a literature review and a textual
analysis of ECB communication. Furthermore, we motivate why one should con-
sider model uncertainty in the context of monetary policy. In section three, the
BMA approach is discussed. In section four the data used is discussed. In sec-
tions five and six, the estimation results are explained in detail, and robustness
checks are conducted. The last section concludes the paper.
1.2 The ECB’s potential interest rate determinants
In 1993, John Taylor proposed that the central bank-set short-term interest rate
i can be approximated according to the following rule:
(1.1) it = Z Õt— + Át
where — is a vector of reaction coe cients, Z a matrix of macroeconomic variables,
and Á an error term. In its initial specification, Taylor proposed the inclusion
of the macroeconomic variables inflation and a measure for economic activity
captured in the matrix Z.1 Quite surprisingly, this standard Taylor rule provided
a relatively good fit for the Federal Reserve (Fed)’s and ECB’s actual interest
1Note that Taylor (1993) assumes a constant real interest rate. However, in most advanced
economies there is growing evidence for a decline in real interest rates (see Del Negro, Giannone,
et al., 2019). We address this decline by dividing the sample period and presume a constant
real interest rate within those subsamples.
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rate path (see Gerdesmeier and Ro a, 2003; Sturm and Wollmershäuser, 2008).
This fit is illustrated in Figure 1.1, where we compare the actual ECB interest
rate and its Taylor rule-based approximations for the period from 1999 until
2018.2 We measure the ECB’s interest rate i by the Euro OverNight Index
Average (EONIA) rate (black line) and use two Taylor rule-based interest rate
approximations as comparisons: one measured using current inflation and output
(red dashed line) and one using expected inflation and expected output (blue
dotted line).3 Figure 1.1 provides anecdotal evidence for the following three
conclusions. First, both Taylor rules approximate the short-term interest rate
(relatively) well until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. Second, after the
outbreak, deviations became more severe, suggesting a more restrictive monetary
policy stance than actually conducted. The divergence between the actual interest
rate and the Taylor rule-based approximations indicates that a single reaction
function based on the standard Taylor rule might not be su cient to approximate
the actual short-term interest rate. Therefore, it seems unlikely that two variables
2The corresponding regression table can be found in Section A.1.
3Note that conclusions derived from Taylor rules based on actual data (backward-looking)
or based on expected data (forward-looking) can vary and, therefore, provide di erent policy
implications (see e.g. Svensson, 2003; Gerdesmeier and Ro a, 2003). The implications of
forward- and backward-looking specifications are further discussed in Section 1.2.1.
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are su cient to properly approximate the short-term interest rate.
Consequently, we argue in line with Milani (2008) that the central bankers in
charge do not seem to follow one single model when setting interest rates. In-
stead, the ECB’s interest rate setting can be best approximated by using a variety
of models. Considering di erent models is equivalent to assume that each cen-
tral banker has a model about the economy in mind and her model is assigned
some probability of being chosen to represent the aggregated Governing Council
decision.
We use textual analysis of the ECB’s communication as an additional instru-
ment to analyze the ECB’s monetary policy reaction functions. To be precise, we
analyze introductory statements of the ECB’s press conferences, the o cial com-
munication instrument of the central bank to the general public. Using textual
analysis on these statements, we provide evidence to include further variables
in the reaction function. A word cloud of the introductory statements (see Sec-
tion A.2) shows that the ECB discusses myriads of di erent variables and indica-
tors, each, at least implicitly, a potential indication for some reaction by central
bankers to the respective variable. Even though the ECB mentions ‘inflation’
and ‘output’ in the introductory statements frequently, those two variables do
not encompass all of the attention. Also other variables, e.g., related to financial
stability and commodity prices, are discussed by the ECB frequently. Therefore,
the introductory statements indicate that additional variables might play a role
for the ECB.
We do not choose our variables with a view to the Taylor rule, but follow an
‘unbiased’ approach by using a three-step procedure to identify potential deter-
minants. In a first step, we derive these variables from the monetary policy
literature. In a second step, we eliminate variables that were not mentioned in
papers analyzing the ECB’s monetary policy in a rule-based environment at least
once. In a last step, we identify variables that the ECB presidents referred to in
their introductory statements. An overview of all potential determinants can be
found in Section A.3.
Note that two aspects are beyond the scope of this paper: First, we do not
examine whether these additional variables enter the ECB’s monetary policy
6
1 WHAT IS ON THE ECB’S MIND?
framework on their own or as an instrument, i.e., by a ecting other variables
such as inflation and economic activity. Therefore, the derived variables from
the estimated reaction functions do not necessarily reflect the determinants of
the central banks’ objective function. As a result, causal interpretation should
be regarded with caution. Second, we do not claim to estimate the ‘true’ ECB
reaction function since the Governing Council’s monetary policy discussions are
not provided to the general public. By using exclusively public information, we
analyze the public perception of an ECB monetary policy reaction function rather
than a private – ECB internal – reaction function.
1.2.1 Business cycle variables
Inflation and output According to its o cial mandate, the ECB’s primary
objective is to maintain price stability (see Article 127 §1 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union). Since 2003, price stability is defined as the
medium-term annual growth of the HICP of below but close to two percent (see
European Central Bank, 2019a). A second, subordinated, objective of the ECB is
to support the general economic policies of the European Union (EU) (see Article
127 §1 and Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
This objective is often interpreted as considering economic activity, i.e., output
and unemployment, when setting interest rates. Due to their pivotal roles, it
is not surprising that the terms ‘inflation’ and ‘output’ are used frequently in
the communication of the ECB. These terms account for more than 1.3% of all
words used in press conference statements, i.e., ‘inflation’ is mentioned almost
2000 times and ‘production’ and ‘output’ 142 times. Therefore, we are confident
that inflation and output are relevant for the ECB’s reaction functions.
Note that the actual indicators measuring inflation and economic activity are
discussed heavily. While various Taylor rules use actual data for inflation and
output, Svensson (2003) argues that a standard Taylor rule focusing on backward-
looking data is not optimal as those variables a ect monetary policy with a lag.
Therefore, he suggests to use inflation and output expectations as applied in Sauer
and Sturm (2007) and Gerlach (2007). Further, it is ambiguous whether the ECB
focuses on HICP inflation, core inflation (see Gerlach, 2007), or commodity prices.
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In our analysis, we use both backward-looking and forward-looking inflation and
output as well as core inflation, and commodity prices.
Unemployment Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU speci-
fies full employment as one objective of the EU. Therefore, the euro area-wide
unemployment rate could be relevant for the ECB’s interest rate decision. Fur-
thermore, the state of the labor market can be interpreted as an indicator for
economic activity (see Molodtsova and Papell, 2013). Textual analysis supports
the importance of unemployment. Terms containing the word ’employment’ are
mentioned more than three times as often (429 times) as the terms ’production’
or ’output’.
1.2.2 Financial markets variables
One of the most prominent extensions of the standard Taylor rule is with respect
to the stability of financial markets (see Peek, Rosengren, et al., 2016). We
identified various channels through which financial stability could influence the
ECB’s interest rate setting (see Kaefer, 2014).
Credit measures Credit growth is suspected to impact financial stability via
two channels: Firstly, asset bubbles could emerge if credit is massively invested in
asset markets. Secondly, credit-financed consumption and investment could lead
to a non-sustainable level of debts, which negatively influence economic activity.
The term ‘credit’ is mentioned more than 600 times in the ECB’s communication.
Euro exchange rate If a currency appreciates, exporters become less com-
petitive, driving a decline in output and inflation. This appreciation might lead
to capital inflows potentially creating asset bubbles. Holders of the appreciated
currency experience financial gains, and consumers adjust inflation expectations.
The relevance of the exchange rate is emphasized by the ECB mentioning the
exchange rate more than 100 times.
Euro area government bond yield A decrease in the government bond yield
eases refinancing cost for countries and is expected to work as a stimulus for the
8
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respective economy. Furthermore, Roskelley (2016) stresses the forward-looking
component of government bond yields. Terms such as ‘government debt’, ‘gov-
ernment deficit’, and ‘government bond’ are mentioned more than 100 times in
the ECB press conferences.
Stock prices The inclusion of asset prices, such as stock prices, follows a sim-
ilar argumentation as the inclusion of the exchange rate.4 An increase in asset
prices can lead to a rise in output and inflation through increased consumption
(consumption smoothing) and investments. Thereby, stock prices include rele-
vant information about future inflation. Terms related to stock and asset prices
appeared more than 170 times in ECB communication. Additionally, in the cur-
rent literature, researchers use market volatility as a measurement for financial
stability (see Albulescu, Goyeau, et al., 2013; Bleich, Fendel, et al., 2013). Since
we analyze a wide information set, we include stock prices as well as volatility
measures.
Financial stress indicator The global financial crisis revealed that insta-
bilities in the financial sector can impact financial stability. Hollo, Kremer, et
al. (2012) constructed an indicator measuring systemic risk and contemporane-
ous stability in the financial system, the so-called Composite Index of Systemic
Stress (CISS). The index aggregates information beyond the above-mentioned
channels about the current instability of the financial system. ‘Stress’ is men-
tioned almost 30 times in ECB communication.
Money supply One important component of ECB’s policy strategy is the mon-
etary analysis. In the long run, an expansion in the monetary base is expected
to drive inflation (see Friedman, 1963; Belke and Klose, 2010). Money supply
(’M3’) is mentioned more than 500 times in the ECB communication analyzed.
4Note that we do not include property prices as property prices typically adjust slowly due
to market frictions and infrequent valuations since transactions are conducted seldom. As a
result, the response to central banks’ monetary policy measures takes place with a considerable
lag. Therefore, property prices may reflect long-term interest rate expectations (e.g., forward
guidance) and do not solely react to actual short-term monetary policy changes.
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1.2.3 Further variables
Economic policy uncertainty Political and economic uncertainty could en-
courage individuals to postpone investment and consumption decisions. Aastveit,
Natvik, et al. (2013) argue that, in the presence of uncertainty, individuals react
more cautiously to interest rate decisions. In order to ensure e ective monetary
policy measures, central banks would have to act more aggressively to achieve
their objectives. Furthermore, Philip Lane, the chief economist of the ECB, ar-
gues that uncertainty can a ect the wage-setting of companies (see Lane, 2019).
Due to the relevance of uncertainty (mentioned 280 times), we include Baker,
Bloom, et al.’s (2016) economic policy uncertainty index for the euro area.
Trade deficit Obstfeld and Rogo  (2005) and Ferrero, Gertler, et al. (2010)
argue that trade flows capture information on future currency movements. Hence,
the trade balance can be suspected to be a source of inflationary pressures. The
ECB mentions ‘trade’ almost 70 times.
Interest rate smoothing Note that we do not account for interest rate
smoothing as we assume that the central bank monitors a variety of di erent
indicators and variables when setting interest rates. Therefore, the central bank
reacts to di erent economic signals – both positive and negative – that provide
mixed interest rate implications indicating a smooth response as positive and
negative signals yield an inert interest rate response.5 Milani (2004) argues that
"the explicit introduction of a wider information set is [...] itself a cause of
interest rate smoothness".
1.3 Estimation approach
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the ECB’s monetary policy under
the assumption that central bankers consider a multitude of models containing
a wide information set. In this section, we briefly summarize the methodology
5This hypothesis is later supported when analyzing BMA-based monetary policy reaction
functions.
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of Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA).6 Using a BMA approach allows us to
account for model uncertainty and to assess and evaluate every feasible model
combination that can be constructed from a predefined dataset based on the
potentially relevant variables identified in Section 1.2.
In previous publications, BMA was already applied to account for model uncer-
tainty in economic contexts, e.g., by analyzing determinants of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth (see Koop, 2003; Fernandez, Ley, et al., 2001b), and ex-
change rate crises (see Cuaresma and Slacik, 2009). Milani (2008), Lee, Olekalns,
et al. (2013), and Lee, Morley, et al. (2015) were the first to use a BMA approach
in the context of monetary policy.
Lee, Olekalns, et al. (2013) estimate a ‘meta Taylor rule’ – i.e., they characterize
monetary policy with reference to the Taylor rule – for the United Kingdom using
data from 1972 until 2010 and for Australia from 1972 until 2011. Lee, Morley, et
al. (2015) use a similar approach for deriving monetary policy reaction functions
for the United States, analyzing data from 1972 until 2008. Both papers apply
the BMA approach in the context of monetary policy to account for uncertainties
with respect to the duration of monetary policy regimes and the specification of
the Taylor rule. While both do not consider variables beyond the standard Taylor
rule, i.e., inflation and economic activity, they also address regime uncertainty
– an aspect we do not focus on in our analysis.7 Whereas Lee, Olekalns, et al.
(2013) and Lee, Morley, et al. (2015) estimate a three-digit number of models, we
evaluate approximately 33,000 di erent models and, therefore, consider a wider
range of di erent variables and resulting models. A wide range of variables is also
used in Milani (2008) making his approach most similar to ours. In his setup,
also variables beyond the ’classical’ Taylor rule are included as potential determi-
nants – di erent to Lee, Olekalns, et al. (2013) and Lee, Morley, et al. (2015), but
6We refer the interested reader to more comprehensive BMA literature such as Fernandez,
Ley, et al. (2001a), Milani (2008), Zeugner and Feldkircher (2015), and Moral-Benito (2015).
We mainly follow the notation of Moral-Benito.
7Lee, Olekalns, et al. (2013) and Lee, Morley, et al. (2015) specifically analyze the impact
of monetary policy regimes, e.g., related to the stability of the policy responses to economic
conditions, policy horizons, or the presidents of the respective central bank. In this paper, we
di erentiate between the period before the global financial crisis (1999–2008) and the period
during and after the crisis (2008–2018). Therefore, we consider two di erent ‘regimes’, but do
neither address the role of di erent presidents, nor changes independent of the global financial
crisis.
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in line with our approach. However, Milani (2008) applies BMA for the United
States considering data from 1979 only until 2001.
In contrast to Milani (2008), Lee, Olekalns, et al. (2013), and Lee, Morley, et
al. (2015), we analyze the ECB’s monetary policy of the last two decades and
take structural changes around the financial crisis and the emergence of the Zero
Lower Bound (ZLB) into account. Furthermore, we integrate elements from tex-
tual analysis to allow for more systematic insights. Our paper is – to the best of
our knowledge – the first to use BMA in the context of monetary policy around
the financial crisis and, generally, the first to analyze ECB’s monetary policy us-
ing BMA.
We implement the BMA approach in the following way: First, we specify the
ECB’s short-term interest rate as the dependent variable y. Second, we choose a
set of independent variables potentially influencing the dependent variable (Z).
The matrix Z consists of all potential regressors that were identified and discussed
in Section 1.2. Third, we perform the actual BMA estimation and evaluate all
possible linear combinations of these regressors.8 Uncertainty about the (subjec-
tive) choice of the ‘true model’ vanishes as not only one single model is analyzed,
but rather all possible model combinations. For every model, the regression coef-
ficients captured in the vector —̂ are estimated via Bayesian techniques. As a last
step, we compute the average coe cient weighted by the respective likelihood of









where —̂j is the coe cient estimate of model j and wj is the respective weight. In
the following, —̂ is referred to as the posterior probability and w as the posterior
model probability.
8Note that the integration of interaction terms or other non-linear parameters is still an
open research topic in BMA and, therefore, excluded from our analysis.
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1.3.1 Bayesian model averaging
The following linear model is considered:
(1.3) yt = Z Õt— + Át
Át ≥ N(0, ‡2)
where yt is the interest rate and Zt is a vector of k explanatory variables at
time t. — is the k-dimensional vector of regression coe cients and Át is a vector
of error terms, which follows an univariate normal distribution with zero mean
and variance ‡2. With k being the amount of possible regressors, we observe
model space M = {Mj : j = 1, . . . , 2k} and coe cients — = {—j : j = 1, . . . , 2k}
with each model j having k individual beta coe cients. By applying Bayes rule,
the posterior probability – the distribution of the estimated coe cient vector
conditional on one specific model j and the underlying data – can be derived as
follows:




Equation (1.4) states that the posterior probability p(—j|y, Mj) is calculated by
multiplying the likelihood p(y|—j, Mj) with the probability p(—j|Mj) divided by
the marginal likelihood p(y|Mj).9 Note that the marginal likelihood is constant
over all models and is, therefore, a multiplicative term. Thus, the marginal
likelihood is not in the focus of our analysis since it does not depend on —, which
we seek to examine in this paper.
The inclusion of own information – so-called priors – is one of the key features of
Bayesian modeling. In this way, a researcher defines distributional assumptions,
e.g., of a coe cient or a model space, before observing the data. Note that the
prior choice expresses subjective beliefs and has to be set with caution. In this
paper, p(—j|Mj) is referred to as the prior on the parameter space expressing our
belief about the probability distribution of —j. In Section 1.3.2, di erent model
prior specifications are discussed.
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As a next step, we aggregate the posterior distributions over the whole model
space using an aggregation weight wj. The posterior model probability p(Mj|y)
is used as a weight since it indicates the degree of support for model Mj. Applying
Bayes rule yields this posterior model probability:







Equation (1.5) states that the posterior model probability – the probability of
selecting model j – depends on the marginal likelihood p(y|Mj), the marginal
probability p(Mj), and the integrated likelihood p(y). Note that the integrated
likelihood does not vary across models and is, therefore, only a multiplicative
term. To compute the posterior model probability, a second prior needs to be in-
troduced (p(Mj)). This prior specifies the distribution over the model space and
expresses our belief about the probability of choosing model Mj before observing
the data.
As a next step, a weighted average of all individual posteriors probabilities is com-
puted to obtain one full posterior distribution. As a weight, the posterior model
probability from Equation (1.5) is used. Hence, the full posterior distribution can





This full posterior distribution allows us to analyze coe cients across all mod-
els. We examine economic relevance of the included variables by estimating the
expected value E(—BMA|y) and the variance V (—BMA|y) of each coe cient. Both









V (—j|y, Mj)p(Mj|y) + [E(—j|y, Mj) ≠ E(—j|y)]2p(Mj|y)(1.8)
To identify relevant variables, we analyze the Posterior Inclusion Probability
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(PIP) and rank the most relevant regressors based on their fit. The PIP for
variable h can be computed as follow:




A variable with a high PIP indicates that the variable is included in a variety of
relevant models and can, thus, be considered robust. We define variables with a
PIP > 0.15 as robust.
1.3.2 Definition of priors
In this section, we specify the priors on the parameter space p(—j|Mj) from Equa-
tion (1.4) and on the model space p(Mj) from Equation (1.5).
Prior on the parameter space We follow Koop (2003) and specify a nor-
mal distribution with zero mean for the distribution of the coe cient to put as
less (subjective) information on the distribution as possible before observing the
data. For the variance, we apply the g-prior proposed in Zellner (1986), who
introduced an additional parameter g into the variance structure.10 The vector
of the estimated coe cients — of model j, therefore, follows the following normal
distribution:
(1.10) —j|‡2, Mj, g, X ≥ N(0, ‡2g(X ÕjXj)≠1)
In line with the BMA literature, the standard deviation parameter ‡ is assumed
to be equal in all models and is set as an uninformative prior, as proposed in Fer-
nandez, Ley, et al. (2001a) and Zeugner and Feldkircher (2015)11:
(1.11) p(‡) Ã 1
‡
10The popularity of the g-prior variance specification is mainly due to the facts that (1) a
closed-form solution for the posterior distributions exists reducing computational issues, (2) the
variance of the coe cient only depends on the scaling parameter g as ‡ is equal in all models
(see Moral-Benito, 2015), and (3) a penalty for large models is included.
11Note that the prior choice p(‡) does not influence the estimation results since ‡ is equal in
all models and, therefore, has the same implications for every model (see Koop, 2003).
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Therefore, the expected value of —j can be expressed as follows (see Zeugner and
Feldkircher, 2015):
(1.12) E(—j|Mj, g) =
g
1 + g —̂
j
OLS
Equation (1.12) shows that by using the g-prior, the expected value of the
coe cients can be expressed as a convex combination of the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimator —̂j
OLS
and the prior mean (zero). By specifying g, the
researcher indicates how much importance she puts on the prior belief. A small g
expresses a high weight of the prior mean. In the case g æ 0, the expected value
of the coe cient converges to the prior mean (zero). In the case g æ Œ, the
estimated value approaches the OLS estimator, neglecting the prior completely.
This prior structure yields a likelihood p(y|Mj, X, g) that is similar to R2 and
includes a penalty for large models.
In the literature, three di erent possibilities for the specification of g are con-
sidered primarily, namely the Unit Information Prior (UIP) proposed by Kass
and Raftery (1995) (g = t), the Risk Inflation Criterion (RIC) by Foster and
George (1994) (g = k2) and the Benchmark Prior (BRIC) by Fernandez, Ley,
et al. (2001a) (g = max(t, k2)). In our estimation, we apply the BRIC prior as
it combines the UIP and the RIC by using the maximum g of both candidates.
We thereby put as little importance on the prior as possible. In Section 1.6.1, we
show that our results are robust to di erent prior specifications.
Prior on the model space The prior on the model space p(Mj) defines the
expectation about the number of regressors the researcher believes to be included
in the true model. For example, if the prior is set to five the researcher expects the
dependent variable to be most accurately explained by five independent variables.
Hence, the researcher can use the prior on the model space to express a preference
for smaller or larger models. We assume that the model size   follows a binomial
distribution, specified as   ≥ Bin(k, ◊), where ◊ is the prior inclusion probability
for each variable. Therefore, model Mj with k regressors has a prior model
16
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probability of
(1.13) p(Mj) = ◊kj (1 ≠ ◊)k≠kj
In the following, we consider two approaches for implementing this prior on the
model space, namely through a binomial distribution and a binomial-beta distri-
bution. Both priors have the advantage of being easy to implement but have the
disadvantage of neglecting multicollinearity issues, i.e., that the probability that
a regressor will be included in a model is observed separately.12 In other words,
the inclusion or elimination of one variable does not change the probability of any
other regressors being included. Our approach to address the multicollinearity
issue is discussed in Section 2.5.
(a) Binomial (uniform) model prior. Using a binomial approach, the ex-
pected model size can be expressed as:
(1.14) E( ) © m = k◊
Milani (2008) sets ◊ = 1/2, allocating the highest probability (and the expected
value) to models that contain k/2 variables. An alternative is to set ◊ < 1/2. This
specification increases the likelihood of smaller models and could take limitations
in human cognitive abilities into account. In other words, it can be suspected
that central bankers tend to consider primarily small models. We implement
several specifications for ◊ accounting for a lower probability of large models.
Note that our results indicate a tendency towards small models, independent of
the specification of ◊.
(b) Binomial-beta prior. Ley and Steel (2009) suggest the use of a hyperprior
on the inclusion probability ◊. This specification makes ◊ random, in contrast to
the binomial distribution, where ◊ is fixed. Ley and Steel suggest to use a beta
distribution for the hyperprior, i.e., ◊ ≥ Beta(a, b). The use of such a binomial-
12Multicollinearity can lead to outcomes that highly correlated variables are included in the
models causing biased estimation results.
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beta prior leads to an expected model size of
(1.15) E( ) © m = a
a + bk
Ley and Steel (2009) propose a = 1 and b = (k ≠ m)/m expecting the researcher
to specify – similar to the binomial prior – only the expected model size m.





Equation (1.16) indicates that the selected binomial-beta distribution results in
a posterior probability that is equal for each model size. Thereby, it reduces
the subjective influence concerning the expected model size which minimizes the
impact of the prior choice by the researcher. While the probability distribution
is centered around the expected model size for a binomial distribution, in the
case of a binomial-beta distribution, the probability distribution of the posterior
is flat for all models.
1.4 Data
In this section, we discuss the data used in our BMA analysis. Note that we
focus on real-time data, which allows a more comprehensive understanding of the
perceived central bankers’ reaction to macroeconomic data. Orphanides (2001)
provides evidence that monetary policy implications based on revised (not real-
time) data are inaccurate as the data used by policy-makers and researchers does
not align. He argues that revisions constitute new information about previous
data points, not available to policy-makers at that point in time. Since the ECB
acknowledges that macroeconomic variables were subject to significant revisions
(see European Central Bank, 2010), it is essential to use real-time information.
We obtain such real-time data from the ECB’s own Real Time Database (RTD).
Due to the following three factors, we argue that the RTD represents an accurate
information set available to ECB central bankers. First, using the RTD allows to
merge low frequency macroeconomic data such as GDP or inflation with higher
18
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granular financial data such as asset prices or exchange rates. Second, it seems
reasonable to assume that policy-makers primarily consider own information.
Third, the RTD contains the latest macroeconomic data, relevant for the central
bankers, as revisions are usually published on the day before the monetary policy
decisions.
However, the RTD does not contain data for all the variables discussed in the
previous sections. In particular, expectation data of macroeconomic variables,
such as inflation, economic activity, and unemployment, are not included. We
obtain expectation data from the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
The remaining data is obtained from various sources (see Section A.3).13
The interest rate set by the ECB’s Governing Council is the Main Refinancing
Operations (MRO) rate. However, the presence of the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)
and the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures do not favor the MRO
as an appropriate representation of the short-term interest rate. Instead, we use
two alternatives: First, we consider the EONIA rate. The EONIA rate is applied
in Taylor rules, e.g., in Fendel and Frenkel (2006) and Castro (2011). Second, we
consider the Wu and Xia shadow rate for the euro area (see Wu and Xia, 2016)
since it captures additional information from unconventional monetary policy
measures such as forward guidance or asset purchase programs.
Figure 1.2 highlights only minor deviations between the EONIA and the shadow
rate from 2008 until 2011. However, the divergence between the two rates in-
creased from 2011 onwards – with the EONIA being restricted by the ZLB –
and reached a gap of more than five percentage points from 2017 onwards. The
shadow rate (s) is applied as the dependent variable for the period after the
outbreak of the global financial crisis when unconventional monetary policy mea-
sures were introduced. We set the date for the outbreak of the financial crisis
to September 15th, 2008. On that day, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was
o cially declared. Therefore, the short-term interest rate y is comprised of the
13For most data, the only transformation was to compute annual growth rates to reduce
stationarity. One exception is the output gap. We calculated the output gap by applying the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter on real-time data for real GDP. Note that this is di erent from the
method applied in Taylor (1993). Instead of real-time data, he uses an end-of-sample measure
and constructs his data of the output gap from the deviation of actual real GDP from a constant
trend real GDP.
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1.5 Results
In the following section, we discuss the main results of our BMA analysis. We
apply the BRIC g-prior on the parameter space and a flat binomial-beta distribu-
tion on the model space. These specifications are chosen in order to put as little
(subjective) information on the priors as possible. As described in Section 1.4,
the EONIA rate and the Wu and Xia shadow rate have been combined as the de-
pendent variable. As we discuss in the next chapter, our main findings are robust
across di erent prior specifications. We run the regressions in R, using the BMS
package by Zeugner and Feldkircher (2015). To account for multicollinearity, we
use Cuaresma and Slacik’s (2009) approach and neglect all regressors with a cor-
relation14 higher than |0.6|.15 In total, we estimated 2k = 215 ¥ 33,000 di erent
14We recognize the limitation of using bivariate correlations as a representation for multivari-
ate relationships. For further discussions, see Hayo (2018).
15Actual unemployment, expected inflation, and money growth were excluded from the re-
gression due to strong correlation. We have conducted a range of robustness checks to see if
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Table 1.1: Regression results
1999 – 2018 1999 – 2008 2008 – 2018
PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean
HICP Inflation Rate 1.000 1.095 0.736 0.313 0.941 0.776
(0.169) (0.216) (0.273)
Unemployment (expected) 1.000 -0.666 0.239 -0.068
(0.111) (0.136)
Output Gap (expected) 0.986 1.708
(0.438)
Output Gap (actual) 0.967 0.500
(0.179)
Observations 216 114 102
Note: Only robust variables with a PIP Ø 0.15 are presented.
models for the time period from April 1999 until March 2018 aggregating the
respective model-specific estimation results to obtain one average e ect for every
regressor.
1999–2018 The main results of the regression are shown in Table 1.1. The first
column shows the regressor, the second the PIP – the aggregated probability of
the models including the respective variable –, and the third the post mean – the
average marginal e ect – with the standard deviations denoted in brackets.
The main results for the period from 1999 until 2018 are the following: First, the
HICP inflation rate is included in all relevant models, indicated by a PIP of 100%.
Therefore, our results suggest that the current inflation rate is indeed primarily
considered when the ECB sets interest rates. The central bank reacts to an 1
percentage point increase in the annual inflation rate by increasing the interest
rate on average by 1.1%. However, the inflation coe cient’s standard error equals
0.17. Thus, the Taylor principle cannot be confirmed with reasonable statistical
significance. Second, expected unemployment has a PIP of 100% as well. The
coe cient is negative, indicating that the central bank reacts to an increase in
the expected unemployment rate with expansionary monetary policy. Third, no
further variables are considered in the majority of the models, i.e., no variable
our choice has altered the outcomes. The primary findings appear to be selection independent.
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Figure 1.3: Ten Top Models (whole period).
1999 − 2018
Cumulative Model Probabilities
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has a PIP > 15%.
Next, we consider individual models. Figure 1.3 provides an overview of the ten
‘best-performing’ models ranked by their respective model inclusion probabili-
ties. The higher the model inclusion probability, the higher the likelihood that
this specific model represents the ‘true’ model. The cumulative model probabili-
ties – an aggregated likelihood of models considered – are shown on the horizontal
axis and the relevant regressors on the vertical axis, i.e., the variables that are
included in the models with the highest likelihood. Gray color indicates a positive
sign of the respective coe cient, while black color indicates a negative sign. The
model that can explain the data in the most precise manner (the ‘top model’)
has a model probability of 71%, i.e., the best individual model out of 215 models
has a likelihood of 71%. This specific model includes only the two (robust) vari-
ables, namely inflation and expected unemployment with the expected signs. The
model with the second highest likelihood additionally includes the e ective Euro
exchange rate that yields a likelihood of approximately 7%. The next best model
with the inflation rate, unemployment, and credit growth has a model likelihood
of approximately 3%. Thus, the figure indicates that model probabilities are not
evenly distributed across a large number of heterogeneous models. Restricting
the analysis to one single model – a common approach in classical model-selected
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Taylor rules – would neglect relevant model probabilities. Therefore, using our
ten top models instead of a two variable Taylor rule increases the cumulative
model probability from 71% to almost 90%.
1999–2008 A crucial question is whether the ECB altered its monetary policy
strategy after the financial crisis. One approach to detect a potential systemic
change in the perceived ECB reaction function is to observe the communication
of the central bank. Figure 1.4 illustrates the relative frequency of terms related
to inflation and economic activity mentioned in ECB press conferences over time.
Analyzing the relative frequency, we find evidence for a gradual shift from unem-
ployment and output towards inflation. To account for this potential shift, we
separate the time periods during and after the crisis explicitly from the period
before the financial crisis.16 The main results for the pre-crisis period are dis-
played in Table 1.1 in columns four and five: First, the output gap seems to be
the main determinant of the ECB’s interest rate. Both the expected output gap
– based on expectations – and the actual output gap – based on previous data
– are robust and significant. Both variables are included in almost all models
with the expected sign: An increase in the output gap leads, on average, to an
increase in the interest rate. The coe cient for the expected output gap (1.7) is
higher than the coe cient for the actual output gap (0.5). This reaction is in line
with the ECB’s o cial objective to support economic activity in the euro area.
Quite interestingly, the coe cient for the actual output gap equals Taylor’s initial
calibration from 1993. However, Taylor includes only one measure of economic
activity – a key di erence to our empirical results. Note that the focus on the out-
put gap is in line with the communication of the ECB. As discussed previously,
the fraction of output-related terms decreases over time (see Figure 1.4).
Second, the HICP inflation rate is again robust (PIP = 0.74), although with a
lower coe cient. Note that for the pre-crisis period the Taylor principle can be
significantly rejected. Third, the expected unemployment rate is included in a
minority of the models (PIP = 0.24) with the expected sign. Unemployment is
only included in two out of the ten top models (see Figure A.2). Therefore, our
16Note that we use the term ‘post-crisis’ for the time period after the financial crisis although
it actually includes both the period of the crisis itself as well as the post-crisis period.
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Figure 1.4: Relative Frequency of Selected Terms in ECB Communication.
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results suggest that some central bankers – prior to 2008 – saw unemployment as
an important determinant to consider in the context of monetary policy but the
majority favored the output gap as a measure for economic activity. Note that,
overall, the unemployment rate coe cient is not statistically significant. Fourth,
further indicators, such as the exchange rate or stock market prices, only enter
the minority of the models (PIP Æ 0.15) and are, thus, not considered robust.
To summarize, our results suggest that the main determinants of the ECB’s mon-
etary policy for the period before the financial crisis are related to the business
cycle. These findings are in line with the o cial mandate of the ECB to account
for both the development of inflation and economic activity. However, the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union specifies that the two objectives are
hierarchical in a sense that the ECB mainly focuses on inflation and only sub-
ordinately on the business cycle. Our result do not confirm this hierarchy. We
find a stronger focus on economic activity than on inflation, indicated by a higher
posterior mean, a higher PIP, and that the Taylor principle cannot be confirmed.
Focusing on individual models (see Figure A.2), the top model includes the (ac-
tual and expected) output gap and the HICP inflation rate (PIP = 31%). The
ten top models yield a cumulative model probability of 62%. Therefore, the re-
sults provide again evidence to favor averaging techniques when analyzing the
monetary policy of the ECB.
2008–2018 Next, we analyze the ECB’s monetary policy in a post-crisis con-
text. The main results for the post-crisis period are displayed in Table 1.1 in
columns six and seven. The findings suggest a shift in the ECB’s monetary pol-
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icy strategy. On the one hand, inflation stays highly robust. In the post-crisis
period, the PIP is even higher and indicates that HICP inflation is included in
almost all models. The sign of the coe cient is again positive and the magni-
tude of the coe cient is higher compared to the pre-crisis period. Therefore,
our results suggest that the ECB shifts its focus towards the inflation rate after
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. For this period, we can neither reject nor
confirm the Taylor principle. On the other hand, none of the economic activity
measures – actual and expected output gap, and unemployment – are robust for
the post-crisis period (PIP Æ 0.15).
The results suggest that the focus of the ECB shifted from considering both
inflation and economic activity in the pre-crisis period to solely considering the
HICP inflation rate in the post-crisis period. This finding is supported by evidence
from the ECB’s communication, showing that, in the post-crisis period, the ECB
mentions terms related to inflation more often and terms related to economic
activity less often. The ten top models have a cumulative model probability of
80%. The top model only includes HICP inflation and yields a likelihood of 55%.
Short summary To sum up all periods, our results cannot confirm that the
ECB does not account for the inflation rate. Both in normal times and in times of
crisis, inflation is included in the majority of the relevant models. Furthermore,
we find evidence that the ECB reacts to the expected unemployment rate and
the output gap. To be precise, our results suggest that the ECB seems to focus
its monetary policy decisions after Lehman bankruptcy mainly on the HICP
inflation rate, while before the financial crisis both inflation and economic activity
measures seem to be relevant. However, the size of the inflation coe cients
provide evidence that the Taylor principle might not be fulfilled.
Model size Next, we draw inferences on the number of included regressors in
the interest rate setting by evaluating the distributions of the posterior model
sizes. Figure 1.5 plots the posterior model sizes for the di erent time periods.
The black density plot refers to the period from 1999 until 2018 (whole period),
the blue one from 1999 until 2008 (pre-crisis), and the gray one from 2008 until
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The figure indicates that the distributions of the model sizes vary slightly with
respect to their means. Depending on the specification, the average number of
determinants in the monetary policy reaction functions are 2.4 (whole period),
3.7 (pre-crisis), and 1.6 (post-crisis). Hence, these results correspond to our
previous findings in Table 1.1, i.e., that the ECB seems to consider fewer variables
after the financial crisis when setting interest rates. However, independently of
the time period considered, large models with more than five regressors seem
unlikely. Hence, the ECB’s monetary policy is best approximated using medium-
sized models with between one and five variables.
Model fit Next, we analyze the model fit of the ten top models via an in sample
prediction. The main results are presented in Table 1.2 and can be summarized
as follows: First, an improvement in explanatory power for the whole period
can be reached by using BMA. If we compare the BMA-derived ten top models
with the two standard Taylor rules (see Section 1.2), the goodness of fit improves
according to the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between 28% and 33%. This im-
provement could potentially be caused by overfitting. However, it is unlikely that
overfitting is the sole driver of the better fit since we demonstrated that the de-
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Table 1.2: Model Fit Evaluation
MSE AIC BIC
Taylor rule (backward looking) 5.30 376.72 390.31
Taylor rule (forward looking) 4.95 361.38 374.97
BMA 1999 – 2018 3.55 302.16 339.54
BMA 1999 – 2008 & 2008 – 2018 1.89 163.16 200.54
rived ten top models include only a few variables. To further examine overfitting,
we evaluate our results using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as alternative measures for goodness of fit.
For both criteria, we find similar improvements.17 Therefore, we argue that the
improvement in fit is predominantly driven by increased information provided by
the additional regressors.
Second, the separation between pre- and post-crisis periods leads to a further sub-
stantial improvement in fit as indicated in Table 1.2, with a decrease in the MSE
by more than 60%. Moreover, we find similar improvements when controlling for
the higher amount of variables in both the AIC and BIC. Figure 1.6 compares
the BMA-derived interest rate approximations with the actual short-term interest
rate captured by the EONIA and the shadow rate. Until 2015, both BMA approx-
imations provide similar results with little variation. Afterwards, the two BMA
approximations diverge substantially. The increase in the BMA-derived interest
rate for the whole period (red dashed line) suggests more restrictive monetary
policy measures in that period. The specification separating the whole period
in the pre- and post-crisis period (blue dotted line) supports the expansionary
monetary policy stance to a higher degree. The separated specification advocates
an interest rate higher than the shadow rate, but still below the ZLB. At the
end of our observation period, the gap between our two BMA approximations
is more than 2%. Note that inflation as the main determinant in the post-crisis
period has steadily increased since the end of 2015 leading to a divergence from
the shadow rate.
17AIC and BIC are more appropriate criteria compared to the MSE. AIC and BIC introduce
a trade-o  between overfitting and underfitting by including a penalty increasing with the
number of regressors. To analyze the robustness of our results, we conservatively estimate both
measurements with the maximum number of possible variables instead of the actual maximum
model size.
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1.6 Robustness checks
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results. Robustness checks are
conducted with respect to (1) prior modifications, (2) a varying date of the begin-
ning of the financial crisis and (3) the use of a di erent dependent variable. We
conclude that our results are robust across a multitude of model specifications.
1.6.1 Priors
In a first robustness check, we modify the priors. As mentioned in Section 1.3.1,
priors are chosen subjectively by the researcher. Therefore, it is essential to
conduct robustness checks to di erent prior specifications.
Prior on the model space In the benchmark case, we apply a flat binomial-
beta model prior. However, as described previously, one could assume that central
bankers favor small models. Therefore, as a robustness check, we apply a di erent
binomial-beta prior, thereby putting a higher weight on small models (m = 2).
Results are illustrated in Section A.5. The findings are similar to the benchmark
case. If the whole time period is considered, inflation and the expected unem-
ployment rate are again the only robust variables and the respective posterior
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means are almost identical. When separating the pre-crisis and post-crisis pe-
riod, the findings with respect to the PIPs and coe cient estimates do not vary
substantially, as well. To summarize, if a higher weight is put on smaller model
sizes, the key findings remain the same.
Prior on the parameter space Next, we alter the prior on the parameter
space. In the benchmark case, we apply the BRIC g-prior. Note that this prior
combines the RIC and the UIP. As long as k2 > N , the BRIC equals the RIC.
In our case (k = 15 and N = 216), the RIC dominates the UIP. Hence, applying
the RIC rather than the BRIC does not alter the outcomes. The results for a
robustness check using the UIP prior are shown in Section A.5. The findings
are (again) almost identical with respect to the PIP and the posterior means
compared to the benchmark case. To summarize, applying di erent priors on the
parameter space leads to similar results.
1.6.2 Starting date of the crisis
In our benchmark case, the beginning of the financial crisis is set to the day of
Lehman’s bankruptcy, where also macroeconomic data indicated an upcoming
recession. However, one can also date the beginning of the financial crisis 13
months earlier, precisely on August 9, 2007. On this day, the inter-banking
market in the euro area broke down and the ECB provided additional funding for
banks (see Stark, 2010). We, therefore, perform another robustness check altering
the starting date of the financial crisis. Results are shown in Section A.5. In the
pre-crisis period, the robust variables are almost identical to the benchmark case
and most of the PIPs and post means are similar, with two exceptions: Firstly,
the expected unemployment rate is not robust anymore. Secondly, the inflation
coe cient decreases and becomes insignificant. For the post-crisis period, the PIP
of inflation increases from 0.94 to 1.00 and the coe cient increases almost twofold
to 1.22. To summarize, redefining the starting date of the crisis pronounces our
main result for the post-crisis period even more, namely that inflation becomes the
most relevant determinant in the post-crisis period as the PIP and the coe cient
size increases.
29
1 WHAT IS ON THE ECB’S MIND?
1.6.3 Endogenous variable
In this robustness check, we substitute Wu and Xia’s (2016) shadow rate with the
EONIA rate in the post-crisis period, i.e., we use the EONIA rate for the whole
period from 1999–2018 as our endogenous variable. The findings of the robustness
check are shown in Section A.5. For the whole period, the results are qualitatively
similar. However, the coe cients are – due to the lower variance in the endoge-
nous variable – smaller. Note that the results for the pre-crisis period remain the
same. For the post-crisis period, the findings from the benchmark case seem to be
confirmed qualitatively, as inflation still appears to be a main determinant of the
ECB’s monetary policy. Besides the inflation rate, the expected unemployment
rate is robust and significant. Few other variables tend to be robust – the output
gap, commodity prices and core inflation –, but are neither economically relevant
nor statistically significant. In summary, our benchmark results are robust and
qualitatively independent of the selection of the endogenous variable.
1.7 Conclusion
Over the last decade, the standard Taylor rule, using inflation and economic ac-
tivity to approximate the ECB’s short-term interest rate, has lost substantial
explanatory power. This divergence might indicate that central bankers consider
other variables beyond those suggested in Taylor (1993) and employ di erent
models when setting interest rates. In this paper, we mainly attribute this diver-
gence to model uncertainty. We analyze a wide arrow of potential determinants
that we derive from the literature and textual analysis of the ECB’s press con-
ference statements. Using a BMA approach enables us to assess and evaluate
every feasible model combination constructed from the variables identified. This
approach has – to the best of our knowledge – not been applied previously in
the context of the ECB’s monetary policy and, therefore, addresses a gap in
the current literature. Our derived reaction functions aim to provide clarity for
understanding the ECB’s monetary policy and allow both researchers and the
general public to draw conclusions about potential determinants of the ECB’s
monetary policy. By separating pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, we account for
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a potential shift in the central bank’s monetary policy strategy.
Our key findings are the following: First, our results indicate that, irrespective
of the period analyzed, the inflation rate is a robust determinant. However, our
analysis suggests that the inflation coe cient is not statistically significantly dif-
ferent from one. Therefore, we do not find evidence that the Taylor principle is
fulfilled. Second, the importance of inflation in terms of robustness and coe cient
magnitude increased over time. In fact, for the last decade, inflation appears to
be the only robust determinant. This result seems to be in accordance with the
communication of the ECB. Third, we find that the robustness of the output gap
has decreased over the last decade. Fourth, small single-digit models, including
between two and seven variables, approximate the ECB’s monetary policy most
precisely. Fifth, the distribution of model probabilities shows that no single model
can su ciently explain the observed data. This finding rea rms using model av-
eraging methods when evaluating monetary policy of central banks rather than
selecting one single – e.g., standard Taylor rule-based – model. Nonetheless, we
can explain most of the variation in the interest rate by analyzing only ten mod-
els.
This paper provides a first analysis of applying model averaging techniques for
the ECB interest rate setting. Future research could extend the model averaging
approach as follows: First, dilution priors could be incorporated into BMA appli-
cations as an alternative approach to account for multicollinearity issues. Second,
whereas BMA has already been applied to monetary policy of other central banks
(e.g. Lee, Morley, et al., 2015), our approach incorporates novel techniques – such
as textual analysis and analyzing a broader range of variables – and enables the
determination and comparison of monetary policy reaction functions of di erent
central banks. Applying this approach to the interest rate setting of other cen-
tral banks, such as the Fed or the Bank of England, could provide an interesting
comparison of similarities and di erences of monetary policy strategies of global
central banks. Third, future research could put a higher focus on accounting for
heterogeneity, i.e., by considering macroeconomic developments of specific euro
area countries and not euro area aggregates. Finally, in our analysis, we neglect
regime uncertainty in the spirit of Lee, Morley, et al. (2015). Accounting for dif-
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ferent regimes may add another dimension to our understanding of how central
banks conduct monetary policy.
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2 Above, but close to two percent. Evidence on
the ECB’s inflation target using text mining
Johannes Zahnerb
Abstract
Due to its o cial mandate, the European Central Bank (ECB) is assumed
to maximize an implied objective function that leads it to pursue inflation
with a subordinate focus on economic activity. This objective is – by its
very nature – di cult to quantify. My paper tries to decipher information
regarding the ECB’s objective through the use of text mining on all public
speeches between 2002 and 2020. The findings of my analysis suggest
a concave objective regarding the inflation rate. The implied inflation
target is best summarized as an inflation rate of ’above, but close to 2%’.
Deviations from this target lead to a reduction in the optimism of the
institutions’ communication. Furthermore, my results suggest a convex
objective towards output growth and a linear objective towards the unem-
ployment rate, with a preference for higher GDP growth and employment
independently of the current level. The hierarchical order in the ECB’s
mandate does not always appear to be consistent with my findings. De-
viations from its primary objective, the inflation rate, appear to be of
no greater concern than deviations in its subordinate objective. Finally,
in periods of heightened uncertainty, there is an additional decrease in
sentiment.
Keywords: Sentiment Analysis, ECB, Monetary Policy, Public Perception.
JEL classification: E53, E58, E61.
bCorresponding author. School of Business and Economics, Institutional Economics Re-
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"We communicate what we are trying to achieve, and how we go about
achieving it. In practical terms, this means that communication re-
volves around providing a narrative about the economy and the outlook
for price stability relative to our objective."
— Peter Praet (2014)
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, the relevance of narratives and perception in explaining
macroeconomic phenomena gains importance in the economic discourse (Shiller,
2017). Monetary policy is thereby no exception. As stated in the quote at the
beginning of this paper, the ECB recognizes that the role of monetary policy is
not limited to actions, but that words are a powerful tools for anchoring expec-
tations and self-enforcing a desired equilibrium path. Since the e ectiveness of
monetary policy depends on the belief of the general public in the inflation tar-
get (Diron and Mojon, 2005), the central bank invests enormous e orts to shape
expectations around this institution. This e ort is related to the ECB’s success
in maintaining its target and mandate of price stability.
However, in the current environment of persistently low inflation, the potential of
abandoning the asymmetry in the current target (Blot, Creel, et al., 2019) or the
2% reference and raising the inflation target in an e ort to anchor inflation ex-
pectations at a higher level are frequently discussed (e.g. Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia,
et al., 2010; Ball, 2014). The ECB’s internal evaluations of its monetary policy
strategy reveal that the central bank is not indi erent to these debates. In May
2003, the central bank clarified its inflation objective by adding the component
"close to [2% inflation]" to its existing definition of price stability, and in June
2021, it moved to a "symmetric 2% inflation target" (European Central Bank,
2021, p. 7).
However, there may remain ambiguity about the central bank’s objective func-
tion. According to Miles, Panizza, et al. (2017), the euro area’s low inflation
expectations may be due to the ECB’s target’s double asymmetry: On the one
hand, because of the de facto inflation ceiling before 2021 and the resulting un-
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likely anchoring of inflation around 2%, and on the other hand, because of the
vagueness surrounding what the term "close to" actually means. Furthermore,
while it is widely assumed that the function has some relationship towards infla-
tion and economic activity, specific quantitative measurements of the function’s
shape are unknown. In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the history of the
ECB’s objective functions by building on the work of Shapiro and Wilson (2019)
in approximating it using semantic information from the central bank’s public
communication.
The ECB asserts that in recent years, communication of its monetary policy has
become increasingly more important, both to experts and to the general public
(European Central Bank, 2021). The central bank has various communication
channels that target such a broader audience. Alongside its blog, podcast, and
’ECB Listens’-events, the primary means of ECB communication to a wider audi-
ence are still public speeches. Consequently, over the last two decades, members
of the ECB Executive Board held more than 2,000 speeches, and thereby pro-
vide an abundance of qualitative information of central bankers elucidating their
objectives to the general public. The aim of this paper is to quantify this qual-
itative data through the use of text mining, which allows for the approximation
of otherwise intangible objectives.
Taking advantage of the heterogeneity in economic conditions – i.e. inflation and
economic activity – allows me to approximate the communicated objective func-
tion of the ECB. Ultimately, I will be able to identify the respective bliss point
towards the variables in this function. This means that speeches become more
pessimistic (optimistic), above and below the maximum (minimum) – implying
an articulated target. My findings suggest that the ECB communicates an in-
flation target that is "above, but close to 2%". I find further evidence that the
subordinate objective of promoting the general economic policy of the EU is best
aligned with a relationship where the central bank favors better economic condi-
tions, unconditionally of the present level. Furthermore, my findings suggest that
speeches respond equally strongly to changes in economic activity as to changes
in the inflation rate. Moreover, speeches become more pessimistic over time, even
when controlling for macroeconomic and financial variables.
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The contribution of this work is to be found in the areas of text mining, mon-
etary policy, and public perception. Using text mining techniques, this paper
contributes to a better understanding of the perception of monetary policy in the
euro area. It is, to my best knowledge, the first work on the monetary policy
objective function, using text analysis on speeches the euro area.
This paper is structured in the following order. The second section provides a
brief literature overview of text mining applications in the central bank commu-
nication literature. Next, the empirical approach to estimate the latent inflation
target is introduced. The text-mining approach used to derive the endogenous
variable, as well as the underlying datasets for the exogenous variables, are dis-
cussed in depth in the fourth section. The results and their implications are
addressed in the fifth section before the final section concludes this paper.
2.2 Literature review
The relevance of communication as a monetary policy instrument has increased
substantially in central banking. Blinder, Ehrmann, et al. (2008) identify four ra-
tionalizations that require communication by a central bank, including the degra-
dation of asymmetric information between the general public and the central
bankers. The content of this asymmetric information could originate from a va-
riety of sources. It may regard the outcome of previous policy votes (Meade,
2005), the content of committee members’ deliberations (Hansen, McMahon, and
Prat, 2018), or the central bankers’ risk balance assessment (Hanson and Stein,
2015). As a result, there is a myriad of applications where tone variations in
monetary policy communication are used to evaluate market responses.18 Re-
actions to changes in sentiment were found by asset price markets (Schmeling
and Wagner, 2019), sovereign yield spreads (Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015), and
short-term interest futures (Rosa and Verga, 2008). Furthermore, improvements
in the predictability of future monetary policy decisions, using sentiment analysis
(Apel, Blix Grimaldi, et al., 2019; Baranowski, Bennani, et al., 2021), have been
found.
18The terms ’tone’ and ’sentiment’ are used substitutable throughout this paper. In Sec-
tion 2.4.1, sentiment will be defined as a measure of optimism in one’s language.
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The number of applications using of text mining in analyzing central bank com-
munication has increased substantially thanks to the rise in computational power
and the abundance of available text. Inherent in those papers – as in mine – is
the assumption that market participants believe a central bank obeys a coher-
ent systemic approach that allows for the inference with respect to its parame-
ters. However, while earlier text mining literature assumed central bankers would
communicate coherently and and observe market reactions to changes in commu-
nication, my analysis concentrates on changes in communication in response to
variation in economic conditions. To be precise, my paper concentrates on the
institutionalized objective function underlying the ECB and thus the communi-
cated objectives towards inflation and economic activity that it implies.
The closest papers in this respect are by Shapiro and Wilson (2019), Paloviita,
Haavio, et al. (2020), and Fraccaroli, Giovannini, et al. (2020). Shapiro and
Wilson provide the econometric model – shown in the next chapter – applied
in this paper. The authors use internal meeting transcripts of FOMC meetings
to estimate the central banks’ inflation objective using sentiment analysis. The
FOMC had no explicit inflation target before 2012. Nevertheless, it has long
been assumed to be close to ECB’s. However, Shapiro and Wilson (2019) find
an implicit inflation objective of 1.5% for the FOMC, substantially lower than
the expected 2%. Their estimated inflation target prevails at 1.5%, even when
considering public speeches and a dual mandate. Finally, the authors find that
the central bankers’ sentiment is heavily a ected by output growth – rather than
changes in the unemployment rate – and stock market performance. However,
they remain agnostic whether this result is driven by the perceived predictive
power of financial markets or by central bankers’ reactions to financial variables
in general.
The main di erence between Shapiro and Wilson (2019) and my paper is the un-
derlying text corpus, the resulting magnitude of the implied inflation coe cient
as well as the factors influencing the sentiment of central bankers. Whereas the
former focuses on transcript of FOMC meetings, my analysis uses public infor-
mation from the Executive Board members of its European counterpart. Their
estimated inflation target prevails at 1.5%, even when considering public speeches
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and a dual mandate – the most analogous regression to mine. Contrary, my find-
ings suggest that the ECB – which had an explicit inflation objective since its
beginning – maintains a communicated inflation target above 2%. Moreover, my
results suggest that sentiment of the ECB Executive Board is primarily driven by
economic conditions (the unemployment rate and output gap), whereas financial
variables do not have any significant a ect.
Paloviita, Haavio, et al. (2020) replicate the results of Shapiro and Wilson (2019)
employing a di erent empirical approach19 for the euro area relying on the ECB’s
introductory statements. The authors find an implicit 1.7% inflation target. How-
ever, when allowing for a flexible inflation target and including the output gap, the
implicit inflation target rises to 2.3%. My paper di ers primarily in the method-
ology, as well as – again – in the underlying text corpus and the magnitude of
the implied inflation target. In Section 2.4.1, I demonstrate that, in contrast
to speeches, the use of these introductory statements has the disadvantage of
increasing similarity over time, which may explain the discrepancy in results. In
terms of magnitude, my results consistently indicate a target that is significantly
higher than 2%.
Finally, Fraccaroli, Giovannini, et al. (2020) employs sentiment analysis and topic
modeling in ECB, FOMC, and Bank of England (BoE) parliamentary hearings.
They find that the respective central banks’ objectives strongly influence the top-
ics discussed, and that the current unemployment rate, in particular, is a strong
predictor of sentiment during those hearings.
2.3 Econometric model
This paper aims to empirically identify the latent inflation target that is com-
municated by the ECB by the use of sentiment analysis. It thereby follows the
econometric approach for identification presented by Shapiro and Wilson (2019).
In short: the method approximates the central bank’s loss by a semantic index.
Assuming a traditional New-Keynesian loss function, allows me then to estimate
the central banks’ implied inflation target using current inflation data.
19The authors estimate a symmetric piecewise linear loss function and find the implied infla-
tion target via a grid search.
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Following the textbook literature (e.g. Gali, 2015; Walsh, 2017), a central bank
is modelled to minimize a loss function. Assuming that its members share one
function, the utility loss Lt at time t can be described as
(2.1) Lt = fî2t + „ŷt
where fît (ŷt) represent deviations in inflation (economic activity) and „ the rel-
ative weight on economic activity. Note that both, the inflation gap and the gap
in economic activity, are latent variables, i.e. can not be directly observed. They
are defined as the di erence of the observable current inflation fit (current eco-
nomic activity yt) and the target inflation fiú (target economic activity yú) – the
variable at interest in this study. Consequently, Equation (2.1) can be written
with fît = fit ≠ fiú and ŷt = yt ≠ yú.
The inclusion of an inflation and an economic activity term in the monetary pol-
icy loss function stems from the o cial mandate ECB set out in the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union. The Treaty specifies two objectives that
the ECB must adhere to in hierarchical order. Article 123 §1 sets out the pri-
mary objective of maintaining price stability in the medium term. A subordinate
objective of promoting the general economic policies of the European Union is
laid out in Article 3. This is usually interpreted as an objective regarding output.
However, as one of the European Union’s explicit targets relates to employment
levels, the unemployment rate is sometimes used as an appropriate indicator (e.g.
Molodtsova and Papell, 2013). In Section 2.6, I present findings with respect to
both hypotheses, a measure for output and unemployment as economic activity
terms, demonstrating irrelevance of this choice to the overall results.
One essential presumption in the following analysis is that public statements of
the central bank contain information that can be approximated by the tone of
those discourses. In the communication literature on monetary policy, this prin-
ciple has been applied numerous times. For instance, Bennani and Neuenkirch
(2017) demonstrate that central bankers’ sentiment in public communication is
a ected by current economic conditions and Bennani, Fanta, et al. (2020) provide
evidence that this sentiment could be used as a predictor for future interest rate
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decisions. My paper continues with this practice of suggesting that speeches are
a communication device used to inform the public about a central bank’s ob-
jective and, thus, the words chosen in a speech can approximate that objective.
Assuming that the loss function from Equation (2.1) can be approximated by
a sentiment index Si,t, the sentiment for speaker i at time t can be written as
follows:
Si,t = “i Lt
¥ —0,i + —1 fî2t + —2 ŷt + ‘t.(2.2)
The introduction of a speaker-specific constant allows for personal and unique
communication nuances between the speakers that are unrelated to the objec-
tive. This constant also ensures that the Executive Board’s composition does
not a ect the estimated loss function. The necessity of this speaker specific term
is further elaborated in Section 2.4.1, where the heterogeneity of the Executive
Boards’ communication is addressed. Disassembling the latent variables into its
components, Equation (2.2) can be reformulated as:
Si,t = —0,i + —1 (fit ≠ fiú)2 + —2 (yt ≠ yút ) + ‘t
=  i + —1 fi2t +   fit + —2 yt + ‘t(2.3)
with  i = —0,i +—1fiú2 +—2yú and   = ≠2—1fiú. Thus, the communicated inflation






Assuming that the perceived quadratic loss function can be approximated by the
sentiment index, Equation (2.4) enables me to calculate the global minimum or
maximum in the loss function with respect to the inflation rate. In other words,
if the members of the ECB’s Executive Board communicate an objective, which
is, say, concave to the inflation rate, the sentiment in its speeches should be the
highest – the most positive – if the current inflation is equal to fiú. At this point,
the deviation from the inflation target is e ectively zero, which in turn minimizes
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Equation (2.1).
2.4 Data
Following from the previous section, a sentiment indicator (Si,t) as well as data
on the objectives – inflation (fit) and economic activity (yt) – is required. Hence
this section’s focus is twofold. The estimation of the dependent variable, i.e. the
sentiment index, is discussed first. The second part dicusses on the right-hand
side macroeconomic variables.
2.4.1 Sentiment Index
Studies quantifying central bank communication di er mainly in two aspects: the
underlying text corpus and the method of quantifying the information in the text.
With respect to the underlying text corpus, most research on the ECB focuses on
the organization’s introductory statements to the monthly press conference fol-
lowing its monetary policy decision. While this permits for coherent observations
– with constant time, location and communicator – it has two shortcomings: few
observations and increasing similarity. Using exclusively press conference state-
ments disregards much of the potentially relevant information the central bank
provides to market participants. To be explicit: There are ten times the num-
ber of speeches compared to press conferences throughout my observation period.
This larger amount of observation renders the quantification simpler. In addition,
speeches remain heterogeneous in their language throughout the observation pe-
riod as opposed to the press conference texts. Amaya and Filbien (2015) find the
similarity of the ECB’s press statements increased about fivefold between 1998
and 2014. A graphical illustration of both observations is provided in Figure 2.1,
where each red squares present one ECB’s introductory statement and each green
triangle a speech. It is apparent that the public speeches between 2002 and 2020
do not exhibit such non-stationarity behavior in the similarity index.
Although not as abundant as studies on press conferences, there exists literature
that investigates the ECB’s communication beyond press statements. Signifi-
cant contributions were made through the analysis of media coverage (Bennani,
Fanta, et al., 2020), tweets (Masciandaro, Romelli, et al., 2020) and speeches
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Figure 2.1: Similarity of ECB speeches.
Similarity index between two months Similarity index within a month













Notes: The plot above illustrates three similarity indices estimated by Amaya and Filbien’s
(2015) measurement. Similarity is estimated as the occurrence of the same bigrams in two
consecutive months (left plot) and within a month in di erent speeches (right plot) against
time. Consequently, a high similarity (near one) is a sign for homogeneous texts, and the
similarity is low (near zero) for heterogeneous text. The appendix provides a brief overview
as to what bigrams are and a summary of Amaya and Filbien’s (2015) index. The author’s
calculations for all three indices are available upon request.
(Hayo, Kutan, et al., 2008; Bennani and Neuenkirch, 2017; Gertler and Horvath,
2018). My work is closely related to the latter two studies, however, I use a novel
dataset that enables me to evaluate all of the central bank’s Executive Board
public speeches. The speech corpus used in this analysis is larger in size, covers a
longer time period and is uniform in terms of the organization represented. Thus
di erences in tone nuances can be attributed to the individual, rather than the
speaker’s organisation.
For the calculation of the sentiment index, I rely on the speech dataset provided
by the ECB itself (European Central Bank, 2019b). The corpus contains (all)
public speeches made by members of the Executive Board between January 1998
and January 2020. The dataset provides information on 2150 speeches, including
the name of the speaker, the title, the subtitle, the date, and, of course, the text
of the speech itself. Due to the missing observation in the dataset, I am forced
to discard speeches held before January 2002. In addition, restrictions on word-,
sentence- and speech-level are implemented.
To begin with, I convert all words to lower case and remove numbers and special
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signs. On the sentence level, I follow the convention of Shapiro and Wilson (2019)
to include only sentences concerning economic content. Therefore, each sentence
must contain at least one economic word or phrase as defined in the Oxford Dic-
tionary of Economics (Black, Hashimzade, et al., 2017). This restriction intends
to remove the non-economic parts of the speech – like obligatory thank-you re-
marks in the beginning. Although the dictionary is quite exhaustive, with more
than 3,500 words and phrases, almost one-third of the sentences in the corpus
do not pass this restriction. On the speech level, my restriction follows Bennani
and Neuenkirch (2017), whereby each speech must contain at least 25 of the
’economic sentences’ defined above. Imposing these restrictions yields a corpus
of 1,915 speeches and roughly 170,000 sentences from 21 board members over a
time horizon of 18 years.
There are di erent ways to reduce the dimensionality of such a dataset – i.e. to
quantify text. The interested reader is referred to more comprehensive literature
on textual analysis such as Gentzkow, Kelly, et al. (2019) and Bholat, Hansen,
et al. (2015). The three most common methods are based on manually rating
text by hand, enabling a computer to rate text according to a predefined dic-
tionary and unsupervised machine learning techniques. This paper relies on the
dictionary approach – often called a ’bag-of-words’ – to calculate a sentiment
index, using a predefined lexicon to count positive and negative terms. In recent
years, the ’bag-of-words’ approach on central bank communication text has been
applied to the ECB (Tobback, Nardelli, et al., 2017), the Bundesbank (Tillmann
and Walter, 2018), the FOMC (Apel, Blix Grimaldi, et al., 2019) and the Riks-
bank (Apel and Grimaldi, 2014), among others.
Regarding the lexicon, Loughran and McDonald (2011) provide evidence that
the frequently applied Harvard dictionary causes misleading results when ap-
plied in the financial sector. Instead, they developed their lexicon, identifying
around 2,700 words that are classified as either positive or negative. Although
their dictionary is heavily biased towards negative terms – the updated dictionary
contains 2,355 negative terms and only 354 positive terms – I will later show that
the average sentiment estimated with this lexicon is not significantly di erent
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Table 2.1: Statistic summary of Sentiment Index
Number of sentences Negative terms Positive terms Sentiment score Si,t
Mean 91.14 47.78 36.66 -0.06
Std. dev. (51.76) (38.69) (23.73) (0.36)
Note: Descriptive statistics of our variables based on a total of 1,915 observations. The
Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary is used to determine positive and negative
terms. Sentiment is estimated according to Equation (2.5).
from zero.20
Following the literature on central bank communication (Bholat, Hansen, et al.,
2015) the sentiment index Si,t is estimated by the relative fraction of positive mi-
nus negative terms. After removing positive and negative words that are preceded
by "not" – as recommended by Loughran and McDonald (2016) – the sentiment









Using Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) dictionary, the average speech contains
approximately 48 negative terms and 37 positives. The resulting mean sentiment
score is therefore ≠0.06. However, with a standard deviation of 0.36, the average
sentiment is not significantly di erent from zero. The index’s statistical summary
can be found in Table 2.1.
In order to assess time-dependent developments, the average monthly sentiment
and its standard deviation are graphically illustrated in Figure 2.2. Two notewor-
thy observations arise. First, there seems to be no adjustment in the sentiment
during economic downturns (grey bars). One might expect the sentiment of those
speeches to reflect the economic condition during the crisis, however, there is no
evidence in this graphical representation. Second, there appears to be a shift from
predominantly positive communication in the 2000s to largely negative commu-
nication in the 2010s. Given that monetary policy in the 2010s was dominated by
the presence of the e ective lower bound and inflation rates that are considerably
below the explicit target, this observation provides first anecdotal evidence that
20An example text for illustration purposes is provided in Section B.1.
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 Monthly standard deviation Recession
Notes: The plot above shows the monthly average sentiment index over time. In addition the
standard deviation for each month is illustrated by the shading around the curve. Recessions
are illustrated according to the organization of Economic Development (OECD) based recession
indicator for the euro area. The author’s calculations are available upon request.
the sentiment index measures the institutions’ objective and therefore contains
useful information. This interpretation should be regarded with caution, as given
the small number of observations per month this shift is not statistically signifi-
cant.
Although the index appears to be stationary, a unit root rest (Dickey and Fuller,
1979) on the sentiment scores cannot be rejected. To control for such non-
stationarity, I include a delayed sentiment term into the regression. Since speeches
do not occur on a regular basis (e.g. once every month), there are two possibili-
ties to include such a term. In the baseline regression, the sentiment term from
the previous speech is included, averaging the sentiment score when more than
one speech was held on a single day. However, suspecting that a central bankers
sentiment in a particular speech might be a ected by the ’general’ mood of her
peers during speech writing, I also control for the lagged sentiment variable with
the average sentiment of the previous month in one robustness check.
Before moving on, it is important to highlight three potential shortcomings of the
text corpus. Table B.1 in the appendix provides an extended summary statistic
for each Executive Board member, outlining the first two. First, the number
of speeches each speaker delivered in the underlying text corpus di ers greatly.
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Notes: The plot above is an illustration of Table B.1 in the Appendix. The author’s calculations
are available upon request.
Some Executive Board members (in particular Jean-Cleaude Trichet) deliver far
more speeches than others. Second, the speaker’s average sentiment varies con-
siderably across speakers as illustrated in Figure 2.3. This may suggest that there
are members in the ECB’s Executive Board who are generally more positive (or
negative) in their communication. Note that the statistical rule of mean reversal
appears to adhere to the sentiment scores, since the average score of the three
most frequent speakers (Jean-Claude Trichet, Benoit Coeure, and Mario Draghi)
can be found at the center of the distribution. Consequently, this indicates that
variations in sentiment between speakers may be due to limited observations,
and not to speaker’s heterogeneity. Nevertheless, with those limitations in mind,
the deviations are considerable. The most extreme (Philip Lane with -0.31 and
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell with 0.27) are almost 0.6 index points apart. In abso-
lute terms, this would imply a di erence of 57 positive expressions between those
two in an otherwise average speech. Note that the di erence is substantial with
an average of only 37 positive terms per speech (see Table 2.1). Therefore, in
order to control for such diversity in communication, I include a speaker-specific
constant in the regression model (see Equation (2.2) in the previous section) and
thereby measure only the deviation from their mean.
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Finally, it is not clear whether the information provided is of relevance. In partic-
ular, it is important to question whether the speaker provides information on the
objective function of the institution. Hayo and Neuenkirch (2013) argue that the
setting of a public speech might prevent a speaker from revealing true preferences,
but adjust their language to the respective regional auditorium.21 However, de
Jong and van Esch (2014) argue that a public event may force the speaker to ex-
press her opinion on the o cial role she represents. That is particularly important
for a central banker trying to shape expectations. Therefore, the sentiment index
may represent the objective function as perceived by the employee. Implicit in
this argument is the assumption that the members of the ECB Executive Board
have a coherent function – and therefore an inflation objective – in mind when
communicating, and only di er in word choice due to individual semantic pref-
erences and their perception of the shared objective. The result would be the
heterogeneity of speeches for which I control.
2.4.2 Inflation, Output and Unemployment
This second subsection focuses on the variables used to represent the objectives –
i.e. inflation, output, and unemployment – and the need for real-time data in the
analysis. In combination with the day-specific sentiment scores, this enables me
to replicate accurately the information set available to the general public when
listening to a speech.
Orphanides (2001) provides evidence that monetary policy regressions with re-
vised data sets can lead to inaccurate findings. Since the ECB has acknowl-
edged significant revisions of macroeconomic variables (European Central Bank,
2010), it is important to use unrevised data – real-time data – for the question
at hand. I utilize real-time information provided by the ECB through its Real
Time Database. The database collects revisions of macroeconomic variables in
the Monthly Bulletin. By treating each revision as new information to the general
public, I am able to create a real time dataset for the macroeconomic variables
of interest. This approach has been used in other work with an interest in the
21It is crucial to emphasize, however, that Federal Reserve Fed presidents operate in a di erent
institutional setting: they are expected to represent the special interests of their respective
districts.
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perception of ECB monetary policy (e.g. Gross and Zahner, 2021).
The HICP, as stated in the o cial objective,22 expressed in annual growth rates,
is used for the underlying analysis to measure the inflation rate. Economic ac-
tivity is expressed either in terms of output, through the euro-wide annual GDP
growth rate and the output-gap – calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter
–, or in terms of the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate.
One assumption, at least implicitly, is that this macro-economic dataset is exoge-
nous to the speech corpus. This assumption is likely to be true, since macroe-
conomic information collection is done independently from speech writing. How-
ever, the prospect of a revision of a macro-economic variable in the context of
the forthcoming speech can not be completely excluded.
The regression analysis includes a number of control variables. As mentioned
before, the speaker’s specific sentiment as well as lagged sentiment is controlled
for. In addition, one regression incorporates a time variable, capturing the devel-
opment in the general sentiment as highlighted in the previous section.
Moreover, the presence of a stability objective, independent of inflation and eco-
nomic activity, as a tertiary objective reemerged following the central banks’
response during the financial crisis (e.g. Peek, Rosengren, et al., 2016; Kaefer,
2014). Using text-mining techniques on congressional hearings in the US, Wis-
chnewsky, Jansen, et al. (2021) find evidence that deteriorating financial stability
a ect the monetary policy of FOMC. Consequently, to control for such a po-
tential tertiary objective, three additional variables are included in the analysis.
First, the EURO STOXX 50 Volatility (VSTOXX) is added in linear and square
terms to measure the implied volatility for the euro area stock market. Second,
the european uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, et al. (2016) is included as a
benchmark in logarithmic terms for political instability. Finally, the 3-month
standard deviation of the EURO STOXX 50 is added to capture medium-term




2 ABOVE, BUT CLOSE TO TWO PERCENT.
2.5 Results
This section presents the regression results, where the ECB’s speeches are used
to quantify the central banks’ objective, allowing for the calculation of its implied
inflation target. The regressions are estimated versions of Equation (2.3), using
around 1.800 speeches from 21 speakers between January 2002 and January 2020.
All results can be found in Table 2.2, with the implied inflation target estimates
as calculated in Equation (2.4) and a 95% confidence interval at the bottom of
the table.23
As discussed in the preceding section, two di erent potential subordinate objec-
tives are being considered as representations for the ECB’s goal of promoting the
general economic policies of the European Union: output and unemployment.
The discussion starts with the output growth rate as subordinate objective. The
regression results can be found in Table 2.2 in the first three columns. Following
that, the findings for a central bank with an unemployment subordinate objective
are addressed. Columns four through six contain the results. Finally, the seventh
column presents the findings of the ECB targeting both output and unemploy-
ment. Robustness checks with respect to (1) the exponentiation of the economic
activity term, (2) an alternative economic activity terms, (3) the lagged senti-
ment indicator, and (4) the resorts of the central bankers conclude this section.
My findings appear to be robust.
2.5.1 Inflation and output
To begin with, a naive model is estimated, including only the inflation rate and
output growth as inputs, neglecting speaker heterogeneity and other controls
like the tertiary financial stability objective. The results are shown in column
one. There are several noteworthy observations by this naive model. First, the
inflation coe cient is statistically significant and economically relevant. The co-
e cient suggests that an increase in the inflation by 1 percentage point leads to
23The inflation target and the confidence intervals were estimated using a non-parametric
case resembling bootstrap method, sampling the regression 5000 times with replacement. The
implied inflation target represents the average of the estimated implied inflation targets. The
95% confidence interval of these estimates is presented in this paper. Note that few extreme
outliers were removed (<0.1%).
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Table 2.2: Regression Results
Sentiment Index Si,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
fi 0.118úú 0.071úú 0.079úúú 0.053 0.034 0.028 0.052ú
(0.050) (0.031) (0.025) (0.043) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030)
fi
2 ≠0.019 ≠0.014 ≠0.015úú ≠0.010 ≠0.008 ≠0.006 ≠0.011
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
yt 0.049úúú 0.041úúú 0.042úúú 0.030úú
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
ut ≠0.040úúú ≠0.028úú ≠0.034úúú ≠0.024úúú
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
St≠1 0.117úúú 0.079úúú 0.059úúú 0.110úúú 0.083úúú 0.060úúú 0.052úú
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Year ≠0.012ú ≠0.015úúú ≠0.016úúú
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
EPUEurope ≠0.089úúú ≠0.079úúú ≠0.070úúú
(0.022) (0.015) (0.016)
Speaker Dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Inflation target 3.4 2.9 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.1 2.2
CI [3.3, 3.5] [2.7, 3.1] [3.0, 3.5] [2.2, 3.4] [1.9, 2.4] [1.7, 2.5] [2.0, 2.5]
Observations 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.212 0.225 0.063 0.210 0.224 0.228
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. The variable yt denotes log GDP.
Financial market controls, as well as a time trend, are included in specifications (3), (6),
and (7), as defined in Section 2.4.2. EPUEurope is the uncertainty index by Baker, Bloom,
et al. (2016). Robust standard errors (clustered by speaker) are displayed in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
an increase of the sentiment index by 0.12. This translates to around 10 more
positive words throughout an ordinary speech, although the negative quadratic
term may partly o set this e ect. The positive sign of the inflation coe cient,
combined with the negative sign of the squared inflation coe cient indicates a
concave relationship towards inflation. Importantly, the concavity in the inflation
relationship is consistent across all specifications in this paper. The existence of a
such concave inflation target implies the existence of a global maximum for that
objective. Based on the results in the naive regression model, the communicated
inflation target of the ECB is more than 3%. This is well above the o cial target
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of ’close, but below 2%’.
Second, the output growth coe cient is significant and suggests a positive corre-
lation between production and sentiment, i.e. one additional percentage point of
GDP growth increases an average speech by approximately four positive terms.
Therefore, when comparing only the linear coe cients, the hierarchical order of
the ECB’s objective appears to be manifested in its speeches sentiment. However,
this might be driven by the heterogeneity communication between speakers, as
we will see below. Finally, the tone of the previous speech – delayed sentiment
index – is a highly statistically significant and relevant approximate, even if the
speakers di er, indicating persistence in tone over time. The Durbin-Watson test
suggests that with the inclusion of this delayed index, no auto-correlation remains
in the residual.
Taking into consideration that much of the variation in the sentiment of a par-
ticular speech may arise from the semantic di erences between the speakers, I
will next correct for this. In the second column of Table 2.2, the regression re-
sults controlling for speaker-specific nuances are presented. The main findings are
the following. First, the speakers generally enter the regression results with the
anticipated signs. The most pessimistic speaker is Lorenzo Smaghi (-0.135***),
whereas Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (0.419***) is the most optimistic speaker af-
ter controlling for economic conditions. The inclusion has significant implications
for the delayed sentiment index, which decreased by a third in magnitude. Sec-
ond, controlling for speaker-specific sentiment has a significant impact on the
magnitude of the implied inflation target, which decreases to 2.9%. This suggests
that the previous finding may genuinely have been a ected by the heterogene-
ity of the members in the ECB’s Executive Board. Using bootstrapping on the
perceived inflation target, the 95% confidence interval can be estimated at [2.7%,
3.1%]. This interval still clearly rejects the null hypothesis that the target is
articulated to be zero. It also rejects the interpretation that the implied inflation
target does not significantly exceed 2%.
Third, the output coe cient remains positive, statistically significant and de-
creases only to a small degree in magnitude. As a result, the ECB appears to
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Notes: The illustration of a ’bin-scatter-plot’ represents a practical alternative to the more
conventional scatter plot. The data points are grouped into bins, and each bin is averaged.
In addition, the size of each point is proportional to the number of data points within the
respective bin. The objective (red continuous line) is illustrated as of regression results (3).
The author’s calculations are available upon request.
be only slightly more responsive to deviations in inflation than production, the
di erence is not high. A back-on-the-envelope calculation shows that an increase
in GDP by 1 percentage point has less of an e ect on the sentiment index than an
increase in inflation from 1% to 2%.24 Fourth, the regression’s explanatory power
increases more than five-fold, suggesting the necessity to incorporate speaker-
specific information in the regression model. Note that to economize on space
the only measure for the goodness-of-fit provided here is the adjusted R2 but the
AIC confirms these findings.
Finally, I include the additional measures of financial stability and the time-
dependent dummy. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent
with the previous ones. The inflation rate becomes highly significant – as does
the squared inflation term – and the implied inflation target increases slightly to
3.2%. A graphic illustration of the objective, as estimated in this regression, is
provided in Figure 2.4. The left bin-scatter plot illustrates the perceived inflation
24Raising the inflation rate from 1% to 2% increases the sentiment by 2◊0.071≠22 ◊0.014≠
(1◊0.071≠1◊0.014) ¥ 0.03, whereas an increase in GDP growth by 1% increases the sentiment
by ¥ 0.04.
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target. The concavity of the communicated objective itself (red line) is visually
highlighted. The estimated relationship towards output is illustrated on the right
side of the above mentioned bin-scatter plot. The positive correlation between
sentiment and GDP growth rates is evident. The plot provides further evidence
on the stronger reaction of sentiment to changes in production than inflation.
GDP growth remains a highly significant variable.
In addition a potential tertiary objective towards financial stability, as identified
for the FOMC (Wischnewsky, Jansen, et al., 2021), is added to the regression.
However, neither the VSTOXX, nor the standard deviation of the euro area stock
market have a significant impact. Only Baker, Bloom, et al.’s (2016) uncertainty
index is statistically significant. A 1% increase in the index decreases the respec-
tive speech by about six positive words, indicating that the discourse is becoming
extra pessimistic in times of heightened uncertainty. Furthermore, there appears
to be a negative trend in sentiment over time. This finding is significant and
economically relevant, with an average of almost two fewer optimistic terms used
per speech every year. The decline in sentiment over time is consistent with the
anecdotal evidence presented in Figure 2.2 and may be indicative of the central
bankers’ increasingly challenging role of maintaining inflation in the euro area
while being restricted by the e ective lower bound.
In my findings, the adjusted R2 is substantially higher than that by Shapiro
and Wilson (2019) on their public communication dataset of the FOMC. As
mentioned previously, the analysis of Shapiro and Wilson (2019) focuses on the
FOMC’s non-public communication. There, up to a quarter of the variation can
be explained by their regression (R2 ¥ 0.24). However, the model’s explanatory
power decreases to R2 ¥ 0.06 when using speech data. Therefore, with regard to
explanatory power, my findings (R2 ¥ 0.22) on public speeches by the ECB seem
to be in line with their results on the private correspondence of the FOMC.
Overall, the results of the regressions suggest that the objective is communicated
with a concave relationship to the inflation rate and a linear increasing relation-
ship to the output growth rate. This finding implies the presence of an inflation
rate, which minimizes the loss function of the ECB. According to my results,
the implied inflation target is around 3%. Above and below this price increase,
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the institution’s sentiment in speeches becomes more negative. Importantly, my
findings appear to imply that deviations in output growth, rather than inflation,
appear to be the most relevant factor in explaining variations in sentiment. This
finding contrasts with the results of Shapiro and Wilson (2019) and Paloviita,
Haavio, et al. (2020). In addition, speaker-specific e ects have a huge impact on
the sentiment score and financial uncertainty tends to influence the speeches. In
the next step, I will substitute the GDP growth rate with the unemployment rate
in order to test the consistency of the findings.
2.5.2 Inflation and unemployment
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, there remains ambiguity regarding the subordinate
objective of ECB. In the previous subsection, the findings when interpreting
the aim of promoting the general economic policies in the euro area as an ex-
plicit production growth target were presented. As mentioned in Section 2.2,
the unemployment rate is an alternative metric for this subordinate objective.
Qualitatively, my results on the inflation target appear to be independent of the
choice in the economic activity objective. However, using employment reduces
the statistical power of the inflation coe cients. The results can be found in
Table 2.2 in columns four to six.
Embedding the unemployment rate in the regression instead of the production
growth rate yields several findings. First, the implied inflation target does diverge
from previous findings but may still be best described as ’above, but close to 2%’.
Again, it is noteworthy that the implied inflation target decreases, once I con-
trol for the respective speaker. Although they deviate in quantitative terms, the
findings of the preceding subsection can be qualitatively confirmed. The implied
inflation targets are consistently between 2% and 3%. A graphical illustration
of the inflation objective – including speaker-specific e ects, financial stability
controls and time e ects – can be found in the appendix.
Second, the indicated relationship towards unemployment is negative and highly
statistically significant, indicating that the ECB communicates a preference to-
wards lower unemployment. Analogous to my previous findings, the reaction
of the sentiment to changes in unemployment is economically relevant and domi-
54
2 ABOVE, BUT CLOSE TO TWO PERCENT.
nates the e ect of changes in the inflation rate. An increase in the unemployment
rate by 1% decreases an average speech by up to three positive terms. Finally,
the integration of financial stability and a time index yield findings that paral-
lel those in the output-case. The depreciation of sentiment over the observation
horizon is now highly statistically significant and, in terms of magnitude, very
similar to what was previously found.
2.5.3 Inflation, output, and unemployment
In the last regression, GDP growth is embedded together with the unemploy-
ment rate in the regression. The results are presented in the last column in
Table 2.2. Interestingly, both economic activity coe cients – GDP growth and
unemployment rate – remain highly statistically significant, but decrease slightly
in magnitude. The inflation rate yields only weakly significant results and is
further dominated by the economic activity coe cients in terms of economic rel-
evance. The back-of-the-envelope calculation (ignoring significance levels) shows
that GDP growth would have to increase by only 0.5% (or the unemployment
rate decrease by 1%) in order to have the same impact on the communicated
loss as an increase in the inflation rate from 1% to 2%.25 This further indicates
that central bankers are reacting to changes in GDP and unemployment rather
than inflation and may be more concerned with these variables. Nevertheless,
the implied inflation target remains above, albeit close to 2%. Also its confidence
interval [2.0, 2.5] still rejects the ’below 2% inflation’ target.
2.6 Robustness checks
This final subsection covers a set of robustness checks conducted for my analysis.
To economize on space, the regression results are shown in Section B.5. The
first two robustness checks concern the presence of a non-linear economic activ-
ity term (columns one and two) and the choice of output measurement (column
three). This section concludes with a robustness check of an alternative delayed
25Raising the inflation rate from 1% to 2% increases the sentiment by 2◊0.052≠22 ◊0.011≠
(1 ◊ 0.052 ≠ 1 ◊ 0.011) ¥ 0.02, whereas an increase (decrease) in GDP growth (unemployment
rate) by 1% increases the sentiment by ¥ 0.03 (¥ 0.024).
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sentiment index (columns four and five) and the inclusion of task-specific central
banker controls (last two columns).
In Equation (2.1), following standard textbook literature (e.g. Walsh, 2017; Barro
and Gordon, 1983), ŷt enters the objective function with a linear term. However,
one could also use non-linear version (e.g. Walsh, 2017; Shapiro and Wilson, 2019;
Paloviita, Haavio, et al., 2020). In this subsection I validate my results using a
squared economic activity in addition to the linear one, demonstrating that the
results qualitatively hold independently of this assumption. The presence of this
non-linear term has the interesting side e ect of allowing me to calculate the opti-
mal level of output and employment, i.e. the implicit bliss point for the economic
activity term.
Including the non-linear term yields the following results: There is only a slight
variation in the implicit inflation target, being 2.6%. The non-linear output coe -
cient is positive and statistically significant (as is the linear coe cient), indicating
a convex production objective for ECB. The implicit minimum is a growth rate
of -3%. This growth rate is below the lowest reported GDP growth rate in the
euro area. In other words, the Executive Board at the ECB communicates more
pessimistically until production deteriorates by 3% year-on-year, i.e. the central
bankers seem to favor a positive output-gap, independently of the current eco-
nomic situation. Note that the implication is therefore very similar to the linear
case. The objective is illustrated in Figure 2.5. When the squared unemployment
rate is included, the coe cients do not yield the same statistical significance any-
more. Since u2
t
and ut are highly correlated (≥ 99%), this insignificance is likely
to be driven by multicollinearity. Hence, for the unemployment rate, the linear
specification seems preferable. Finally, in both robustness tests, the remaining
variables join with similar sign, magnitude and significance level as they did in
the baseline regression.
The second robustness reviews the validity of GDP growth as representation for
the economic activity objective. The use of the output-gap is an alternative to
the previously applied growth rate. The output-gap is estimated using a HP-filter
and replaces the growth rate in this regression. While inflation becomes a highly
statistically significant variable, the output-gap is not significant. In addition,
56
2 ABOVE, BUT CLOSE TO TWO PERCENT.


















 2  1 0 1 2
GDP growth
 
Notes: The illustration of a ’bin-scatter-plot’ represents a practical alternative to the more
conventional scatter plot. The data points are grouped into bins, and each bin is averaged.
In addition, the size of each point is proportional to the number of data points within the
respective bin. The objective (red continuous line) is illustrated as of the robustness regression
results (1). The author’s calculations are available upon request.
the response of the sentiment index to uncertainty as measured by the Baker,
Bloom, et al.’s (2016) index increases. The inflation target in this regression can
be calculates as 2.9% inflation.
The third robustness check concerns the delayed sentiment variable. The senti-
ment of the previous speech was included in the baseline regression. However,
in order to capture the general mood when giving the speech and test the ro-
bustness of this choice, I substitute this term with the average sentiment of the
previous month. The findings remain the same. The result indicates – similar to
the previously used lagged variable – a significant positive impact. Both, output
and unemployment, remain significant variables in this regression, while inflation
remains significant in the output specification.
The final robustness check addresses the speaker specific e ects. One might argue
that the resorts (departments) held by a central banker influence the sentiment
of this banker’s speech, since a central banker speaking about, say, "Risk Man-
agement", may be forced to choose a more pessimistic language than her peer
speaking about the "New ECB Premises Project". Therefore, I reconstruct the
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resorts held by each central banker at the time of her speech and include the
corresponding dummy in the regression. Although most resorts do not yield sig-
nificant impact on sentiment, the hypothesis of irrelevance can be rejected by
a joint significant test. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the inclusion of
speaker-specific dummies is preferable in terms of explanatory power.
2.7 Conclusion
With its price stability mandate in the euro area, the ECB is tasked to pur-
sue inflation with a subordinate goal to stabilize economic activity. The general
public’s perception of this objective function is important for the e ectiveness of
the central bank’s monetary policy, which in turn incentives the ECB to clearly
communicate it. In light of the current internal evaluation of the central bank’s
monetary policy as well as the ongoing debate over the specific functional form
of its objective, this paper employs a text mining approach proposed by Shapiro
and Wilson (2019) to approximate the objective function and its determinants.
Using a sentiment index, the approach quantifies the central bank’s satisfaction
with the current economic state. Taking all public speeches delivered by the
ECB’s Executive Board between 2002 and 2020, I contribute to a growing body
of academic work focusing on quantifying qualitative text data.
First, the findings of my analysis suggest a concave objective regarding the in-
flation rate. The implied optimum for inflation – the ECB’s inflation target –
is best described as ’above, but close to 2%’. Deviations from this value lead to
a reduction in the sentiment of the institution’s communication. This finding
contrasts the results obtained by text analysis on press conference statements by
Paloviita, Haavio, et al. (2020), who found a communicated target of ≥ 1.6%.
However, as pointed out in this paper, the non-stationarity in similarity in the
press-conference statements, in comparison to the speeches, makes me confident
in the presented results. Furthermore, my results appear to be robust across a
wide range of model-specifications and determinants.
Second, including output growth or the unemployment rate as a subordinate aim
of promoting the European Union’s general economic policies yields qualitatively
similar results. My findings suggest a potential concave relationship between the
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central bankers sentiment and output, as well as a linear relationship towards the
unemployment rate. Independent of the specification, my findings suggest a com-
municated preference for higher GDP growth and lower levels of unemployment,
regardless of the current economic condition. The hierarchical order in the ECB’s
mandate does not always appear to be consistent with my findings. Deviations
from its primary objective inflation appear to be of no greater concern than devi-
ations in its subordinate objective. In fact, both output and unemployment are
consistently significant variables, in contrast to inflation.
Third, in contrast to the findings of the FOMC, financial market variables have
no significant e ect on the central bankers’ sentiment. Fourth, over the last two
decades, the tone of speeches has deteriorated, even when controlling for eco-
nomic condition. This might be indicative for the increasing challenging role of
the ECB after approaching the e ective lower bound. Fifth, during times of cri-
sis and heightened uncertainty, central bankers appear extra pessimistic. Finally,
the explanatory power of public communication of the ECB is surprisingly high,
especially when compared to previous studies on the FOMC.
This paper provides a first analysis of the ECB’s objective function using text
mining on the institutions’ speeches. Future research may further examine the
tremendous amount of information provided by the speeches and the heterogene-
ity of the speakers. One possibility would be to extend the analysis beyond its
sentiment by incorporating meta-information provided by the text of the speech.
Evidence of the impacts of complexity and length of press conference statements
have previously been observed (Smales and Apergis, 2017b; Hayo, Henseler, et
al., 2020). Further potential might be in the heterogeneity of communication
between central bankers or even national central banks (Hayo and Neuenkirch,
2013; Tillmann and Walter, 2018). This could provide an interesting comparison
of the di erences across countries. In addition, it would be one way of testing
whether there is evidence for the hypothesis that a central banker communicates
the inflation target of a central bank, or vice versa.
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3 Complexity of ECB Communication and Fi-
nancial Market Trading
Bernd Hayo,c Kai Henseler,d
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Abstract
We empirically examine how complexity of ECB communications a ects fi-
nancial market trading based on high-frequency data from European stock
index futures trading. Our sample covers ECB press conferences between
January 2009 and December 2017, during which unconventional monetary
policy measures (UMPM) substantially increased communication complex-
ity. Analysing the linguistic complexity of the introductory statements
and di erentiating between press conferences with and without UMPM-
announcements, we find more complex communication, i.e. high linguistic
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3.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, central bank communication has become a key component of
the central bankers’ toolkit (see, e.g., Dell’Ariccia, Rabanal, et al., 2018; Kuttner,
2018).26 To e ectively steer the expectations of the private sector with the aim of
enhancing monetary policy transmission, central banks in several countries have
institutionalised monetary policy communication (see, e.g. Blinder, Ehrmann, et
al., 2008). Announcements about current monetary policy decisions, assessments
of the economic outlook, and the expected consequences of monetary policy have
become an important tool of central banks’ communication strategy (see, e.g.
Hansen, McMahon, and Prat, 2018; Kohn and Sack, 2003)
However, the increase in complexity of monetary policy during and after the finan-
cial crisis creates significant challenges for central bank communication (see, e.g.
Bulir, Cihak, and Jansen, 2013; Bulir, Cihak, and Smidkova, 2013; Hernández-
Murillo and Shell, 2014). As Peter Praet, former chief economist of the ECB,
put it ’[i]n normal times, central banks adapted their monetary policy stance by
influencing the level of one short-term interest rate. In unconventional times,
communication has had to cope with the new challenge of explaining the com-
plementarities between policy tools, as non-standard monetary policy has become
multidimensional. [...] In this context, it is perhaps no coincidence that the com-
plexity of the introductory statements delivered at the ECB’s press conferences,
as measured by common indices of text readability, has also increased’.27
While there is a large number of studies exploring central bank communication
(see the surveys by Blinder, Ehrmann, et al., 2008; de Haan and Sturm, 2019),
there is still little understanding as to how financial markets are influenced by the
complexity of central bank communication. We address this gap in the literature
26Communication is "a process by which information is exchanged between individuals
through a common system of symbols, signs, or behaviour" (Merriam Webster Dictionary,
available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/communication (accessed: 05 Mar
2019)). Central banks can utilise communication to reduce asymmetric information and share
their private information to guide expectations. Central banks’ private information may stem
from a myriad of sources, such as the outcome of previous policy votes (see, e.g., Meade, 2005),
the discussions at the meeting (see, e.g. Hansen, McMahon, and Prat, 2018), or risk balance
evaluations (see, e.g. Hanson and Stein, 2015).
27See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/ecb.sp171115.en.html
(accessed Dec 2, 2020).
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by studying the European Central Bank’s (ECB) press conferences following the
Governing Council meeting and the impact of linguistic and content-related com-
plexity of the introductory statement for contemporaneous trading behaviour in
financial markets. After interest rates reached the e ective lower bound following
the 2008 financial crisis, many central banks around the world embraced uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures (UMPM), such as quantitative easing and
forward guidance (e.g., Bowdler and Radia, 2012). Arguably, the complexity –
and potential ambiguity – associated with these novel monetary policy tools de-
mands a more disciplined and coherent communication strategy, especially since
the e ectiveness of monetary policy potentially seems to increase in the degree
of comprehension of financial market participants (see, e.g. Cœuré, 2018; Lucca
and Trebbi, 2009; Praet, 2017).28
To date, central banks in all major economies conduct regular press conferences
following the meetings of their monetary policy committees. The ECB instituted
its press conferences after the Governing Council Meetings (GCM) right from its
establishment. Each press conference begins with a prepared introductory state-
ment and ends with a Q&A session attended by journalists. In the light of the
ECB’s unique communication design, we address the question of whether higher
complexity of central bank communication, causes financial market participants
to delay trading and whether the generally less complex Q&A sessions may mit-
igate the e ect.
We measure market trading using high-frequency data from European stock in-
dex futures trading and study ECB press conferences in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crises, during which unconventional monetary policies substan-
tially increased communication complexity. We proceed in four steps. First, we
analyse the linguistic complexity of the introductory statements. Di erentiating
between press conferences with and without the announcement of UMPM, we
find no di erence in their linguistic complexity. Second, examining the overall
e ect of linguistic complexity on trading volume, we find – in contrast to Smales
and Apergis (2017a) who study the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) –
28An extensive discussion on how financial market participants themselves evaluate the suc-
cess of these policies is provided in Hayo and Neuenkirch (2015a) and Hayo and Neuenkirch
(2015b).
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no e ect in our sample period. Third, di erentiating between press conferences
with and without the announcement of UMPM, we find that higher linguistic
complexity of introductory statements is associated with a lower level of contem-
poraneous trading activity for UMPM-announcements. Moreover, we find that
increasing complexity leads to a shift in trading activity towards the subsequent
Q&A session, which suggests that Q&A sessions facilitate market participants
information processing. Finally, drawing on Ehrmann and Talmi (2020), we anal-
yse the similarity of introductory statements and infer that the observed e ect
of UMPM-announcements is due to their ’unconventionality’ that is, their degree
of novelty. Specifically, we document that UMPM communication is, on average,
less similar and, therefore, more likely to transmit a higher degree of potentially
complex new information.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section develops
the central research question and presents our hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes
the dataset and provides the descriptive analysis. Section 3.4 illustrates our
empirical design and presents the regression results. Section 3.5 discusses the
robustness of the results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Central Bank Communication and Financial Markets
Economic theory suggests that trading decisions depend on ’news’, i.e. novel
information (see, e.g., Stigler, 1961), which is swiftly incorporated by e cient
financial markets (see, e.g., Fama, 1979). Central bank communication often
contains such relevant news about future economic developments, with conse-
quences for the macroeconomy, specific industries, and individual companies (see,
e.g. Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Funke and Matsuda, 2006). Consistent with
that view and Cukierman and Meltzer’s (1986) hypothesis, Andersson (2010) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) find evidence that unexpected information (i.e.
surprises) in central bank communication has an immediate e ect on financial
markets.
Most studies analysing the informational content of central bank communica-
tion focus on well-defined signals from the central bank, such as monetary policy
announcements (see, e.g. Blinder, Ehrmann, et al., 2008). In an attempt to min-
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imise omitted variable bias and endogeneity, these studies commonly take an
event-study approach (see, e.g. Rosa, 2011a). The dependent variables employed
typically include some short-term reactions by financial markets around monetary
policy announcements (see, e.g. Boguth, Grégoire, et al., 2019; Brand, Buncic,
et al., 2010; Gürkaynak, Sack, et al., 2005; Hussain, 2011; Rosa, 2011a; Rosa,
2011b; Schmeling and Wagner, 2019). Other studies quantify the content of these
announcements through text-mining techniques and investigate communication
of various central banks, e.g., the ECB (Picault and Renault, 2017), the FOMC
(Shapiro and Wilson, 2019), the Bundesbank (Tillmann and Walter, 2018), and
the Riksbank (Apel and Grimaldi, 2014).
In general, this stream of research considers information to be a rather simple
construct, easily understood and comprehended by market participants. How-
ever, several studies question this assumption and emphasise the possibility of
(1) variations in the degree of understanding and interpretation of information
(see, e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1993) and (2) het-
erogeneity in the speed of information processing. Kandel and Pearson (1995),
for instance, suggest that di erent ex ante opinions may rationalise dispersion
in interpretation, that is, while all market participants receive the same infor-
mation, their assessment is heterogeneous. Alternatively, the (lack of) general
comprehensibility of the information could be the cause for the di erential in-
terpretation of information (see, e.g. Loughran and McDonald, 2016; Smith and
Ta er, 1992; You and Zhang, 2009). That is, all market participants receive the
same information but decode it di erently and/or at a di erent speed due to the
contents’ complexity. Hong and Stein (1999) argue that private information may
be required to transform public news into an opinion and heterogeneity in private
information may result in gradually updated opinions and, thus, an underreaction
of the market to public news.
Regarding central bank communication, Ehrmann and Talmi (2020) report sub-
stantial similarity in press releases announcing monetary policy decisions. They
find that similarity of press releases of the Bank of Canada is negatively asso-
ciated with market volatility. Examining FOMC statements, Hernández-Murillo
and Shell (2014) document that these statements have become more complex since
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the beginning of UMPM. Smales and Apergis (2017a) and Smales and Apergis
(2017b) investigate in two studies the e ect of linguistic complexity of FOMC
statements and find that complexity positively a ects daily trading volume. The
authors rationalise their finding with heterogeneity in beliefs and opinions be-
cause of the complexity of information in light of Harris and Raviv (1993) and
Kandel and Pearson (1995).
In this paper, we extend the analysis of Smales and Apergis (2017a) and Smales
and Apergis (2017b) along two dimensions. First, we are interested in the dy-
namics of information processing and trading behaviour in financial markets. In
light of Hong and Stein (1999), we argue that at a given level of cognitive abil-
ity and private information, the time to process news is positively correlated
with the complexity of the text containing that news. Hence, we expect that
the market underreacts to more complex central bank communication and that
contemporaneous trading volume is negatively correlated with complexity:
H1: Complexity of central bank communication has a negative impact
on contemporaneous trading behaviour.
Second, we argue that it is not only the linguistic complexity of the transcripts
that matters, but also the complexity of the context and content that matters.
Following Peter Praet, former chief economist of the ECB, who argues ’[a] multi-
instrument policy toolkit [UMPM] is more complex because it adds a further di-
mension to the central bank reaction function’,29 we posit that announcements of
UMPM are more complex in context and content. Hence, in the case of UMPM-
events, we expect the underreaction of the market to be even more pronounced.
H2: Complexity of central bank communication has a more negative
impact on contemporaneous trading behaviour, when communication
refers to unconventional monetary policy measures.
Finally, we shed some light on the question of whether the unique communi-
cation design of the ECB, where each press conference begins with a prepared
introductory statement and ends with a Q&A session attended by journalists,
29See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/ecb.sp171115.en.html
(accessed Dec 2, 2020).
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may mitigate the underreaction of the market. Arguing that communication in
Q&A sessions is less formal and thus less complex, we hypothesise that Q&A
sessions may be helpful for reducing heterogeneity in information processing and
opinions and thus attenuate the underreaction of the market to complex news.
H3: There is a positive relationship between ECB communication
complexity and a temporal shift of trading activity to the Q&A ses-
sion.
3.3 Sample and Descriptive Analysis
To test the three hypotheses, we analyse the e ect of complexity in introductory
statements of the ECB press conferences using high-frequency trading volume
data from European stock index futures. Our core sample contains all press con-
ferences from January 2009 to December 2017.30 It covers the aftermath of the
2008 financial crises, when the ECB started conducting UMPM on a recurring ba-
sis. Specifically, it covers the announcement of ECB’s first covered bond purchase
programme on 07 May 2009 (see, e.g. Henseler and Rapp, 2018).
3.3.1 Introductory Statements to ECB Press Conferences
The main decision-making body of the ECB is the Governing Council, which
assesses economic and monetary developments and conducts monetary policy
decisions on a regular basis at the ECB’s premises in Frankfurt am Main, Ger-
many.31 After GCMs, the ECB issues a press statement at 13:45 CET on its
interest rate decision, followed by a press conference, where the monetary policy
decisions are explained in detail by the ECB’s president, sometimes supported by
other members of the Executive Board.
A typical GCM press conference proceeds as follows. After the o cial start at
14:30 CET, the ECB’s president reads a prepared introductory statement, which
30In the robustness checks, we extend the sample to cover the January 2003 to December
2017 period. Our results remain una ected (see Section 5.1).
31A detailed and comprehensive description of the Governing Council’s responsibilities can
be found at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html
(accessed: 17 Feb 2019).
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covers the GCM’s decisions, the underlying rationale, and a monetary policy out-
look. This introductory statement takes between 10 and 20 minutes, with mean
and median at 15 minutes (for our sample). Subsequently, a 40- to 60-minute
Q&A session is held, starting at around 14:50 CET. During this, local partici-
pants (usually press representatives) ask questions, which are answered by the
president. The Q&A session is explicitly intended to make the correspondence
of the ECB as clear as possible (see, e.g. Cœuré, 2018). The press conference
concludes between 15:30 to 15:50 CET.
Searching the ECB webpage, we identify all GCM press conferences during our
sample period. For each press conference, we download transcripts of the intro-
ductory statement and save it in a separate text file.32 We opt for analysing
the GCM press conference introductory statements, since they represent an im-
portant and standardised part of ECB communication (e.g. Hayo, Henseler, and
Rapp, 2019): important, as it embodies the communication as intended by the
ECB, and standardised, as the statements exhibit a common structure and du-
ration. Still the statements di er in content and, hence, provide an appropriate
basis for comparative text analysis. Overall, our sample covers 95 introductory
statements.
3.3.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures
In a detailed content analysis, we assess the introductory statements with regard
to the disclosure of Asset Purchase Programmes, Swap Agreements, Allotment
Policy, and/or Forward Guidance. If at least one of these topics is discussed
substantively, a dummy variable UMPM is coded 1 and 0 otherwise. A compre-
hensive list of the resulting 34 press conferences can be found in Table C.1 in the
Appendix.
3.3.3 Measuring Complexity of Introductory Statements
To quantify the latent dimension of comprehensibility, we follow the linguistic ap-
proach of and Hernández-Murillo and Shell (2014), Smales and Apergis (2017a),
32ECB press conference transcripts with introductory statements and Q&A sessions are avail-
able at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf.
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and Smales and Apergis (2017b) and use the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (Kin-
caid, Fishburne Jr., et al., 1975) to measure complexity in the introductory state-
ments.33
The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score (FK) is a linear function in the average
sentence length and the average word length measured in syllables. Technically,
for a document i it is calculated as:






It is supposed to be equivalent to the US grade level of education and indicates
the required years of education to be able to understand the respective text.
The Flesch-Kincaid grade level approach can be applied to documents of arbi-
trary length. Consider for instance, the following – rather complex – sentence
from Mario Draghi’s introductory statement to the ECB press conference on 4
September 2014: ’The Eurosystem will purchase a broad portfolio of simple and
transparent asset-backed securities (ABSs) with underlying assets consisting of
claims against the euro area non-financial private sector under an ABS purchase
programme (ABSPP)’.34 With 37 words and 68 syllables, the Flesch-Kincaid grade
level score of this sentence is 0.39 ◊ 37/1 + 11.8 + 68/37 ≠ 15.59 = 21, suggesting
that a person needs to be a professional reader for full comprehension.
We calculate the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score for all introductory statements
using the quanteda package in R (Benoit, Watanabe, et al., 2018). To reduce the
potential influence of outliers, we define the variable Complexity as the log of this
score.
3.3.4 Measuring Trading Volume
To proxy financial market trading activity, we use trading volume of the EURO-
STOXX-50 futures, since futures are highly liquid trading instruments that react
quickly to new information (see, e.g. Kuttner, 2001; Bomfim, 2003). The underly-
33This approach is also applied in other fields of finance. For example, Smith and Ta er
(1992), You and Zhang (2009), and Miller (2010) investigate the e ect of complexity in corporate
reports on subsequent trading volumes and stock-price movements. Loughran and McDonald
(2016) discuss the use of textual analysis and linguistic measures in accounting and finance.
34https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140904.en.html
(accessed: 29 Aug 2020).
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ing stock index, the EURO-STOXX 50 (ISIN: EU0009658145) with 50 large-cap
constituents from the euro area, is one of the leading European stock indices.
The corresponding future (ISIN: DE0009652388) is traded on the EUREX and,
with a tick-size of 10, is widely considered the most liquid European stock index
future.35
We retrieve trading volume at a 1-minute frequency from PortaraCQG and cal-
culate V olumeIntro as the natural logarithm of the mean trading volume (per
minute) over the 15-minute window from 14:30 - 14:45 CET. This period reflects
the start of the press conference and the average time span needed to read the
introductory statement. Correspondingly, we define V olumeQ&A as the natural
logarithm of the mean trading volume (per minute) measured during the roughly
60 minutes long Q&A-session (14:50 - 15:50 CET) and V olumeConf as the natural
logarithm of the mean trading volume (per minute) over the period of the whole
press conference (14:30 - 15:50 CET).
3.3.5 Descriptive Analysis
In this subsection, we provide descriptive statistics about the linguistic complexity
of the introductory statements, as well as stylised facts and anecdotal evidence
demonstrating the relevance of our hypotheses. Specifically, with regard to the
later, we analyse (1) the trading activity around the press conferences, (2) the
trading activity’s temporal distribution, and (3) its relationship with respect to
complexity of the introductory statements.
Linguistic Complexity of Introductory Statements Calculating the
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score for every introductory statement in our sample,
we find a mean score of 15.4 with a standard deviation of 0.6. This can be roughly
interpreted as 15 years of education are required to comprehend and follow an
35According to Eurex Daily Statistics from 30 December 2016 and 29 December 2017, the
average annual trading volume of the EURO-STOXX-50 futures was roughly 328 million con-
tracts, corresponding to 10,474bn Euro and an average daily trading volume of 1.35 million
contracts (Source: https://www.eurex.com/ex-en/data/statistics/trading-statistics, accessed 4
December 2020). In our sample, covering 2009-2017, the average trading during an introductory
statement is some 4,600 contracts per minute, which is significantly more than the (time-of-the
day pattern adjusted) average trading volume per minute (see Figure 3.1).
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average introductory statement of the ECB. For all statements, the observed
minimum and maximum values for the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level are 14.2
and 16.5, respectively. These statistics correspond with the findings of Coenen,
Ehrmann, et al. (2017) and demonstrate that the level of linguistic complexity
of introductory statements is consistently high. A descriptive summary of the
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level is provided in Table C.2 in the Appendix. Interest-
ingly, we do not find a significant di erence between UMPM-events (15.5) and
non-UMPM events (15.4).
Figure 3.1: Complexity distribution of the ECB’s communication
Total sample UMPM events Non−UMPM events
















Notes: Boxplot of Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level across introductory statements and Q&A ses-
sions, with observed values illustrated as jitter plot. Di erentiation between UMPM-events and
non-UMPM events according to Table C.1 in the Appendix.
To illustrate the disparity in complexity between introductory statement and
Q&A session, we also calculate the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score for the
transcripts of the Q&A sessions. With an average Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level
of above 15 for the introductory statement (independent of the type of event)
and below 11 for the Q&A session (again, independent of the type of event),
we discover a di erence of more than 4 years of required education between the
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two forms of communication. Figure 3.1 shows these di erences for all press
conference, UMPM-events, and non-UMPM events, respectively.
We can see that in all three samples, statements are clearly more linguistically
complex than Q&A sessions. Moreover, the most complex Q&A session is less
complex than the least complex introductory statement. This supports our argu-
ment that communication in Q&A sessions is less formal and thus less complex,
and thus may help to improve the flow of information and encourage trading.
Excess Trading Patterns Next, we examine the EURO-STOXX-50 future
trading activity during all GCM press conferences in our sample to understand its
extent and temporal distribution. To exclude the e ects stemming from common
time-of-the-day patterns, we calculate excess trading volumes, defined as the
di erence between the mean trading volume per minute from all event days (i.e.,
press conference days) minus the mean volume per minute from non-event days
(i.e., days without an ECB press conference). Figure 3.2 illustrates the mean
excess trading volume for UMPM-events and non-UMPM events.
Three observations stand out. First, mean excess trading volume in stock index
futures increases significantly a few minutes after the beginning of the GCM press
conferences (14:30 CET). The pattern is consistent with previous work on the
e ects of ECB communication on financial markets (see, e.g., Andersson, 2010),
and the view that the introductory statement conveys relevant news for financial
markets.36 Second, the mean excess trading volume remains high at the beginning
of the Q&A session (at around 14:50 CET). This suggests that the Q&A session
provides additional information to financial market participants. From 15:00 CET
onwards, trading volumes slowly decrease until the end of the Q&A session around
15:50 CET, when trading activity reverts to near normal levels. Third, Figure 3.2
highlights considerable di erences between trading volume during UMPM-events
(grey) and non-UMPM events (black). In addition, the following conclusions can
be drawn: (i) trading volume tends to be higher during UMPM-events, (ii) trading
peaks later during UMPM events, and (iii) during the Q&A session, excess trading
36Note that these spikes in trading volumes are unlikely due to reactions to the Governing
Council’s interest rate decision, as the interest rate decision is communicated prior to the press
conference at 13:45 CET.
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Notes: Mean excess trading volume in stock index futures during the analysed GCM press
conferences. Calculation using mean excess trading volume for 1-minute intervals of the EURO-
STOXX-50 Future across all GCM days between January 2007 and December 2017. Excess
trading volume computed as mean EUREX trading volume across all GCM days minus mean
EUREX trading volume on non-meeting days over the same period. Di erentiation between
UMPM-events and non-UMPM events according to Table C.1 in the Appendix.
volumes slow down faster for non-UMPM than for UMPM-events. This pattern
is consistent with the view that financial market participants find UMPM-events
relatively more di cult to understand than non-UMPM events, which is why they
temporarily underreact. The hike in trading activity especially during UMPM-
events suggests that the less complex Q&A session provides valuable information
for market participants too.
Temporal Distribution of Trading Volumes Next, we assess whether the
temporal distribution of trading activity illustrated in Figure 3.2 is representative
for all events in our sample or whether it is simply a product of aggregation over
time. For each of our UMPM-events and non-UMPM events, Figure 3.3 plots
the (logarithm of the) average trading volume during the Q&A session versus
the (logarithm of the) average trading volume during the introductory statement
as well as the corresponding event-specific regression lines. Three main patterns
are evident from Figure 3.2. First, there is a positive correlation between the
trading volumes in the two periods. This relationship is statistically significant
in both cases. Second, qualitatively, we find a steeper slope for the regression line
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Notes: Cross-plot of trading volumes across introductory statements and Q&A sessions, with
observed values and a fitted regression line. Calculated using the natural logarithm of aver-
age (mean) minute trading volume of the EURO-STOXX-50 Future on EUREX all GCM days
between January 2009 and December 2017. Separation between 14:30-14:45 introductory state-
ment and 14:50-15:50 Q&A session. Di erentiation between UMPM-events and non-UMPM
events according to Table C.1 in the Appendix.
representing UMPM-events, suggesting that financial markets react with delayed
trading in case of UMPM events. Third, the quantitative relationship between
trading volume during the introductory statement and during the Q&A session
can vary substantially. This indicates that the relationship is not perfectly linear
and, therefore, further variables appear to be relevant.
Trading Volumes and Complexity Finally, we shift our focus to the ease
of understanding of the transmitted information. We analyse whether there is a
relationship between the temporal distribution of trading volumes and the lin-
guistic complexity of introductory statements. In order to capture the temporal
distribution of trading volumes in a single variable, we calculate the di erence of
the logarithm of the average trading volume per minute during the introductory
statement, V olumeIntro, to the respective value for the Q&A session, V olumeQ&A.
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Notes: Temporal distribution of trading volumes and complexity. Calculation based on the ratio
of average (mean) minute trading volumes of the EURO-STOXX-50 Future on EUREX over
GCM days with during the 14:50 - 15:50 Q&A session divided by the 14:30 - 14:45 introductory
statement, with the natural logarithm applied to the fraction. Communication complexity of
GCM introductory statements is measured by the natural logarithm of the Flesch-Kincaid Grade
Level. Di erentiation between UMPM-events and non-UMPM events according to Table C.1
in the Appendix.
Figure 3.4 plots this log di erence against the linguistic complexity for each event.
For UMPM-events, the relationship between the complexity of the introductory
statements and the temporal distribution of trading volumes is positive, whereas
it is slightly negative for non-UMPM events. This pattern is consistent with
the view of a positive association between complexity and delayed trading. In
other words, we find evidence of an underreaction of the market in the case of
UMPM-events.
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3.4 Regression Analysis
3.4.1 Empirical Design
To formally test our hypotheses, we estimate versions of the following regression:
Vt =– + —1 ◊ Complexityt + —2 ◊ Complexityt ◊ UMPMt
+ —3 ◊ UMPMt + “ ◊ Controlst + ‘t,
(3.2)
where Vt measures trading behaviour at the event t (i.e., the ECB press conference
following the Governing Council Meetings), Complexityt the linguistic complex-
ity of the event’s introductory statement, and UMPMt the type of event. –
represents a constant, Controlst a vector of control variables, and ‘t the error
term. Table 3.1 provides further details of our variable definitions. The —i’s are
our coe cients of interest. Specifically, arguing that UMPM-events are more
complex in context and content, it is —2, the coe cient of the interaction term,
which is geared to reflect our argument that it is not only the linguistic complex-
ity of the transcripts that matters, but also the complexity of the context and
content.
We add three control variables to our regression. First, based on Kuttner (2001),
we capture the surprise e ect in conventional monetary policy by long-term Bond
Returns. We use the log-return of the 10-year BUND future as traded on EUREX
during 13:44 - 14:29 CET. Second, we use a Rate Change Dummy, which indicates
whether the ECB announced a change in its de-posit facility rate at 13:45 CET.
Third, we include   Shadow Prime Rate, which captures monetary tightening
as conveyed in the ECB’s communications. In line with Hayo, Henseler, and
Rapp (2019), we calculate this measure using the Wordscores approach (Laver,
Benoit and Garry, 2003), calibrated by using introductory statement transcripts
of GCM press conferences from 1999 - 2006 and corresponding changes in the
deposit facility rate.
3.4.2 Regression Analysis
To assess the first two hypotheses, we regress statement complexity on trading
volume. Table 3.2 reports the results for two measures of trading behaviour,
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Table 3.1: Overview of variable definitions
Dependent variables
Vt VolumeIntro ln(mean minute volume14:30≠14:45)
VolumeQ&A ln(mean minute volume14:50≠15:50)
VolumeConf. ln(mean minute volume14:30≠15:50)
Dt VolumeQ&A≠to≠Intro ln((mean minute volume14:50≠15:50) /(mean
minute volume14:30≠14:45))
VolumeQ&A≠to≠Conf. ln((mean minute volume14:50≠15:50) /(mean
minute volume14:30≠15:50))
Independent variables
Complexityt Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for GCM introduc-
tory statements, calculated as: 0.39 ◊ WS +
11.8 ◊ SW - 15.59
WS = Total number of words divided by total
number of sentences
SW = Total number of syllables divided by total
number of words
Control variables
Controlst Bond Return ln(Price[14:29]/Price[13:44]), of EUREX traded
EURO-BUND Futures
Rate Change Dummy Deposit facility rate change announced at 13:45
(yes=1/no=0)
 Shadow Prime Rate Calculated using Wordscores, calibrated based
on introductory statement transcripts of GCM
press conferences in 1999-2006 and correspond-
ing changes in the deposit facility rate
Note: A descriptive summary of all variables can be found in Table C.2 in the Appendix.
V olumeIntro and V olumeConf , where V olumeIntro measures trading volume dur-
ing the introductory statement and V olumeConf during the aggregate press con-
ference.37 For each of the volume measures, we estimate three specifications.
The results can be summarised as follows. First, Specification (1) and (4) re-
veal that linguistic complexity of introductory statements is negatively (but in-
significantly) correlated with contemporaneous trading activity. While this is
consistent with our first hypothesis (H1), the coe cients are far from significant.
Essentially, the results from these two specifications suggest that overall for the
period 2009-2017 linguistic complexity of introductory statements uncorrelated
with contemporaneous trading activity, which is in contrast to the findings of
37We confirm the results presented here in unreported tests, where we use (i) corresponding
measures of excess trading volume and (ii) an alternative measure for V olumeIntro, which we
define as the logarithm of average trading volume defined over the period 14:35-14:45 CET aim-
ing to get rid of potential noise trading and make sure we capture the e ect of the introductory
statement only.
77
3 COMPLEXITY OF ECB COMMUNICATION.
Table 3.2: Analysis of trading volume
Dependent variable:
VolumeIntro VolumeConf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Complexity ≠1.23 2.68 2.73 ≠0.97 1.45 1.46
(1.77) (2.05) (1.98) (1.37) (1.61) (1.51)
Complexity◊UMPM ≠11.88úúú ≠9.87úúú ≠7.43úúú ≠5.57úú
(3.53) (3.61) (2.77) (2.76)
UMPM 32.69úúú 27.12úúú 20.55úúú 15.35úú
(9.64) (9.89) (7.57) (7.56)
Bond Return 0.57 0.47ú
(0.35) (0.27)
Rate Change Dummy 0.32 0.35úú
(0.20) (0.15)
  Shadow Rate 0.26 0.25ú
(0.19) (0.14)
Constant 11.54úú 0.76 0.67 10.59úúú 3.88 3.89
(4.84) (5.59) (5.41) (3.76) (4.39) (4.14)
Observations 96 96 95 96 96 95
R2 0.01 0.14 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.22
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Smales and Apergis (2017a) and Smales and Apergis (2017b) for FOMC state-
ments.
Second, Specification (2) and (5) document an event-di erentiated correlation of
linguistic complexity with trading activity in financial markets. While the coe -
cient of Complexity is positive (but insignificant), the coe cient of the interaction
term Complexityt ◊ UMPMt is negative and highly significant. The sum of the
coe cients, i.e. —1 + —2, in Specification (2) is -9.2 (with a standard deviation
of 2.47) and highly significant (p<.01).38 This is not only consistent with You
and Zhang (2009) and Miller (2010) who propose a negative relationship between
information complexity and trading behaviour and our second hypothesis (H2),
but also economically meaningful: Specifically, Specification (2) suggests that an
increase in complexity by 1% is associated with a decrease in trading volume by
38For Specification (5) the coe cients add up to -5.98 with a standard deviation of 2.37,
which is significant at the 5%-level.
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up to 9%, or some 420 contracts per minute. Relatedly, a hike in the Flesch-
Kincaid Grade Level index by one year beyond the average (i.e., from 15.4 to
16.4) is on average accompanied by a reduction in trading volumes by some 2,760
contracts per minute (about 75% of the standard deviation).
Third, Specification (3) and (6) document that these results remain intact, when
we add our control variables. However, the coe cients of the interaction term
decrease and thus the estimated correlation of linguistic complexity with trading
activity in case of an UMPM event. Specifically, the sum of the coe cients —1
and —2 are -7.1 and -4.1 in Specification (3) and Specification (6), respectively.
Finally, looking at the coe cients —2 and —3 of Specification (2), we find, con-
sistent with Figure 3.2, that for an UMPM-event of average Complexity, which
is -2.7, contemporaneous trading volume is about 23% (p<.10) higher than for a
non-UMPM event with similar Complexity. In sum, the results from Table 3.2 are
consistent with our argument that it is not only the linguistic complexity of the
transcripts that matters, but also the complexity of the context and content that
matters and a market that underreacts to complex central bank communication.
To assess our third hypothesis, we turn to the temporal distribution of trad-
ing activity. Table 3.3 reports results for two measures of temporal distribution
of trading activity, V olumeQ&A≠to≠Intro and V olumeQ&A≠to≠Conf , which are de-
fined as the di erence between V olumeQ&A and V olumeIntro and V olumeQ&A
and V olumeConf , respectively. Again, for each of the measures, we estimate
three specifications.
The results can be summarised as follows. First, Specification (1) and (4) reveal
that linguistic complexity of introductory statements is positively (but insignifi-
cantly) correlated with delayed trading activity. While this is consistent with our
third hypothesis (H3), the coe cients are far from significant. Second, again we
find an event-di erentiated correlation of linguistic complexity with trading ac-
tivity in financial markets.39 While in Specification (2) and (5) the coe cient of
Complexity is negative (but insignificant), the coe cient of the interaction term
Complexityt ◊ UMPMt is positive and significant. The sum of the coe cients,
39We confirm the results presented here in unreported tests, where we also control for the
complexity of Q&A statements and allow the complexity of Q&A statements to interact with
UMPM.
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Table 3.3: Analysis of the temporal distribution of trading volume
Dependent variable:
V olumeQ&A≠to≠Intro V olumeQ&A≠to≠Conf.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Complexity 0.62 ≠1.38 ≠1.44 0.36 ≠0.15 ≠0.18
(1.25) (1.51) (1.56) (0.34) (0.41) (0.43)
UMPM_dummy ≠16.22úú ≠15.82úú ≠4.07úú ≠4.05ú
(7.14) (7.80) (1.94) (2.12)
Complexity◊UMPM 5.94úú 5.80úú 1.50úú 1.49ú
(2.61) (2.85) (0.71) (0.78)
Bond Return ≠0.09 0.01
(0.28) (0.08)
Rate Change Dummy 0.02 ≠0.001
(0.16) (0.04)
  Shadow Rate ≠0.01 ≠0.01
(0.15) (0.04)
Constant ≠2.03 3.42 3.59 ≠1.08 0.30 0.37
(3.42) (4.13) (4.27) (0.93) (1.12) (1.16)
Observations 96 96 95 96 96 95
R2 0.003 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.06
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
i.e. —1 + —2, in Specification (2) is 4.6 (with a standard deviation of 1.8) and sig-
nificant (p<.05).40 Third, Specification (3) and (6) document that these results
remain intact, when we add our control variables. However, the coe cients of
the interaction term are slightly lower. Finally, looking at the coe cients —2 and
—3 of Specification (2), we find no significant di erence between UMPM-events
and non-UMPM events for average Complexity (p>.30).
In sum, the results from Table 3.3 again are consistent with our argument that
markets underreact to complex central bank communication and delay trading.
Moreover, the results suggest that trading is not uniformly delayed, but – for
UMPM events – gains momentum with the beginning of the Q&A session, which
supports our third hypothesis (H3).
40For Specification (5) the coe cients add up to 1.35 with a standard deviation of 0.52, which
again is significant at the 5%-level.
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3.4.3 Additional Analysis
In this section, we aim to shed some light on the di erence between UMPM-
events and non-UMPM events. Therefore, we investigate whether UMPM-
announcements contain more novel information than standard announcements,
i.e. whether they are more ’unconventional’. Specifically, we employ Amaya and
Filbien’s (2015) similarity index to assess the degree of homogeneity between
di erent statements.
To calculate the index, we (i) remove all numbers, dates, and stop words, and (ii)
construct word bi-grams (two-word combinations) in order to capture combined
expressions, for example, ’quantitative easing’. We calculate the cosine similarity















where B represents the total number of unique bi-grams in all press releases and
frb,t and frb,t≠1 are the frequencies of bi-gram b in press releases t and t ≠ 1,
respectively.
To illustrate the idea of our similarity measure, consider the following two sen-
tences: ’The Governing Council expects the euro area economy to grow at a
moderate pace in 2010’ and ’We expect price stability to be maintained over the
medium term, thereby supporting the purchasing power of euro area households’
from two introductory statements from 2010. They contain one shared bigram
(euro_area) and 34 unique bigrams (the_governing, governing_council, coun-
cil_expects, ...). The similarity index value of those two sentences is 1/35=0.03.
Comparing longer texts tends to increase the value of the index, as the probabil-
ity of recurring bigrams rises. In our sample, the similarity index has an average
score of 0.44, indicating that 44% of all bigrams in an introductory statement oc-
curred in the previous one too. To assess whether UMPM announcements di er
from non-UMPM announcements, we run the following regression:
(3.4) Similarity(t and t≠1) = – + — ◊ UMPMt + “ ◊ Similarity(t and t≠2) + ‘t,
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Note that Amaya and Filbien (2015) find that ECB introductory statements be-
come more similar over time. To capture this development, we include a delayed
similarity index as a regressor. It is based on comparing the content of the cur-
rent statement with the text of the statement in t-2. The Durbin-Watson Test
supports our choice of the delayed similarity term.
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results. The UMPM-Dummy is statistically sig-
nificant and economically relevant. Statements with UMPM announcements are
3% less similar to the previous period statements than statements without UMPM
announcements. Given an average of 1420 bigrams, this increases the number of
unique bigrams by 45. Since UMPM announcements do not significantly di er in
length from other announcements, they appear to contain more ’novel’ informa-
tion. Arguably, it is this new information that drives the previous results. That
is, through the deviation from ’standard’ announcements, complexity increases
traders’ cognitive costs, which causes them to postpone their trading decisions to
the ’easier’ Q&A session. These findings do not change when controlling for the
previous event type (i.e. using a lagged UMPM-Dummy and interaction terms).41











Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression.
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level,
respectively.
In a next step, we analyse the similarity between introductory statement and
Q&A session. First, there is a remarkably strong similarity between the two
41All omitted results here and elsewhere in the paper are available on request.
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institutionalised forms of communication. Given that Figure 3.1 suggests con-
siderable di erences in linguistic structure, an average similarity index of about
0.2 provides empirical evidence that the substance of the Q&A session is close to
the preceding introductory statement. Second, the degree of similarity between
introductory statement and Q&A session does not di er during UMPM-events,
which suggests that traders can generally rely on Q&A questions to clarify the
more complex content of the introductory statement.
These findings complement our previous results, namely (1) linguistic complexity
of Q&A sessions is lower than that of introductory statements, (2) for UMPM-
events with high linguistic complexity trading is delayed to Q&A sessions, and (3)
the similarity between subsequent press conferences is lower for UMPM-events.
Thus, we discover empirical evidence supporting the following transmission pro-
cess from statement complexity to financial market trading behaviour: Traders
know that they can reliably depend on the context of the introductory state-
ments being elaborated on in the subsequent Q&A. They realise that introduc-
tory statements referring to UMPM’s are complex and contain relatively more
novel information. While this causes them to underreact to the new information,
the discussion and clarification of the cognitively costly content during the subse-
quent Q&A session mitigates this e ect. An outcome of this process is that parts
of the trading shifts from the statement phase to the Q&A phase of the ECB’s
press conference when UMPM’s are discussed.
3.5 Robustness of Results
As robustness tests, we (1) increase the time horizon, (2) address the concept
of vagueness in our complexity metric, (3) consider alternative measures for the
latent variable of complexity, and (4) determine complexity via factor analyses
based on multiple complexity measures as well as further communication-related
measures.
3.5.1 Time Horizon
To incorporate events prior to the period of the e ective lower bound, we increase
the observation period to January 2003 until December 2017. This extension
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Table 3.5: Robustness check - Time horizon
Dependent variable:
VolumeIntro VolumeConf VolumeQ&A≠to≠Intro VolumeQ&A≠to≠Conf.
H1 H2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Complexity 4.39úúú 3.16úúú ≠1.72úú ≠0.49úú
(1.11) (0.92) (0.76) (0.21)
Complexity◊UMPM ≠13.35úúú ≠9.17úúú 5.99úú 1.81úúú
(3.58) (2.96) (2.44) (0.68)
UMPM 37.14úúú 25.67úúú ≠16.44úú ≠4.96úúú
(9.79) (8.09) (6.67) (1.86)
Bond Return 0.53 0.35 ≠0.21 ≠0.03
(0.34) (0.28) (0.23) (0.06)
Rate Change 0.21 0.26ú 0.06 0.02
(0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.03)
 Shadow Rate ≠0.14 ≠0.13 0.01 0.005
(0.19) (0.15) (0.13) (0.04)
Constant ≠4.32 ≠1.16 4.41úú 1.25úú
(3.02) (2.50) (2.06) (0.57)
Observations 163 163 163 163
R2 0.24 0.24 0.07 0.06
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
roughly doubles the number of observations to around 163 press conferences.
The estimation results for extending the sample are presented in Table 3.5 and
demonstrate that our previous findings are robust. In addition to the earlier
results and similar to the results of Smales and Apergis (2017a) and Smales and
Apergis (2017b) for the FOMC, for non-UMPM-events the relationship between
complexity and trading volume is now statistically significant.
3.5.2 Complexity or Vague Talk
Next, we examine the possibility that the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level metric
may better be interpreted as an indicator for vagueness rather than complexity.
We argue that complexity is a proxy for the cognitive cost of comprehending
the content. However, vagueness also generates information that is di cult to
follow, but originates from a lack of clarity. The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level
index consists of two components, the average length of a sentence (WS) and the
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average word length (SW ):
(3.5) FKi = 0.39
total wordsi
total sentencesi¸ ˚˙ ˝
W S
+11.8 total syllablesi
total wordsi¸ ˚˙ ˝
SW
≠15.59
Longer sentences, i.e. higher WS, may be associated with both, more complexity
and more vagueness, whereas the use of longer words, i.e. higher SW , should
only a ect comprehensibility. In other words, SW measures complexity but not
vagueness, whereas WS is a representation of complexity and vagueness.
Table 3.6: Robustness check - Vague talk
Dependent variable:
VolumeIntro VolumeConf VolumeQ&A,Intro VolumeQ&A,Conf.
H2 H3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SW 1.76 1.49 ≠0.26 0.003
(1.39) (1.04) (1.09) (0.30)
WS ≠3.48 ≠6.07 ≠2.59 0.001
(6.81) (5.08) (5.31) (1.44)
SW◊UMPM ≠5.71úú ≠3.90úú 2.44 0.62
(2.59) (1.95) (2.04) (0.56)
WS◊UMPM ≠15.08 ≠7.51 11.30 3.74
(14.47) (10.80) (11.29) (3.06)
UMPM 18.47úú 9.01 12.64úú 4.51 ≠7.80 ≠6.68 ≠1.96 ≠2.18
(8.34) (8.61) (6.28) (6.42) (6.57) (6.72) (1.79) (1.82)
  Shadow Rate 0.29 0.30 0.26ú 0.23 ≠0.06 ≠0.08 ≠0.03 ≠0.02
(0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.04) (0.04)
Bond Return 0.71úú 0.65ú 0.55úú 0.52ú ≠0.18 ≠0.13 ≠0.02 0.004
(0.35) (0.37) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.08) (0.08)
Rate Change Dummy 0.34ú 0.31 0.36úú 0.35úú 0.01 0.06 ≠0.005 0.01
(0.20) (0.21) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 2.52 10.22úú 3.12 11.53úúú 0.48 1.20 ≠0.12 ≠0.11
(4.42) (4.11) (3.33) (3.06) (3.49) (3.20) (0.95) (0.87)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Disaggregating the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level into these two components, we
discover that the correlation between SW and the complete index is almost 90%,
compared to around 10% for WS. Furthermore, if we include SW and WS
in our regression model (see Table 3.6), we find that SW (i.e. ’complexity’)
appears to drive our results rather than WS (’vagueness’). Qualitatively, this
conclusion holds for both hypotheses but only the estimates for H2 are statistically
significant.
85
3 COMPLEXITY OF ECB COMMUNICATION.
3.5.3 Alternative Measures of Complexity
Table 3.7: Definitions of Alternative Complexity Measures
Complexity measures
Flesch Reading Ease (inverted) 1/(206.835 ≠ 1.015 ◊ WS ≠ 84.6 ◊ SW )
WS = #words divided by #sentences;
SW = #syllables divided by #words
Gunning Fog Index 0.4 ◊ WS + 40 ◊ CWW
WS = #words divided by #sentences;
CWW = #complex words divided by #words
SMOG Index 1.0430 ◊

PS ◊ (30/S) + 3.1291
PS = #polysyllables (3 or more syllables); S = #sentences
Coleman-Liau Index 5.88 ú AL + (0.296 ◊ Nst/Nw) ≠ 15.8
AL = Average #letters per 100 words;
AS = Average #sentences per 100 words
Automated Readability 4.71 ◊ (C/W ) + 0.5 ◊ (W/S) ≠ 21.43
Index C = #characters; W = #words; S = #sentences
Note: We use the inverse of the Flesch Reading Ease, so as to ensure that for all indicators
larger values represent a higher degree of complexity.
Our operationalisation of the latent complexity variable in the form of the Flesch-
Kincaid Grade Level follows Smales and Apergis (2017a) and Smales and Apergis
(2017b). To demonstrate that our results do not depend on this choice, we employ
a variety of alternatives. The most common measures for linguistic complexity
are the Flesch Reading Ease (Flesch, 1948), the Gunning Fog Index (Gunning,
1952), the SMOG Index (McLaughlin, 1969), the Coleman-Liau Index (Coleman
and Liau, 1975), and the Automated Readability Index (Senter and Smith, 1967).
Table 3.7 sets out the respective definitions. Table 3.8 reports the estimated co-
e cients for Equation (3.1) for the various complexity measures indicators. We
include all control variables, but only report the coe cients for the interaction
term between UMPM and the respective complexity measurement.
Regardless of the underlying complexity definition, the coe cients have the ex-
pected sign and most of them are significant at the 10% level or below. Thus,
we conclude that our results are generally robust with regard to the definition of
complexity.
86
3 COMPLEXITY OF ECB COMMUNICATION.




Flesch Kincaid Grade Level -12.09*** 5.42*
(3.91) (3.06)
Flesch Reading Ease -5.83*** 3.00*
(2.04) (1.59)
Gunning Fog Index -12.69*** 6.32*
(4.23) (3.29)
SMOG Index -15.67*** 7.73*
(5.21) (4.06)
Coleman-Liau Index -7.65 1.37
(5.66) (4.33)
Automated Readability Index -10.36*** 3.69
(3.23) (2.54)
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
3.5.4 Complexity Approximated via Factor Analyses
Since all indicators in the previous section are supposed to measure the same
latent variable, it is appropriate to approximate complexity using factor analy-
sis. We employ two sets of underlying variables. In a first step, we conduct a
factor analysis using the six complexity measures discussed above and find two
common factors (Eigenvalue > 1). In a second step, we conduct another factor
analysis containing an additional set of variables quantifying communication. An
overview of these additional variables is provided in Table 3.9. Combining the six
Table 3.9: Additional Variables for Quantifying Communication - Related As-
pects
Communication measures
Future-Orientation % future adjectives
Uncertainty % uncertainty verbs
Active/Passive (% active verbs - % passive verbs)+1
Overstated/Understated (% overstated verbs - % understated verbs)+1
Positive/Negative (% positive verbs - % negative verbs)+1
Positive/Negative (% positive verbs - % negative verbs)+1 [Loughran-McDonald definition]
Strong/Weak (% strong verbs - % weak verbs)+1
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complexity indicators with the seven additional variables, we find three common
factors (Eigenvalues > 1). The six complexity indicators primarily load on the
first factor. The communication indicators Future, Positive/Negative and Ac-
tive/Passive mainly load on the second factor, while the remaining ones tend to
load on the last factor. We use both factors from the first factor analysis and the
three factors from the second factor analysis to re-estimate Equation (3.1), with
Vt defined as V olumeIntro and V olumeQ&A≠to≠Conf . The results are reported in
Table 3.10.
Table 3.10: Coe cients for complexity measures based on factor analysis
Dependent variable:
Panel A: Factor Analysis VolumeIntro VolumeQ&A≠to≠Intro
(Complexity Measures) H2 H3
Factor 1◊UMPM-Dummy -0.42*** 0.06*
(0.15) (0.03)




Panel B: Factor Analysis
(Complexity + Add. Measures) H2 H3
Factor 1◊UMPM-Dummy -0.48*** 0.06*
(0.16) (0.03)
Factor 2◊UMPM-Dummy 0.24 -0.03
(0.15) (0.03)




Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
Consistent with our previous results in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, the factor captur-
ing complexity has a significantly negative coe cient for H2 and a significantly
positive one for H3. In contrast, the two other factors reflecting the additional
communication-related aspects are insignificant. We therefore conclude that our
findings are also robust to complexity approximated via a factor analysis as well
as with regard to other aspects of communication.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the e ects of central bank communication complexity
on trading behaviour of financial market participants. Our analysis covers the
o cial ECB press conference following regular GCMs between January 2009 and
December 2017, during which unprecedented UMPM substantially increased com-
munication complexity. Examining the transcripts of the introductory statements
and using high-frequency data on European stock index futures, we investigate
whether complexity of ECB communication a ects contemporaneous trading in
financial markets.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. First, di erentiating between UMPM-
events and non-UMPM-events, we do not find evidence for any di erence in the
linguistic complexity of introductory statements. Second, we discover a nega-
tive relationship between ECB communication complexity and contemporaneous
trading volume during events where unconventional monetary policy is discussed.
This event-di erentiated underreaction of the market suggests, that when the
ECB shares information with financial markets, it is not only the linguistic com-
plexity of the communication that matters, but also the complexity of the context
and content. To support this view, we demonstrate that more ’novel’ information
is transmitted during UMPM-related press conferences than during other press
conferences. These findings, which are in line with results reported by You and
Zhang (2009) and Miller (2010) and consistent with the argument that investors
underreact to cognitively costly/complex information (Hirshleifer, 2001; Hong
and Stein, 1999; McEwen and Hunton, 1999), extent the findings of Smales and
Apergis (2017a) and Smales and Apergis (2017b) for the Federal Reserve.
Finally, we shed some light on the question of whether the ECB’s Q&A-sessions
may help to mitigate the underreaction of the market. Consistent with that view,
we find a positive relationship between the complexity of ECB communication
in UMPM-events and a shift of trading activity from introductory statement to
Q&A session. Going forward, promising future research could focus on the ques-
tion of what drives complexity of central bank communication and whether, in
case of the ECB, a shift of trading activity to Q&A sessions can be explained by
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Q&A sessions e ectively mitigating complexity issues. In addition, it would be
interesting examine whether our findings apply to other central banks and other
forms of central bank communication. This could help to identify best practices
for central banks’ communication strategies vis-a-vis financial markets.
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4.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, there has been an increase in the analysis and inter-
pretation of central bank communication (Blinder, Ehrmann, et al., 2008). This
development was accelerated by the emergence of the zero lower bound and the
emergence of forward guidance, wherein central bankers recognized the possibil-
ity to complement actions with well-placed language to steer market participants
towards a desired equilibrium path. As a result, central banks increased their
communication substantially. The FOMC, for example, started publishing press
conferences since 2011, and the ECB began disclosing monetary policy meeting
minutes in 2015.
Consequently, a substantial body of literature has emerged that developed meth-
ods for quantifying di erent aspects of such communication. The literature is
still primarily driven by dictionary approaches, in which pre-defined dictionaries,
such as Loughran and McDonald (2011), Apel and Grimaldi (2014), and Picault
and Renault (2017), are used to count terms (for example, positive and negative
ones) to extract a single dimension (for example, sentiment) from a text cor-
pus. However, these methods fall short of incorporating the language’s richness,
its multidimensionality, and its context-dependence. Moreover, dictionary ap-
proaches are inherently subjective, as discussed in Gentzkow, Kelly, et al. (2019,
p. 554) survey on text mining in economics, where the authors emphasize that
"dictionary-based methods heavily weigh prior information."
To address these weaknesses, we turn to linguistic and computer science, using
machine learning tools to develop a novel language model. Such a model can be
estimated from a set of texts – the corpus –, and an algorithm that locates words
a multidimensional vector space. In this vector space, conceptually similar terms
are mapped in close proximity, reflecting meaningful relationships. Following re-
cent advances in computational linguistics, we propose (word) embeddings as a
novel language model for quantifying central bank communication. Therefore,
the main objective of this paper is to bring computational linguistics research
into the economic sphere. By developing a language model trained explicitly for
monetary policy, our focus is essentially twofold. On the one hand, we sharpen
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the previously broad focus of embeddings, while, on the other hand, we enhance
content extraction compared to the simplicity of dictionary approaches. We see
this paper as an essential step in the endeavor of modern text quantification,
initialized by Gentzkow, Kelly, et al. (2019, p. 553) who state that "approaches
[...] which use embeddings as the basis for mathematical analyses of text, can play
a role in the next generation of text-as-data applications in social science".
This paper contributes to the current literature on several fronts. First, we collect
a novel text-corpus unparalleled in size and diversity. The corpus, which contains
approximately 23.000 speeches by 130 central banks, is considerably larger than
any previously used in the central bank communication literature. Second, this
paper introduces novel machine learning algorithms for text quantification. We
compare a multitude of di erent algorithms according to objective criteria. Third,
by training the novel algorithm on the novel text corpus, we introduce a language
model previously unseen in monetary policy (and likely economics). We demon-
strate how this language model can be used in various applications throughout
this paper, such as examining the e ect of central bank speeches during the Euro
Area crisis, predicting monetary policy surprises, comparing central bank objec-
tives, and measuring gender bias. Finally, by making the language model publicly
available42, this paper’s most important contribution is to make this new string of
research accessible to other researchers, allowing them to incorporate embeddings
into their own research.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a lit-
erature overview of the current state of Natural Language Processing (NLP) in
monetary economics. In Section 4.3 we introduce both the text corpus and the
algorithms, combining both elements into language models. We then evaluate
the quality of the resulting embeddings in the central bank context in Section 4.4
before applying the best performing language model in Section 4.5. The final
section concludes this paper.
42https://sites.google.com/view/whatever-it-takes-bz2021
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4.2 Related literature
NLP has established itself in the central banking literature with an abundance
of high-quality research. There are several methods available to researchers for
quantifying qualitative information; Gentzkow, Kelly, et al. (2019) provides an
excellent survey on the use of text data with a focus on economics.
Rather than the explicit analysis of text, tracking market reactions during peri-
ods when a text is published is a frequent dimensionality reduction method. This
strand of literature disregards the qualitative data provided and instead entirely
focuses on the market’s interpretation of the text. Among successful implementa-
tions are Gürkaynak, Sack, et al. (2005), Brand, Buncic, et al. (2010), JarociÒski
and Karadi (2020), and Swanson (2021) who utilize intraday data around the
reading of press-conference statements to measure the e ect of monetary policy
decisions.
When working with text data, a di erent approach is to manually classify them,
whereby humans categorize sentences, paragraphs or even sections and thus quan-
tify the qualitative information themselves. Although the process is labour-
intensive and prone to misclassification, it allows the researcher to capture highly
specific patterns. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) use manual classification to
compare di erent types of communication between central banks, Hayo and
Neuenkirch (2013) measure the home biases of central bankers, and Tillmann
(2020) classifies answers during the ECB press conference’s Q&A to estimate a
disagreement index.
However, most applications today concentrate on rule-based classification utiliz-
ing computers. The majority of NLP in economics focuses on so-called dictionary
methods, whereby a predefined dictionary classifies certain words, thereby quan-
tifying the qualitative information into few dimensions. Famous examples in eco-
nomics include the calculation of an uncertainty and recession index by counting
respective terms in news-articles (e.g. Baker, Bloom, et al., 2016; Ferrari and Le
Mezo, 2021), stock market predictions using a psychosocial dictionary on a Wall
Street Journal column (Tetlock, 2007), or measuring media slant in American
news-outlets from phrase frequencies in Congressional Records (Gentzkow and
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Shapiro, 2010). There are also numerous applications utilizing dictionaries in the
context of central bank communication. In fact, dictionaries have been explicitly
designed for the use in financial and central bank context (e.g. Loughran and
McDonald, 2011; Apel and Grimaldi, 2014; Picault and Renault, 2017; Correa,
Garud, et al., 2021). The peculiarity of the terminology spoken in the central
bank context necessitates the usage of such central bank-specific dictionaries.
These dictionaries have been applied in numerous ways, for example, to measure
implied inflation targets (Shapiro and Wilson, 2019; Zahner, 2020), or financial
stability objectives (Peek, Rosengren, et al., 2016; Wischnewsky, Jansen, et al.,
2021).
The benefit of dictionary-based methods is their ease of understanding and eval-
uation through their straightforward and transparent quantification of an under-
lying corpus. However, at the same time, they lack objectivity and omit relevant
information. By definition, dictionaries are subjective, as researchers define a sub-
set of a language’s vocabulary based on their own assessment of the underlying
true meaning of the respective word. Furthermore, due to their low dimensional-
ity, dictionaries are incapable of capturing nuance as well as interactions between
terms. For example, the phrase great recession is classified as neutral in Loughran
and McDonald’s (2011) sentiment dictionary, even though the term great is not
meant to be positive in this context. Finally, a substantial portion of text is
omitted when relying on a dictionary, an argument made before by Harris (1954,
p. 156), who state that "language is not merely a bag of words but a tool with
particular properties which have been fashioned in the course of its use".
Recent research recognizes and highlights the dictionary approach’s disregard-
ing element, suggesting either augmenting such an index or combining di erent
dictionaries to improve predictive power. Tadle (2021), for instance, uses the
former approach utilizing two dictionaries (one for hawkish/dovish and the other
for positive/negative), rejecting a sentence’s classification as hawkish or dovish
if it contained more negative than positive terms. The author shows how this
augmented sentiment index helps explain movements in high-frequency variables
during the FOMC press conference. Another famous example is the interaction
of topic-modelling and sentiment analysis by Hansen and McMahon (2016) and
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Fraccaroli, Giovannini, et al. (2020). A di erent approach is applied by Azqueta-
Gavaldon, Hirschbühl, et al. (2019), Kalamara, Turrell, et al. (2020), Shapiro,
Sudhof, et al. (2020), and Gorodnichenko, Pham, et al. (2021), who combine
di erent sentiment indices in a regression model at the same time. They find
that di erent dictionaries capture various aspects of an underlying corpus and
can thus complement each other.
In addition to these augmentations, alternatives to dictionary approaches are
becoming more popular. One example is the concept of similarity, which is oper-
ationalized using the distance between two documents’ vocabulary. This metric
gained popularity through Acosta and Meade (2015), Amaya and Filbien (2015),
and Ehrmann and Talmi (2020), who find that introductory statements became
more similar over time. Another example is the measurement of verbal com-
plexity, which is commonly approximated with the Flesch-Kincaid grade level by
Kincaid, Fishburne Jr., et al. (1975). Smales and Apergis (2017a) and Hayo,
Henseler, et al. (2020) illustrate that markets react strongly concerning the com-
plexity of the information communicated in press statements. As helpful as these
new approaches are, some of the corpus’ relevant underlying information remains
neglected. For example, exchanging the term inflation with deflation does not
change the level of complexity but substantially alters the message.
In the last years, embeddings have entered the realm of monetary policy, fol-
lowing a trend predicted by Gentzkow, Kelly, et al.’s (2019) quote in the intro-
duction. Word embeddings are multidimensional word representations that are
used to measure similarity in Twitter tweets (Masciandaro, Romelli, et al., 2020),
in the development of a real-time economic sentiment index (Aguilar, Ghirelli,
et al., 2021), for the improvement of the Euro Area uncertainty index (Azqueta-
Gavaldon, Hirschbühl, et al., 2019), for the decomposition of central bank vague
talk (Hu and Sun, 2021), and to measure central banker disagreement (Apel, Blix
Grimaldi, et al., 2019). Generally, economic research relies on general language
models trained on a general text corpus such as Wikipedia. Shapiro, Sudhof,
et al. (2020), for example, use such embeddings in their analysis of news articles.
The authors are unconvinced by the results and resort to the modified dictionary
approach mentioned earlier. However, the lack of predictive power is most likely
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the result of the limited sample size and may possibly be due to the absence of
specificity in the training corpus. For example, some general language models
lack relevant monetary policy specific terms, such as hicp. One notable excep-
tion, and thus methodologically the closest research to our paper, is Apel, Blix
Grimaldi, et al. (2019), who employ a recurrent neural network to develop their
disagreement metric, thereby training word embeddings as a byproduct. How-
ever, the authors neither disclose information about their embeddings, nor use
them outside this specific context.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to train embeddings on a specific
text corpus and apply the language model to a variety of applications. Thereby,
this paper touches two di erent literature strings. On the one hand, in the devel-
opment of novel text-representation (Apel, Blix Grimaldi, et al., 2019), and on
the other hand, in the need to fine-tune these representations for their respective
use (Loughran and McDonald, 2011).
4.3 Methodology
"The meaning of words lies in their use"
— Wittgenstein (1958, p. 80)
A language model maps a text corpus into an n-dimensional space, whereby the
model itself can be arbitrarily simple. Take, for instance, dictionary approaches in
sentiment analysis that classify terms as positive, negative and neutral, thereby
mapping a corpus’ vocabulary into a single dimension. This paper’s proposed
language model is a multidimensional representation called embedding, received
by training an algorithm on a text corpus. A stylised overview of the procedure
- and an overview of the structure of this section - is provided in Figure 4.1.
4.3.1 Text Corpus
Our text corpus reflects our paper’s primary focus on monetary policy. To make
the corpus as broad as possible, we acquire all English central bank speeches
published by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS).43 We complement the
43We determine the language of the individual text using Google’s Compact Language De-
tector 3.
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Figure 4.1: How to get a language model
Text Corpus Algorithm Language Model
Table 4.1: Corpus Summary
Source Type n
BIS Speech 16,627
FED Minute, Press Conference, Transcript, Agenda, Blue-, Green-, Teal-, 2,238
Beige- and Red-Book
BOJ Minute, Economic Report, Release, Outlook Report 2,187
ECB Minute, Press Conference, Economic Outlook, Blog 343




Note: The table summarizes the number of documents (n) by sources in the our text
corpus.
corpus with as much meta-information as possible, collecting title, speaker, role
of speaker, event at which the speech was delivered, and further information. In
the next step, we enrich the corpus with documents gathered from central bank
websites. Among them are reports, minutes, forecasts, press conferences and eco-
nomic reviews. To keep our corpus as homogeneous as possible, we exclude all
presentations and scientific papers. The former usually contain little coherent
text; the latter are primarily oriented towards the academic audience in their jar-
gon and are thus not o cial central bank communication. The use of information
on the respective central bank allows us to create features for the country, the
currency area and each central banker. We provide a set of descriptive illustra-
tions in the appendix.
Compared to the previous NLP application in monetary policy (e.g. Amaya and
Filbien, 2015; Hansen and McMahon, 2016; Ehrmann and Talmi, 2020), we ap-
ply a minimum of pre-processing on the text corpus. This is generally done in
the embeddings literature (e.g. Mikolov, Yih, et al., 2013) since similar words
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should be close in the vector space, which eliminates the need for standardisation
through stemming, lemmatisation or removal of stopwords. As a result, we limit
the pre-processing to improve the expressiveness of the word tokens. First, we
identify so-called collocations, that is, words with specific meaning when used
together. It is important to notice the distinctive features of collocation and con-
text were already highlighted by Firth (1957, p. 11), whereas "collocation is not
to be interpreted as context, by which the whole conceptual meaning is implied"
but as "mere word accompaniment". One example is the word pair of federal and
reserve, which have one specific meaning when used together. Another example
is the word quantitative, which in itself means expressible in terms of quantity. In
contrast, quantitative easing represents a specific measure of central banks that
cannot be concluded from its individual parts. To map these relationships in the
embeddings, it is advantageous to identify related words and combine them as a
token, for example, federal_reserve or quantitative_easing. To do this e ciently
in our large corpus, we use the algorithm introduced by Blaheta and Johnson
(2001) to obtain a basic set of collocations. Furthermore, we form collocations
from all speakers of the BIS corpus. For example, ben and bernanke becomes
ben_bernanke.
Second, to keep the embeddings as uniform as possible, we replace several unique
entities with placeholder tokens. Therefore, all email addresses are encoded as
[email], URLs by [url], Unicode tokens by [unicode] and decimal numbers by [dec-
imal]. Furthermore, we remove all apostrophes and quotation marks. In a final
step, we convert the entire text to lower case.
Our final corpus includes over 23.000 documents, more than 100 million individual
word-tokens, more than 130 central banks worldwide and over 1,000 individual
speakers. As a result, on the one hand, we have a text corpus that is unprece-
dented in quantity and diversity in the monetary policy literature, and on the
other, containing highly specific central bank vocabulary.
The corpus’ homogeneity is what we address next. To compare the central bank’s
jargon, we estimate and compare the relative word frequency for the seven most
frequent central banks in our sample. An illustration for the ECB and the FOMC
is provided in Figure 4.2. Formally testing the homogeneity, we discover that nei-
99
4 WHATEVER IT TAKES TO UNDERSTAND A CENTRAL BANKER.
ther of the six central banks has a correlation below 98 percent in their relative
word use when compared to the ECB, implying that jargon is very homogeneous
across central banks.44 We conclude from this that the institutions do not di er
in any relevant way concerning their jargon. We conduct the same test for the
underlying years and derive qualitatively and quantitatively the same result.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of frequency of used terms between FOMC and ECB
Notes: This graph depicts the wording of the FOMC and its European counterpart. The relative
frequency of each word is measured for both central banks and presented in this jitter plot. To
make it easier to read, numbers and terms that appeared only in the texts of one central bank
(mainly names) are removed. In addition both we scaled both axes by the logarithm and added
noise, so the correlation is even stronger than shown here.
4.3.2 Algorithm
Our emphasis in this subsubsection is on the introduction of algorithms that
provide numerical representations for text documents. Due to the evident short-
comings of traditional dictionary approaches mentioned in the previous section,
we turn to linguistics and computer science for our language model.
Modern language models follow the proposition of leading linguistic academic Zel-
lig S. Harris in their pursuit of superior text representation. According to Harris
44The precise values are: FOMC: 98.7% (t = 884.67), Riksbank: 98.0% (t = 585), BoE:
98.9% (t = 966), Bank of Japan (BoJ): 98.4% (t = 668), Bundesbank: 99.4% (t = 1257), and
Central Bank of India: 98.5% (t = 783). The results are also illustrated in the Appendix in
Figure D.2.
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(1954, p.151), "meaning is not a unique property of language, but a general char-
acteristic of human activity", implying that the distinction between meaning and
the quantifiable properties of language is not always evident. His distributional
theory builds on this observation and approximates the meaning of words using
the distribution over the environments (context) a word occurs. If a word (for
example, outlook) can be found repeatedly in the same environments as another
word (for example, forecast), these words represent a similar concept, whereas
the di erence in environments corresponds to the di erence in meaning.
In the following, we will introduce four algorithms building on the distributional
hypothesis that we will subsequently apply to obtain embeddings. These algo-
rithms can be broadly divided into two categories: prediction-based methods
and count-based methods. The former use surrounding words to make predic-
tions, whereas the latter uses corpus-wide statistical properties such as word
co-occurrence – that is, how often words appear together. The following section
introduces both categories and their most prevalent techniques.
Prediction-based algorithms Prior to formally introducing the algorithms,
we provide a simplistic example to facilitate comprehension between the concepts
of terms, target words and context. Following Harris (1954)’s distributional the-
ory, a word’s meaning is based on the environment in which it appears. The
context of a word, the set of its surrounding words, operationalizes this environ-
ment. Given a context window of one, the context of the word brighter (called
the target word) in the following sentence would be this and outlook:
"[...] this brighter outlook remains subject to considerable uncer-
tainty, also regarding the path of the pandemic [...]"
— Christine Lagarde, IMF Spring Meetings, 8 April 2021
The prediction-based algorithms are generally tasked to predict the target word
given the context words, i.e. p(brighter | this, outlook). They then proceed with
the next target word, i.e. to predict p(outlook | brighter, remains), then p(remains
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| outlook, subject) and so on.45 By optimizing some objective function, the algo-
rithm improves its ability to predict target words based on their context. Note
how the approach directly incorporates the previously stated linguistic premise
by Harris (1954) whereas similar words occur in the same context. It also be-
comes evident why the context is key. Assume the model is given the (slightly
larger) context "this brighter outlook remains subject to considerable..." from the
preceding sentence and is tasked with predicting the next word. To perform well
on this task on average, it must not only assign a high probability to the word
uncertainty, but also to semantically similar words that frequently occur in the
same context, such as risk. As a consequence of the prediction task, the algorithm
places these words close to each other in the word-embedding space, ultimately
capturing the semantic meaning as a byproduct.
Word2Vec The Word2Vec model of Mikolov, Yih, et al. (2013), Mikolov, Chen,
et al. (2013), and Mikolov, Sutskever, et al. (2013) is based on the above principle.
Building on the work of Bengio, Ducharme, et al. (2003), Collobert and Weston
(2008), and Turian, Ratinov, et al. (2010), the authors propose a neural network
capable of predicting words from their context. In doing so, the algorithm is both
accurate and e cient.
Mathematically, Word2Vec, and similar prediction-based models, are single-layer
log-linear models based on the inner product between two word vectors. The
hidden layer’s size determines the dimensionality of the word-embedding’s repre-
sentation. An illustration of such a model is provided in Figure 4.3. Formally,
the target of the neural network underlying the Word2Vec approach is to predict
a single word wt – the target word – based on its surrounding words wc – its
context – for a vocabulary size W . The objective of the network is to maximize
the log-likelihood:





45The demonstrated example is called continuous bag of words model. In addition, there is
a reverse approach, i.e. the algorithm is tasked to predict the context from the target word.
This method is called skip-gram.
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Figure 4.3: Graphical illustration of Mikolov, Yih, et al.’s (2013) Word2Vec
model.





Notes: This figure illustrates the model architecture of a feed-forward neural network with
three layers. The first layer is called the input layer, the second hidden layer, and the third
output layer. The connections between the layer (particularly the nodes) are called weights and
adjusted during the training process. The ensuing word-embedding matrix is, therefore, the
projection of the input layer into the hidden layer. A second weight matrix maps the hidden
layer into the output layer.








where vi is the embedding vector. In other words, the models’ functional structure
represents a single linear hidden layer linked to a softmax output layer, where the
exponential function prevents negative numbers and could be omitted without
loss of generality. The objective is maximized using an iterative optimization
algorithm (stochastic gradient descent, see, e.g. Chakraborty and Joseph, 2017;
Athey, 2019) to identify a local – in best case global – maximum. Ultimately, we
are only interested in the vector representations for the target words V̂ , as those
are the corresponding embeddings.
There are several interesting points to note from this approach. First, the hidden
layer’s size is equivalent to the dimensionality D of the embeddings by design.
This size has traditionally been set to 300 (e.g. Mikolov, Yih, et al., 2013), but
di erent sized representations are entirely feasible. Second, it is apparent that the
window size m (the context) significantly impacts the embedding. Since each word
in the context has equal weight on the target prediction, a broad word context
may not capture important semantic meaning. In contrast, a very narrow context
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may miss relevant details. The initial calibrations of Word2Vec and Doc2Vec (the
algorithm described next) used single-digit window sizes, namely five (Mikolov,
Sutskever, et al., 2013) and eight (Le and Mikolov, 2014).
Third, due to the unsupervised nature of this machine learning model, there is no
necessity to provide labelled data. In other words, no manual input is required
to obtain the desired word embeddings, which is a substantial advantage since
training such models necessitates a large training corpus. Furthermore, if the
underlying text is su ciently homogeneous, researchers can use a much larger
text-corpus during the training phase of the language model compared to its
final application. We utilise this advantage by training the central bank specific
language model on texts from numerous central banks.
Doc2Vec There are several extensions to the original Word2Vec model. The
Doc2Vec approach by Le and Mikolov (2014), which proposes the inclusion of
document specific information in the input layer, is one notable example. In its
simplest form, Doc2Vec incorporates an ID for each document into the neural
network’s input layer, resulting in an embedding vector for each document. This
representation is referred to as document embedding in the remainder of this
paper. An illustration of the Doc2Vec model is provided in Figure 4.4. This ap-
Figure 4.4: Graphical illustration of Le and Mikolov (2014)’s Doc2Vec model.






Notes: This figure is intended to provide an illustration of the Doc2Vec model architecture.
It is inspired by Le and Mikolov (2014)’s depiction. The only di erence to Figure 4.3 is the
additional document ID being fed into the neural network. The ensuing word-embedding and
document-embedding is the projection of the input layer into the hidden layer.
proach is intuitively similar to controlling for specific characteristics in traditional
economic regressions, such as country-dummies in a panel regression. The main
advantage of Doc2Vec over Word2Vec is that the document embedding can be
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used as a summary of the document in subsequent regressions. In Section 4.4 and
Section 4.5, we will demonstrate how similarity in document embeddings may be
used in a regression model. However, it should be noted that, unlike word em-
beddings, document embeddings cannot be easily transferred to new corpora.
Count-based algorithm An alternative to obtaining embeddings through
neural networks is leveraging corpus-wide statistics to obtain word representa-
tions. Our analysis focuses on two approaches: one designed for topic modelling
and the other developed explicitly as a substitute for the previously introduced
prediction-based algorithms.
LDA The most famous example of a count-based model in economics is unques-
tionably the Latent Dirichelet Allocation (LDA) algorithm. Since its introduction
by Blei, Ng, et al. (2003), it has been used in monetary policy numerous times
(e.g. Tobback, Nardelli, et al., 2017; Hansen, McMahon, and Tong, 2019; Wis-
chnewsky, Jansen, et al., 2021). We will not formally introduce the concept of
LDA here owing to its popularity in economics and central banking. Interested
readers are directed to Bholat, Hansen, et al. (2015) for an introduction to LDA
in monetary policy text-mining applications. The premise of LDA is that doc-
uments contain a combination of latent topics, which themselves are based on
a distribution over words in the underlying corpus. The generative probabilistic
model is used in most economic applications to uncover latent topics in a corpus.
As a byproduct, LDA generates topic distributions over the vocabulary as well, a
concept closely related to the embedding matrices of prediction-based approaches,
which is why we incorporate LDA into our analysis.
However, there are several distinctions between our LDA approach and previous
ones in economics. First, to the best of our knowledge, these "topic"-embeddings
have never been used in an economic context. Second, the number of topics –
an important hyperparameter in LDA– varies widely across applications, rang-
ing from two (Schmeling and Wagner, 2019) to 70 (Hansen, McMahon, and Prat,
2018). As our objective is to maximise predictive power and to keep LDA compa-
rable to others algorithms, we cover a much larger number of topics, namely 300.
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Finally, in economic applications, the identification and analysis of latent topics
are generally the main priority. We refrain from interpreting (or even selecting)
topics in the same fashion as we do for all other algorithms.
GloVe The most famous count-based algorithm in NLP is the global factor-
ization method, called GloVe. Following the success of Word2Vec, Pennington,
Socher, et al. (2014) propose GloVe, which trains a language model on global
word co-occurrences. The approach is based on the notion that the global rela-
tive probability of terms, co-occurring in the same context, captures the relevant





f(Xt,c)(wTt wc + bc + bt ≠ log Xt,c)2.
In Equation (4.3) wt is the word-embedding vector for word t, f(.) is a concave
weighing function, bc and bt are bias expressions, and Xt,c the co-occurrence
counts for the context and target word within a defined window. Equation (4.3)
is then iteratively optimized given the scale of the regression. The authors find
substantial improvements over Word2Vec using the same corpus, vocabulary, and
window size.
General corpus models As mentioned in the introduction, no attempts have
been made to train embeddings specifically for the economic context to the best
of our knowledge. This may be due to the computational burden, the necessary
amount of text, or other factors. An alternative to training embeddings from
scratch is the use of pre-trained general language models called transfer learning
(e.g. Binette and Tchebotarev, 2019; Doh, Song, et al., 2020; Istrefi, Odendahl,
et al., 2020; Shapiro, Sudhof, et al., 2020; Hu and Sun, 2021). These are open-
source language models that have been trained on large general corpora. Since
pre-trained language models are methodology-independent, one can find both
pre-trained GloVe models and pre-trained Word2Vec models. We compare our
results to two such general models as a benchmark: GloVe6B and Word2Vec
106
4 WHATEVER IT TAKES TO UNDERSTAND A CENTRAL BANKER.
Table 4.2: Model Overview
Model Word embedding Document embedding Corpus
Word2Vec x CB corpus
Word2Vec GoogleNews x Google News
GloVe x CB corpus
GloVe6B x Wikipedia/Gigaword
Doc2Vec x x CB corpus
LDA x x CB corpus
Note: The columns ’Word embedding’ and ’Document embedding’ refer to the model
language model’s ability to generate the respective embeddings. ’CB’ is used as an ab-
breviation for ’Central Bank’. Word2Vec GoogleNews refers to the Le and Mikolov (2014)
language model and GloVe6B refers to Pennington, Socher, et al. (2014).
GoogleNews.46
In Table 4.2, we provide an overview of all algorithms and corpora applied in this
paper to train the language models. Since many algorithms can be computed in
di erent configurations, we test di erent specifications here. The hyperparame-
ters we used for each model can be found in the Appendix D.2.
4.4 Evaluation of language models
In this section, we apply the algorithms introduced in the previous section to
our corpus and evaluate their performance. In this way, we expect to answer
the question of which algorithm summarizes the content of the text corpus best
and thus provides the most convincing language model. Due to the algorithm’s
heterogeneity – Doc2Vec and LDA estimate document embeddings in addition
to word embeddings – we proceed by estimating a word representation and a
document representation whenever possible.
Since there exists no benchmark for evaluating language models in economics
yet, we turn to the fields of traditional linguistics. There, evaluation tasks can
be broadly distinguished as intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic procedures examine
whether the embeddings reflect an assumed relationship between words. One
typical task would be to determine whether the vectors indicate associations
similar to humans’ perceptions. Another task would be the ability to find word
46GloVe6B (Pennington, Socher, et al., 2014) is trained on 6 billion tokens from Wikipedia
text and News articles with a vocabulary of 0.4 million tokens. Word2Vec GoogleNews (Le and
Mikolov, 2014) results from the original paper and is trained on Google News articles.
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analogies that resemble real analogies. We present several intrinsic evaluations
at the second part of this section.
4.4.1 Extrinsic evaluation
Extrinsic tasks involve evaluating the vectors against other, externally known
contexts, i.e., assessing the embeddings’ ability to solve specific tasks. Typi-
cal methods would be classification tasks or named-entity recognition. However,
the datasets, on which these tasks generally rely on, are designed to evaluate
embeddings in a broad context, when we are interested in the opposite, their
domain specificity. Due to a lack of external evaluation methods, we follow Le
and Mikolov (2014) and evaluate each model’s predictive performance in a clas-
sification task.
Our evaluation task concerns the current interest rate level of the ECB and
FOMC, which we forecast using the respective central bank’s speeches.47 Since
we are primarily concerned with the correct level, we divide the corresponding
3-month interbank rates into quintiles to derive our evaluation target.48 Finally,
as we are interested in the best possible performance, we employ a neural net-
work to predict the respective interest rate levels with our embeddings.49 This
algorithm allows for complex non-linear relationships between the individual di-
mensions, which may be relevant. Each language model is trained on 75% of
our data (the training sample), with the remaining observations serving as the
test set for out-of-sample evaluation. Table 4.3 summarizes the accuracy of the
evaluation results split by Document- and Word Embedding and task. Since
there exists several variants in the Word2Vec and Doc2Vec algorithms and we
47Note that we evaluate our language model on a sub-sample of the available embeddings.
However, Section D.3.1 demonstrates that the presented results are robust on a more general
task.
48It is not uncommon in machine learning and monetary policy to convert a regression analysis
into a classification one. The previously discussed Apel, Blix Grimaldi, et al. (2019) are one
noteworthy example.
49With a few exceptions, the network structure closely resembles the representation in the
previous section. We employ a single hidden layer neural network with 64 units, dropout
regularization, and a Relu activation. Softmax activation is used once more in the output layer.
The Adam optimizer is used to train the model on a categorical cross-entropy loss function.
We tested various specifications, but the performance does not change substantially. The exact
parameterization are available upon request.
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Table 4.3: Evaluation results of algorithms.
Algorithm 3-month Euribor 3-month FFR
Document Embeddings
Doc2Vec Bow Pre 0.74 0.61
Doc2Vec Bow 0.75 0.59
Doc2Vec PVDM 0.70 0.48
Doc2Vec PVDM Pre 0.67 0.52
LDA 0.55 0.42
Word Embeddings
Doc2Vec PVDM Pre 0.41 0.35
Doc2Vec Bow Pre 0.40 0.28
Doc2Vec PVDM 0.44 0.22
GloVe 0.38 0.22
Word2Vec GoogleNews 0.36 0.31
GloVe 6B 0.34 0.19
LDA 0.25 0.22
Doc2Vec Bow 0.21 0.25
Word2Vec Bow 0.20 0.21
Word2Vec Skipgram 0.19 0.21
Note: The table shows the evaluation results across the di er-
ent algorithms introduced in the previous section. The accu-
racy was evaluated on a classification task with five categories
+ one outside option if the model was unsure. Therefore the
expected performance would be 1/6 ¥ 0.17. With regards
to the specifications: Bow = (Distributed) Bag Of Words;
PVDM = Paragraph Vector Distributed Memory; Pre = pre-
trained embeddings were used as more e cient starting points.
aim for a broad comparison, we estimate all variants. The name in column one
starts with the algorithm followed by the variant’s abbreviations.50 Our evalu-
ation yields some interesting results. First, the federal funds rate level appears
to be more challenging to predict across models. Second, we find a consistent
di erence in the level of accuracy between document embeddings and word em-
beddings. While the former are consistently above 40% accurate, only a few word
embedding models achieve this level. Finally, the Doc2Vec algorithm appears to
be most suitable for our context, outperforming the others on both the document
and word levels.
As a result, we decide to concentrate on Doc2Vec as our primary algorithm. The
50For further details, see Mikolov, Sutskever, et al. (2013) and Le and Mikolov (2014).
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Bag-of-words variant with pre-trained word-embeddings is explicitly chosen be-
cause of its high performance on the document level (being close to par for the
ECB task and best at the FOMC task) and consistently good performance on
the word embeddings task.51
4.4.2 Intrinsic evaluation
Following the extrinsic evaluation, we turn to an intrinsic assessment of our
Doc2Vec model. As stated at the outset of this section, these assessments are
inherently subjective and should therefore be viewed cautiously. The presented
intrinsic evaluations are based on the cosine distance in the embeddings space,
which is a measure of similarity between two-word vectors a and b of length n,
and defined as follows:
(4.4) similaritya,b =
a · b
||a|| ◊ ||b|| =
q
n










In the first evaluation, we compare the embeddings based on their assessment of
which terms are most similar to a given word. We then assess the embeddings’
ability to handle homonyms. Finally, we determine the central bank’s similarity
score and evaluate whether the relationship shows meaningful results.
We present the first intrinsic evaluation of our embedding in Table 4.4, which lists
the most similar words based on the cosine distance to the words inflation, un-
employment, and output. For example, the words unemployment and joblessness
are relatively close to each other in our embedding space. It is evident that our
language model is capable of grouping words with semantically similar meanings.
For example, it is reassuring that through the training process, several terms
containing the word inflation, such as core_inflation and inflation_expectations,
are grouped together. The same is true for the terms unemployment and output.
Furthermore, it appears that the language model captures the relationships be-
tween economic concepts such as unemployment and labor market.
Next, we turn to an evaluation of homonyms. Some homonyms arise because
51Please note that the upcoming results are robust for the individual Doc2Vec variants.
Results are available upon request. To ease readability, we will refer in the following to the
language model "Doc2Vec Bow Pre" only as "Doc2Vec".
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Note: The table shows the most similar terms to the words inflation, unem-
ployment and output according to the cosine distance of the underlying word
embeddings as defined by Equation (4.4). The underscore is used to highlight
collocations as described in Section 4.3.1.
their meanings di er in di erent contexts. Since our language model is very
context-specific, the issue with certain homonyms should be less prevalent than
in language models trained on a more general context. In the following, we illus-
trate this by identifying terms with the closest similarity to the term basel and
comparing our results to the general language model GloVe6b and GoogleNews.
The results can be found in Table 4.5, where we can see that basel is associated
with the city in GloVe6b and some abbreviations in Word2Vec GoogleNews, but
it is only associated with banking regulation vocabulary in our language model.
Remarkably, it even correctly matches abbreviations such as the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).52 Finally, we turn to an intrinsic evaluation
of the document embeddings. Here, we measure the similarity between central
banks, assuming that central banks in western countries are more akin to one
another based on similar objectives. We operationalise this idea by averaging
the document embeddings for each central bank and estimating their similarity
towards the ECB. The result is depicted in Figure 4.5 with darker colors in-
dicating greater similarity. It appears that central banks in Europe and North
America are closest to the ECB, which is consistent with our assumption.53 This
52In the Appendix, we provide additional examples for the interested reader.
53Note that we find the same results when using word embeddings.
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Table 4.5: Intrinsic Evaluation: Homonym across language models.











Note: The table shows for the Doc2Vec and the two genereal corpus
models the ten most similar words to the word basel according to
the cosine distance of the underlying word embeddings as defined
by Equation (4.4). The underscore is used to highlight collocations
as described in Section 4.3.1.
observation is investigated further in our first application in Section 4.5.
To summarize, we used the previously introduced algorithms for quantifying
words and documents in this section. We evaluated all methods using out-of-
sample prediction and chose the one with the highest overall predictive power.
Subsequently, we used three intrinsic assessments to determine whether previ-
ously assumed relationships are embedded in our model. We conclude that the
embeddings contain meaningful information at both the word and document level.
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Notes: This graph illustrates the cosine distance between the average ECB document embedding
and all average central bank document embeddings in our dataset. Darker colors depict a lower
distance, i.e. a higher similarity. The cosine distance is defined in Equation (4.4).
4.5 Applications
Genberg and Karagedikli (2021) suggest in their survey on machine learning in
central banking that empirical approaches in the realm of monetary policy serve
one of four purposes: data description, forecasting, structural analysis, and deci-
sion communication. The previous section concentrated on the description com-
ponent, whereas now we apply embeddings in forecasting exercises and structural
analysis. In particular we present four potential applications in monetary policy,
finance and sociology, using our previously chosen language model.
The first application assesses whether central banks’ objectives drive the di er-
ences in similarity we found in the previous section. Indeed, we find that text
issued by inflation targeting central banks are more similar. Next, we use Mario
Draghi’s whatever it takes speech to create an indicator of the ECB’s commitment
to act as a lender of last resort. We find that in times of crisis ECB communica-
tion can calm financial markets. In our third application, we investigate prejudice
and biases in the technical language of central bankers. The final application is in
forecasting, where we put our embeddings to the test as a predictor for monetary
policy surprises.
The applications are intended to provide case studies for the use of embeddings
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via transfer learning. Please note that the source code for all applications can
be found online.54 This is done for two reasons: First, we want other researchers
to be able to comprehend and replicate our findings. Second, and most impor-
tantly, it should demonstrate how conveniently embeddings can be incorporated
into one’s own research.
4.5.1 Inflation targeting
The first application investigates factors that influence central bank similarity,
using the document similarity index introduced in the previous section as a de-
pendent variable. We are particularly interested whether these results are influ-
enced by similar institutional preferences. As a result, we investigate whether
the relative similarity to the ECB can be explained by the adoption of inflation
targeting, since this is among the most prevalent and observable institutional
settings.
In a first step, we label all central banks as "inflation targeting" after their o cial
announcement as an institution aiming for a specific inflation rate, resulting in 44
central banks being classified as such. Next, we determine the average embedding
of all central banks. If an inflation target was announced between 1999 and 2020,
the institution is divided based on the date of the respective announcement. As
outlined in Section 4.4, we calculate the similarity of those average embeddings
to the one representing the ECB. Finally, using these similarities as dependent
variable and the inflation-objective dummy as independent variable, we run an
OLS regression. The results are displayed in column one of Table 4.6.
According to the regression results, adopting an inflation target appears to sig-
nificantly increase the similarity of texts to the ECB. However, since this e ect
may be explained by factors such as common currency or membership in the EU,
we control for both in columns two and three. While the magnitude of the e ect
decreases, it remains positive and statistically significant. Both controls enter the
regression with positive and significant coe cients.
As a robustness test, we run the same regression using the similarity between
54https://sites.google.com/view/whatever-it-takes-bz2021
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Table 4.6: Inflation target regression
Dependent variable:
Similarity to ECB
Document embedding Word embedding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation target 0.124úúú 0.081úúú 0.077úúú 0.003úúú 0.003úúú 0.003úúú
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Euro Area 0.120úúú ≠0.001
(0.028) (0.001)
ECB member 0.091úúú ≠0.001
(0.026) (0.001)
Constant 0.490úúú 0.489úúú 0.488úúú 0.995úúú 0.995úúú 0.995úúú
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 142 142 142 139 139 139
R2 0.300 0.482 0.469 0.122 0.130 0.128
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
word embeddings.55 We find that the adoption of an inflation target remains a
highly significant variable. This result makes us confident that one of the factors
driving central bank similarity is the adoption of a mutual objective.
4.5.2 Whatever it takes
The second application focuses on the e ect of central bank communication in
times of heightened uncertainty, utilizing the document space. Although there is
literature on this topic using word embeddings (Azqueta-Gavaldon, Hirschbühl,
et al., 2019), its focus is on measuring uncertainty using news articles.
We showcase a novel approach utilizing the cosine distance between the central
bank document representations. The focal point is the famous speech by Mario
Draghi in London on 26 July 2012, containing the iconic quote: "Within our
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And
believe me, it will be enough." This is widely interpreted as the ECB signaling its
willingness to act as a lender of last resort if necessary.
Exploiting the particularity of this speech, we calculate the cosine distance be-
55Recall that the jargon used by central banks is very similar as highlighted in Section 4.3.1.
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tween the ECB’s remaining speeches to this event’s embedding, thereby creating
a time-series of an index, indicating the central bank’s willingness to act as a
lender of last resort. Figure 4.6 illustrates that, particularly during the Euro
Area crisis, the embeddings of central bank speeches appear more similar to the
whatever it takes-speech. To investigate whether the similarity to that speech can




























Notes: This graph illustrates the cosine distance between a speech and the whatever it takes
speech. The cosine distance is defined in Equation (4.4).
calm financial markets in times of heightened uncertainty, we run the following
regression:
(4.5)  spread10y,t = witsimil,t + Unct + witsimil,t ◊ Unct + Xt + ‘t
where  spread10y is the change in the spread between Greek 10-year and German
10-year government bonds and witsimil is the cosine similarity of each speech to
the whatever it takes (wit) speech.56 We use three di erent specifications as un-
certainty measures Unc: First, the implied volatility of the STOXX50 on the day
before the speech (V STOXX), second a decomposition of the VSTOXX into un-
56Note that, due to the irregularity of speeches, we use the di erence in bond prices between
the day before a speech and the closing price of the day after a speech.
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certainty (UC) and risk aversion (RA) based on Bekaert, Hoerova, et al. (2021),57
and finally the ECB’s daily CISS index (Hollo, Kremer, et al., 2012). X repre-
sents a set of control variables, among them a dummy for the wit speech, Moodys
agency ratings for Greek bonds, European and U.S. stock prices, monetary policy
surprises based on Altavilla, Brugnolini, et al. (2019), and a dummy for the ECB’s
di erent central bank presidents. Since considerable risk of autocorrelation, we
integrate the first lag of the bond spreads.
Table 4.7: Regression results: Whatever it takes
Dependent variable:
 spread10y
Unct = V STOXXpd,t CISSpd UCpd
witsimil 1.416úúú 0.353úú 0.485úúú
(0.482) (0.161) (0.179)
witsimil ◊ Unct ≠0.070úúú ≠2.911úú ≠0.020úúú
(0.026) (1.262) (0.007)




witdummy ≠1.303úúú ≠1.140úúú ≠1.424úúú
(0.317) (0.406) (0.278)
L(spread10y_d, 1) 0.248úú 0.249úú 0.249úú
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
Constant ≠0.318 ≠0.125 ≠0.123
(0.283) (0.235) (0.267)
Moodys Rating Yes Yes Yes
MP shocks Yes Yes Yes
Stock prices Yes Yes Yes
President Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,028 2,028 2,028
R2 0.116 0.113 0.116
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression.
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, * indi-
cate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
The test statistics are calculated with heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors.
The results can be found in Table 4.7. Starting with the first specification, we
57We thank Marie Hoerova for providing the data series.
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find a positive and highly significant relationship between V STOXX and bond
spreads, which is consistent with finance theory. Furthermore, there is a clear
e ect due to the actual speech of Mario Draghi that had a significant negative
impact on the spread. Due to the interaction term the e ect direction of witsimil
depends on the level of uncertainty and changes with increasing uncertainty. At
low uncertainty (V STOXX < 20), the coe cient is positive and then becomes
negative. A possible explanation for the initial positive e ect would be that a
whatever it takes speech has exactly the opposite e ect at low uncertainty. When
financial markets are calm, such a speech could be interpreted as a signal of
impending troubles. In this situation, the speech would become a self-fulfilling
prophecy, triggering spreads to rise. We find no major di erences in the other
specifications. The sign of the similarity variable remains positive and significant
in both cases, but it reverses as the level of uncertainty rises. Only the config-
uration with the CISS shows a generally lower level of significance. To control
for possible other e ects, we add additional variables to our model.58 None of
these variables cause the coe cients of interest to change substantially. Overall,
we conclude that both Mario Draghi’s speech and similar speeches can lower the
spread between government bonds when tensions are high and may thus be part
of a targeted forward guidance strategy.
4.5.3 Gender Bias
The next application is in an area of monetary policy that is rarely studied:
the analysis of biases in central bankers’ language. Biases have been found in
ordinary language on numerous occasions. However, it may be informative if the
very technical language of central bankers contains the same prejudices. Gender
bias was chosen as an example of potential partiality in the embeddings primarily
because of its contemporary relevance and to showcase how even central bankers’
technical jargon might be biased.
Our analysis builds on a fast growing literature that identifies biases in publicly
available embeddings (e.g. Caliskan, Bryson, et al., 2017; Garg, Schiebinger, et al.,
2018; Manzini, Lim, et al., 2019; Sweeney and Najafian, 2019; Badilla, Bravo-
58The full table can be found in Appendix D.4.1
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Marquez, et al., 2020), including those used as general models in the previous
section. Inherent in those approaches is the idea that language reflects the latent
biases of the underlying institutions. Therefore any language model derived from
a biased text corpus must inherent these biases as well.
We are following Garg, Schiebinger, et al. (2018), who proposed the Relative Norm
Distance (RND) to represent the latent variable of a bias, a metric that measures
a group’s association with a neutral word. When two groups are compared,
the latent bias of either group can be estimated by their distance towards the
neutral term. In practice, the authors recommend gathering two lists of terms
(i.e., male and female pronouns) and then averaging their embeddings. The
distance between these averages and a neutral word (i.e., childcare) can then be
used to calculate the prejudice torwards this neutral term. For instance, if the
distance for the female average embedding is smaller than the distance for the
male average embedding, the term is more closely associated with women, and
vice versa. Formally for the average word list va and vb with n dimensions each










To test for underlying biases in our embedding, we collect study programs and
their respective gender ratios in Bachelor programs across Europe.59 Next, we
estimate the RND for each study program with respect to a set of male and
female pronouns as suggested by Garg, Schiebinger, et al. (2018).60 The most
feminine and masculine programs according to our language model can be found
in Table 4.8. With a few exceptions, male pronouns are most closely associated
with STEM fields, whereas female pronouns are most closely associated with care-
59We use data from Eurostat on students enrolled in Bach-
elors Programs by sex. The dataset can be found here:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/EDUC_UOE_ENRA03__custom_1091992
/default/table
60 Specifically, the following pronouns are used: Female pronouns (va): she, daughter, hers,
her, mother, woman, girl, herself, female, sister, daughters, mothers, women, girls, females,
sisters, aunt, aunts. Male pronouns (vb): he, son, his, him, father, man, boy, himself, male,
brother, sons, fathers, men, boys, males, brothers, uncle, uncles, nephew. A complete list of
the academic fields is available upon request.
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Table 4.8: Academic profession association by gender







Note: The table replicates the findings of the RND mea-
sure as introduced in Garg, Schiebinger, et al. (2018). It
illustrates the subset of occupations most associated with
gender pronouns.
taking and education.
To formally test whether this bias in association may be driven by the dominance
(or lack thereof) of any gender in the respective academic profession, we run a
simple OLS regression with the former as explanatory variable. The result can
be found in Table 4.9. The regression indicates that female participation is much
higher in fields closer associated with female pronouns. The e ect is statistically
significant and economically relevant.
Importantly, these findings do not imply that any specific central banker or in-
stitution is communicating a gender bias on purpose. Rather, we believe that
general social patterns, such as occupational gender distribution, are likely to be
reflected in central bank texts as well. We hope to emphasize that any text (and
thus its embeddings) are not without prejudice and should therefore be used with
caution.
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Table 4.9: Regression results - Gender Bias
Dependent variable:
Relative norm distance






Note: The RND measure is used as defined in Equation (4.6).
Higher values indicate closer association to female pronouns and
lower values closer association with make pronouns. The respective
pronouns can be found in Footnote 60. Coe cients are estimated
using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in paren-
theses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent
level, respectively.
4.5.4 Predicting monetary policy surprises
In our final application, we turn towards the prediction of financial variables,
specifically whether ECB speeches can accurately predict the central banks’ mon-
etary policy. To investigate whether there is predictive power in the embeddings,
we turn to the monetary policy surprises by Altavilla, Brugnolini, et al. (2019).
The authors construct four surprises based on di erent parts of the term struc-
ture using high-frequency financial data around the ECB press-conference. The
researchers use a rotated factor model to calculate the change in Overnight Index
Swap (OIS) rates from one month to 10 years on four latent variables. They
call the relevant factors target, timing, forward guidance (FG) and quantitative
easing (QE) according to their e ect horizon.61 Since these policy surprises are
expected to be unpredictable (otherwise, markets would price in the change),
this provides an interesting evaluation with respect to the wealth of information
provided by the embeddings.
61For the US Gürkaynak, Sack, et al. (2005) identified a target and path factor. Due to the
unique institutional setting of the ECB, the path factor can be further separated into timing,
FG and QE (e.g. Brand, Buncic, et al., 2010; Swanson, 2021). The target surprise loads most
on one-month OIS rates, timing on 6-month rates, FG on 2-year rates, and QE on 10-year rates.
In general, a positive surprise corresponds to an increase in OIS rates and thus to restrictive
monetary policy and vice versa.
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Figure 4.7: Relative frequency of hawkish and dovish speeches preceding an ECB
press-conference.
Target Timing FG QE























Hawkish shock Dovish shock
Notes: This graph depicts the relative frequency of hawkish to dovish speeches, as measured
by the relative distance between a speech and hawkish to dovish press-conferences separated
by Altavilla, Brugnolini, et al.’s (2019) policy surprises and measured in days. The upper red
line represents the frequency of hawkish speeches preceding a hawkish press-conference. In
contrast, the lower blue line represents the frequency of hawkish speeches preceding a dovish
press-conference. The frequencies were measured with a sliding window of +-3 days.
We begin by categorizing each press-conference and surprise as hawkish if its sur-
prise is positive and dovish if it is negative. Using the RND introduced in the
previous application, we measure the relative euclidean distance for each speech
with respect to all hawkish and dovish press-conferences and classify speeches as
hawkish if they are relatively closer to the hawkish press-conferences and dovish
otherwise. First anecdotal evidence of these speeches’ potential predictive power
can be found in Figure 4.7, where we find a di erence in the relative frequency of
hawkish speeches preceding a hawkish press-conference and vice versa. While the
di erence increases closer to the relevant press-conference for target and timing
surprises, the pattern is less clear for FG and QE. For the former, there is no
clear di erence, and for the latter, the gap fluctuates.62
We run a Probit model regression with the relative frequency as independent vari-
able to formally test this relationship. The results can be found in Table 4.10.
Several macroeconomic variables, such as the EONIA rate, current unemploy-
ment, and inflation rate, are also included. We find the following: First, the fre-
quency is statistically significant for surprises with a short horizon. Both target
and timing surprises show a significant positive correlation between the relative
62Note that QE surprises are not available before 1 October 2014, as QE surprises are not
expected in the Euro Area until that date. Accordingly, the number of observations varies
between surprises.
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Table 4.10: Regression results: Altavilla et. al. (2019) shocks
Dependent variable:
Target Timing FG QE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Frequency 1.46úúú 1.47úú 0.83úú 1.03úú ≠0.05 0.06 0.48 0.03
(0.43) (0.65) (0.42) (0.51) (0.61) (0.63) (1.48) (2.00)
BBD Uncertainty 0.01ú 0.002 0.001 ≠0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.01)
EONIA 0.30 0.03 ≠0.04 ≠1.36
(0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (4.75)
GDP growth ≠0.14 0.05 ≠0.03 0.10
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
Unemployment rate 0.13 0.001 ≠0.01 ≠0.01
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.56)
Inflation ≠0.16 0.21 ≠0.03 ≠0.36
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.67)
Constant ≠1.57úúú ≠3.65úú ≠0.31 ≠1.08 0.15 0.17 ≠0.51 0.49
(0.32) (1.62) (0.31) (1.62) (0.31) (1.51) (1.16) (7.06)
Observations 195 195 195 195 194 194 52 52
Akaike Inf. Crit. 239.64 241.92 267.65 275.26 272.19 281.40 75.68 83.27
Note: The dependent variables are the monetary policy surprises by Altavilla, Brugnolini,
et al. (2019). Frequency depicts the relative frequency of hawkish to dovish speeches prior
an ECB press-conference. Each speech is categorized by the relative distance to the average
hawkish and dovish press conference, for each policy surprises respectively. BBD Uncer-
tainty represents the current Baker, Bloom, et al. (2016) uncertainty index. Coe cients
are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. ***,
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
number of hawkish speeches and the direction of the surprise. With an aver-
age of 10 speeches per press-conference, each additional hawkish speech increases
the probability of observing such a hawkish target or timing policy surprise by
10-15%, depending on the shock. Second, this relationship remains even when
incorporating the di erent control variables, so we assume that the speeches and
embeddings contain more recent information.
Although we cannot provide empirical evidence as to why pre-decision speeches
have predictive power for monetary policy surprises, it seems helpful to point
out a possible theoretical channel from the literature. Bauer and Swanson (2020)
find that Fed surprises are correlated with macroeconomic news. This news could
also be reflected in the central bank’s speeches and thus have predictive poten-
tial. We find these results particular fascinating since we do not filter speeches
at this point, i.e. all speeches are equally weighted, whether they occur ten days
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Figure 4.8: Regression results of rolling window approach.
Target Timing FG QE
















Notes: This graph depicts the hawk-frequency coe cient from the regression results of table 4.10
re-estimated using a rolling window of +-3 days. The y-axis depicts the days to the next ECB
press-conference. The grey area is the standard deviation for the respective coe cient.
before a press-conference or 40 days before. However, it seems unlikely that all
speeches carry the same weight since the executive board has a quiet period prior
to press-conferences and since it seems unlikely that future monetary policy can
be communicated this e ectively months in advance. To investigate whether the
results may be a ected by either the short end (through the quiet period phase)
or the long end (though monetary policy uncertainty), we run the same regression
using a rolling window. Since we cannot e ectively control for macroeconomic
variables, we use only the frequency of hawkish to dovish speeches as a dependent
variable. The resulting coe cients as well its standard error, are illustrated in
Figure 4.8.
The findings are not uniform across surprises but can be summarized as follows.
First, about one month before the press-conference, the predictions become re-
liable. Although the results vary between horizons, the general pattern remains
the same: the coe cient stabilizes or rises around 20-30 days before the press-
conference. Second, we observe the quiet period’s expected e ect. The grey
dotted line depicts the seven days leading up to the press-conference. There, the
coe cients become insignificant and thus are no longer a reliable predictor of the
monetary policy stance. We find qualitatively and quantitatively the same results
for the first three surprises when we use the narrower window for our regression,
but a substantial improvement in significance for the QE surprise (2.95úú).
Finally, we test the embeddings’ out-of-sample performance to evaluate whether
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the language model has actual predictive power. We use an expanding horizon
approach to estimate all regressions in order to formally test forecasting perfor-
mance and avoid look-ahead bias (Chakraborty and Joseph, 2017). The model is
parameterized based on observations prior to 2017, and the predicted policy sur-
prise are compared to their true values between 2017 and 2020 (33 observations,
i.e. ¥ 20% of the sample). We specifically choose this period since we are inter-
ested in the predictive power of our model during di erent time periods.63 The
results can be found in Table 4.11. Across the di erent surprises, the accuracy
of the predictions is remarkable, all predict higher than 50% correctly.64 The
accuracy appears to decrease with increasing horizon, which is consistent with
our earlier findings. This result may provide first evidence that speeches target
expectations on the shorter side.65




Quantitative easing 58 %
Forward guidance 52 %
Note: This table summarizes the out-of-sample predic-
tion performance across di erent surprises. The models
are estimated on ECB speeches before 2017-01-01 and
evaluated on speeches after 2017-01-01. The accuracy
displayed is constitutes the fraction of correct predictions
by all predictions.
This result makes us confident that i) speeches have predictive power beyond
previous findings and ii) that the embeddings can capture some of it. The find-
63Since we anticipate a shift in jargon as the COVID-19 pandemic hits the global economy
in 2020, this event provides an interesting basis for evaluating the language model outside its
training environment. However, we tried other time periods as well and came to the same
conclusions.
64It is worth noting that we also tested word embeddings in this prediction task. Although
they did not outperform the document embeddings, they did provide surprisingly good predic-
tion as well: Target: 64%, Timing: 58%; FG: 58% and QE: 55%. The results are available
upon request.
65It is important to note that, due to the small number of remaining observations for the
training phase, we are not particularly confident in our QE results. We selected multiple time
periods, both longer and shorter, and found that QE performed fairly consistently above 50%.
However, we would caution against over-interpreting this result based on only 22 observations.
125
4 WHATEVER IT TAKES TO UNDERSTAND A CENTRAL BANKER.
ings provide many potential future research questions regarding the most relevant
dimensions in the embedding space and factors a ecting those. Furthermore, we
employ a simple linear model, whereas recent contributions such as Kalamara,
Turrell, et al. (2020) and Hinterlang (2020) demonstrate how machine learning
(and, in particular, neural networks) could be applied to such prediction tasks.
4.6 Conclusion
Understanding the communication of central banks has developed to be a sub-
stantial entity in monetary policy, with dictionary approaches at the forefront
of current techniques to quantify their speeches, press-conference and reports.
In this paper, we expanded this literature in three ways: the compilation of a
novel text-corpus, the introduction of algorithms stemming from computational
linguistic to extract embeddings – a language model – and the provision of central
bank specific embeddings.
First, we collect a text-corpus that is unparalleled in size and diversity within this
literature, as both is necessary to train such a language model su ciently. Then,
we introduce embeddings, a novel approach from computational linguistics to
quantify texts. These language models are trained using machine learning tech-
niques that locate words and documents in a multidimensional vector space. It
has been demonstrated that these embeddings can capture meaningful real-world
relationships. Finally, we are able to provide high quality text-representations
for central bank communication by training and evaluating di erent algorithms
using an objective criteria. The algorithm with the highest predictive power is
able to generate both multidimensional word and document representations.
Within this paper we highlighted the broad applicability of embeddings by illus-
trating four prominent examples in the fields of central bank institutions, finan-
cial uncertainty, gender bias, and monetary policy shock prediction. For example,
we illustrate that our language model is able to extract relevant information to
forecast future monetary policy shocks from public speeches. Throughout our
applications, we emphasize several techniques for extracting the abundance of in-
formation contained within embeddings. In our work with embeddings, we found
that similarities – euclidean and cosine – are a suitable metric for integrating
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textual information into economic models or investigating them as dependent
and independent variables themselves. Furthermore, we highlight how the use of
embeddings in neural networks is a field to be further explored in future research.
Our approach has important implications for policymakers and central bankers,
allowing for more nuanced ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of communication
strategies, such as obtaining preliminary assessments of future communication.
We believe this paper to be just a first step toward answering many exciting
questions, for example extracting superior measures for concepts such as senti-
ment, or uncertainty, modelling institutional di erences, and improving real-time
predictions. We hope that by making our language models publicly available, we
will be able to assist in this process.
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A APPENDIX: WHAT IS ON THE ECB’S MIND?
A Appendix: What is on the ECB’s mind?
A.1 Taylor rule estimate
















Adjusted R2 0.333 0.556
Note: úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
A.2 Textual analysis: Most mentioned bigrams in ECB
communication



















































































































































Source: ECB press conference introductory statements.
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A.3 Summary of variables
Table A.2: Overview of used data and transformations.
Name Source Transformation
Dependent Variables
EONIA Rate Datastream -
Euro Area Shadow Rate (Wu & Xia (2016)) Quandl.com -
Business Cycle
HICP Inflation Rate ECB (RTD) Annual growth
Exp. Inflation Rate ECB (SPF) Annual growth
Output Gap ECB (RTD) HP transformed real GDP
Exp. Output Gap ECB (SPF) HP transformed exp. GDP
Unemployment ECB (RTD) -
Exp. Unemployment ECB (SPF) -
Core Inflation Rate ECB (RTD) Annual growth
Commodity Prices IMF Monthly growth
Financial Markets
E ective Euro Exchange Rate ECB (RTD) Monthly growth
Stock Prices (Euro Stoxx 50) Datastream Monthly growth
Stock Market Volatility (VSTOXX) Datastream Monthly growth
Credit Volume ECB Monthly growth
Euro Area Government Bond Yield FRED Monthly growth
CISS ECB Weekly + monthly growth
Money Supply (M3) ECB (RTD) Annual growth
Further Indicators
Uncertainty Index policyuncertainty.com Monthly growth
Trade Deficit ECB (RTD) Quarterly growth
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A.4 Ten top models (pre- and post-crisis)
Figure A.2: Top models: Pre crisis.
1999 − 2008
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.31 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.62
Euro Stoxx 50








Figure A.3: Top models: Post crisis.
2008 − 2018
Cumulative Model Probabilities
0 0.55 0.66 0.75 0.81
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A.5 Robustness checks
Table A.3: Robustness: Prior on the model space
1999 – 2018 1999 – 2008 2008 – 2018
PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean










Output Gap (actual) 0.952 0.490
(0.190)
Observations 216 114 102
Note: Only robust variables with a PIP Ø 0.15 are presented.
Table A.4: Robustness: Prior on the parameter space
1999 – 2018 1999 – 2008 2008 – 2018
PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean










Output Gap (actual) 0.977 0.502
(0.172)
Observations 216 114 102
Note: Only robust variables with a PIP Ø 0.15 are presented.
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Table A.5: Robustness: Starting date of the crisis
1999 – 2018 1999 – 2007 2007 – 2018
PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean










Output Gap (actual) 0.874 0.474
(0.349)
Observations 216 101 115
Note: Only robust variables with a PIP Ø 0.15 are presented.
Table A.6: Robustness: EONIA
1999-2018 1999-2008 2008-2018
PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean PIP Post Mean
Unemployment (ex-
pected)
1.000 -0.694 0.238 -0.067 0.990 -0.191
(0.059) (0.135) (0.048)






Output Gap (actual) 0.967 0.498 0.609 -0.143
(0.179) 0.130
Commodity Prices 0.999 -0.061
(0.010)
Core Inflation Rate 0.299 -0.164
(0.281)
Observations 216 114 102
Note: Only robust variables with a PIP Ø 0.15 are presented.
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B Appendix: Above, but close to two percent.
B.1 Sample text
The two exemplary texts here provide an illustration the ’bag-of-words’ approach
and Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) dictionary. Positive terms are highlighted
in bold, negative terms in italic, and negations are underlined.
"[...] There is no doubt in my mind that the ultimate goal of economic
policy, which is to improve the standard of living and quality of life of
all members of the community, can only be achieved by an e ective
interplay between policies with a view to achieving simultaneously
e ciency, stability and equity. [...] "
- Eugenio Solans (2003)66
"[...] Unfortunately, many euro area countries entered the financial
crisis and the economic downturn with unnecessarily weak fiscal bal-
ances, having missed the opportunity presented by past years’ rev-
enue windfalls to consolidate their budgets. [...] "
- Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo (2009)67
These exemplary text contains 1 (5) negative and 4 (1) positive negative terms.
However, note that the negative term ’doubt’ is preceded by a negation and there-
fore does not a ect the sentiment index. The respective sentiment index for this
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B.2 Similarity index
The method of estimating the similarity between documents is borrowed from
Amaya and Filbien (2015). Amaya and Filbien compare two preceding ECB press
conferences by counting the occurrence of bigrams. Bigrams are all combinations
in one sentence of two succeeding words. For example, the sentence "Inflation
expectations are higher than expected" has the bigrams "inflation-expectations",
"expectations-are", "are-higher" and so on. By extracting all possible bigrams in
the speech, they measure the similarity between two press conferences that take
place in month t as the number of bigrams that occur in both press conferences,




As this paper compares speeches at a much higher frequency in this paper, I
have adjusted the similarity index by Amaya and Filbien (2015) by aggregating
the bigrams from all individual i speeches within one month and then comparing









To detect whether speeches within a month become more similar with each other,











with i ”= j. The results are presented in the paper in Section 2.4.1 and can be
provided upon request.
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B.3 Descriptive speaker summary
Table B.1: Summary statistics per speaker
Speakers Speeches Mean # of sentences Mean sentiment
1 Jean-Claude Trichet 318 89 0.090
2 Mario Draghi 183 81 ≠0.050
3 Benoit Cure 179 100 ≠0.190
4 Yves Mersch 149 69 ≠0.040
5 Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell 148 74 0.270
6 Vitor Constancio 121 121 ≠0.220
7 Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo 117 96 ≠0.230
8 Peter Praet 117 94 ≠0.240
9 Lorenzo Bini Smaghi 107 122 ≠0.290
10 Lucas Papademos 87 112 0.020
11 Juergen Stark 77 93 ≠0.060
12 Sabine Lautenschlaeger 76 70 ≠0.120
13 Otmar Issing 47 106 ≠0.050
14 Juerg Asmussen 45 60 ≠0.210
15 Luis de Guindos 40 71 ≠0.080
16 Willem F. Duisenberg 25 59 0.190
17 Eugenio Domingo Solans 20 93 0.250
18 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa 16 104 ≠0.050
19 Philip R. Lane 8 184 ≠0.310
20 Christine Lagarde 6 49 0.110
21 Sirkka Haemaelaeinen 6 102 0.170
1, 892 91 ≠0.059
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B.4 Unemployment target illustration

















7 8 9 10 11 12
Unemployment rate
 
Notes: The illustration of a ’bin-scatter-plot’ represents a practical alternative to the more
conventional scatter plot. The data points are grouped into bins, and each bin is averaged.
In addition, the size of each point is proportional to the number of data points within the
respective bin. The objective (red continuous line) is illustrated as of regression results (3).
The author’s calculations are available upon request.
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B.5 Robustness Check Regressions
Table B.2: Regression Results Robustness Checks
Sentiment Index Si,t
Squared Economic ActivityOutput-Gap Monthly AR1 Resorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
fi 0.086úúú 0.028 0.057úú 0.072úúú 0.025 0.079úúú 0.028
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023)
fi
2 ≠0.016úú ≠0.006 ≠0.008 ≠0.013ú ≠0.005 ≠0.014ú ≠0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)














Sentimentt≠1 0.042 0.044 0.057 0.041 0.038
(0.028) (0.027) (0.052) (0.028) (0.027)
Sentimentmonth 0.119úúú 0.115úúú
(0.039) (0.026)
Year ≠0.014úú ≠0.015úúú ≠0.006 ≠0.010úú ≠0.013ú ≠0.011 ≠0.017úú
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
EPUEurope ≠0.071úúú ≠0.080úúú ≠0.119úúú ≠0.083úúú≠0.075úúú≠0.080úúú≠0.077úúú
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018)
Inflation target 2.64 2.38 2.82 2.75 3.39 2.82 2.93
Observations 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,748
Adjusted R2 0.227 0.223 0.215 0.225 0.224 0.232 0.232
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. The variable yt denotes log
GDP. The output gap (xt) is estimated using an HP-Filter with ⁄ = 1600, no drift and
measured in percent. Sentimentmonth is the delayed previous month’s average sentiment.
The inflation target is estimated as defined in Equation (2.4). Financial market controls,
as well as a time trend and speaker controls, are included in all specifications as defined in
Section 2.4.2. EPUEurope is the uncertainty index by Baker, Bloom, et al. (2016). Indi-
vidual ECB Executive Board members’ resorts in specifications (6) and (7) were manually
collected from the ECB website and are available upon request. Robust standard errors
(clustered by speaker) are displayed in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
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C Appendix: Complexity of ECB Communica-
tion.
C.1 UMPM Press conferences
Table C.1: ECB’s GCM press conferences included in the sample
No. Date UMPM disclosure (predominant)
1 07 May 2009 Asset Purchase Programme
2 04 Jun 2009 Asset Purchase Programme
3 06 Aug 2009 Swap Agreement
4 03 Dec 2009 Forward Guidance
5 04 Mar 2010 Allotment Policy
6 10 Jun 2010 Allotment Policy
7 02 Sep 2010 Allotment Policy
8 02 Dec 2010 Allotment Policy
9 03 Mar 2011 Allotment Policy
10 09 Jun 2011 Allotment Policy
11 04 Aug 2011 Allotment Policy
12 06 Oct 2011 Asset Purchase Programme
13 03 Nov 2011 Asset Purchase Programme
14 06 Jun 2012 Allotment Policy
15 02 Aug 2012 Asset Purchase Programme
16 06 Sep 2012 Asset Purchase Programme
17 06 Dec 2012 Allotment Policy
18 02 May 2013 Allotment Policy
19 05 Jun 2014 Allotment Policy
20 03 Jul 2014 Allotment Policy
21 04 Sep 2014 Asset Purchase Programme
22 02 Oct 2014 Asset Purchase Programme
23 22 Jan 2015 Asset Purchase Programme
24 10 Mar 2016 Asset Purchase Programme
25 21 Apr 2016 Asset Purchase Programme
26 02 Jun 2016 Asset Purchase Programme
27 21 Jul 2016 Forward Guidance
28 08 Sep 2016 Forward Guidance
29 20 Oct 2016 Forward Guidance
30 08 Dec 2016 Asset Purchase Programme
31 19 Jan 2017 Asset Purchase Programme
32 09 Mar 2017 Forward Guidance
33 27 Apr 2017 Forward Guidance
34 08 Jun 2017 Forward Guidance
Note: ECB’s GCM press conferences sampled following the 2008 financial cri-
sis, when the ECB started conducting UMPM on a recurring basis, apparent
by the announcement of ECB’s first covered bond purchase programme on 07
May 2009, and covering the period until June 2017. Limitation to press con-
ferences where details on UMPM are disclosed, i.e., details on Asset Purchase
Programmes, Swap Agreements, Allotment Policy, and/or Forward Guidance.
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C.2 Discriptive summary
Table C.2: Descriptive summary
UMPM (n=34) Non-UMPM (n=61)
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Complexity Measures
Flesch Kincaid 15.5 0.55 14.6 16.5 15.4 0.56 14.2 16.5
Flesch 28.7 1.94 25.0 32.6 27.6 1.96 21.7 31.7
FOG 19.6 0.62 18.2 20.8 19.6 0.70 18.1 21.1
SMOG 17.1 0.44 16.2 17.9 17.1 0.50 16.8 18.2
Coleman Liau 13.8 0.35 13.3 14.7 14.1 0.39 13.2 14.8
ARI 15.8 0.66 14.6 17.0 15.6 0.73 13.9 17.1
Trading Volume
VolumeIntro 8.3 0.67 7.19 9.9 8.1 0.72 6.6 9.9
VolumeConf 8.1 0.56 7.14 9.2 7.9 0.49 6.6 9.1
VolumeQ&A≠to≠Intro -0.33 0.43 -1.4 0.47 -0.31 0.55 -1.3 1.2
VolumeQ&A≠to≠Conf. -0.08 0.13 -0.43 0.12 -0.1 0.14 -0.41 0.17
Control Variables:
Bond Return -0.04 0.20 -0.54 0.46 0.95 0.01 0.19 0.50
Shadow Rate 0.19 0.43 -0.99 0.92 -0.17 0.31 -0.78 0.50
Rate Change Dummy 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.08 0.28 0 1
Similarity 0.41 0.09 0.28 0.61 0.45 0.09 0.28 0.65
Robustness Check
WS 25.0 1.34 22.9 27.2 24.2 1.49 20.80 27.50
SW 1.81 0.02 1.77 1.87 1.83 0.022 1.79 1.89
Future-Orientation 1.18 0.32 0.53 1.87 1.15 0.31 0.49 1.70
Uncertainty 0.68 0.26 0.15 1.19 0.75 0.22 0.30 1.24
Active/Passive 1.14 0.02 1.11 1.19 1.14 0.02 1.11 1.19
Overstated/Understated 1.05 0.01 1.03 1.07 1.05 0.01 1.03 1.08
Positive/Negative 1.03 0.01 1.01 1.06 1.03 0.01 1.02 1.06
Positive/Negative LM 1.00 0.01 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.01 0.99 1.01
Strong/Weak 1.11 0.01 1.09 1.14 1.11 0.02 1.08 1.15
Note: Descriptive statistics of our variables based on a total of 95 observations.
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D Appendix: Whatever it takes to understand
a central banker.
D.1 Graphical illustrations of text corpus
Figure D.1: Descriptive summary of the corpus





































Notes: This figure shows the basic properties of our central bank corpus, broken down by year,
type, and word length Documents with more than 30,000 words grouped in the other category.
Figure D.2: Illustration of frequency of used terms between ECB other central
banks.
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D.2 Language Model specifications
The following are the hyperparameters we use. For the Word2Vec model we refer
to Mikolov, Yih, et al. (2013) and Rehurek and Sojka (2011) and for the GloVe
model we use Pennington, Socher, et al.’s (2014) specification. The parameters of
the Doc2Vec model are based on Lau and Baldwin (2016). For the LDA we use
the findings of Blei and La erty (2009) as well as few modifications by Hornik
and Grün (2011).68 The hyperparameters are summarized in the following table:











DBOW 300 15 0.0001 5 20 0.05 - -
Doc2Vec-
DM 300 5 0.0001 5 20 0.05 - -
Word2Vec 300 5 0.0001 5 10 0.05 - -
GloVe 300 - - 10 20 0.1 0.75 -
LDA 300 - - - - - 0.166 0.01
D.3 Additional evaluation
D.3.1 External evaluation
In addition to our economic evaluation task we test our whole embeddings in a
more general setting. This should serve as a robustness test with a di erent task,
di erent empirical methodologies, and far more central bank participation. We
select classification tasks that are uninteresting in and of themselves to reduce
the risk of spurious correlation between the embeddings and potential application
outcome variables (Athey, 2019). In particular, the classification task used here is
to predict each speech’s central bank and publication year, assuming that higher
performance implies a language model’s relative superiority.
Following current research like Chakraborty and Joseph (2017), the assessment is
carried out using out-of-sample testing via cross-validation. In particular, we use
five-fold cross-validation, where each model is trained on four-fifths of the dataset
68For the Gibbs sampling draws we chose a burnin rate of 1000, sampled 2000 iterations and
returned every fifth iteration.
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and evaluated on the remaining fifth. This process is repeated five times, with the
evaluation’s accuracy estimated on each fold. We use the following two machine
learning techniques for the classification task: K-Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) and
random forest.69
The word embedding results are illustrated in Figure D.3, with one algorithm per
row and one prediction task per column. The expected accuracy from guessing
would be 0.25 for the central bank prediction and 0.06 for the year prediction.






























Notes: This graph depicts the evaluation of di erent algorithms as discussed in this chap-
ter. The measurement on the y-axis is accuracy of the underlying task, which is measured as
(true positive + true negative)/(number of observations).
The result is similar to the results from the main text. Document embeddings
seem to be better suited for summarizing text. For word embeddings, only minor
di erences are found between the algorithms. Thus, it seems that in these more
general tasks, unlike in the economics-related tasks, our word embeddings do not
have a clear corpus advantage over the general language models. However, they
69A great introduction into both non-parametric methods as well as the performance metric
is provided by Chakraborty and Joseph (2017).
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are not worse either. This again emphasizes the potential of our embeddings in
the analysis of central banks. Interestingly, there appears no clear trend between
KNN and Random Forest with regard to performance, which is – concerning the
latter ones’ complexity – remarkable. KNN appears to be better in predicting the
central banks, whereas random forest is slightly superior in the year predictions.
D.3.2 Internal evaluation
Similar to our basel example, we find problems with potentially distorting con-
texts in general language models if we look at the term greening: While Word2Vec
GoogleNews associates the colour with this term and Glove6B climate change,
our language model associates this topic with terms from the area of climate
policy regarding green finance.
Table D.2: Additional Intrinsic Evaluation: Homonym across language models.











Note: The table shows for the Doc2Vec and the two genereal corpus
models the ten most similar words to the word "greening" according
to the cosine distance of the underlying word embeddings as defined
by Equation (4.4). The underscore is used to highlight collocations
as described in Section 4.3.1.
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D.4 Applications - Robustness checks
D.4.1 Application 2: Whatever it takes




witsimil 1.416úúú (0.482) 0.353úú (0.161) 0.485úúú (0.179)
witsimil ◊ VSTOXXpd ≠0.070úúú (0.026)
witsimil ◊ cisspd ≠2.911úú (1.262)





witdummy ≠1.303úúú (0.317) ≠1.140úúú (0.406) ≠1.424úúú (0.278)
altavilla.Target ≠0.034 (0.038) ≠0.031 (0.038) ≠0.034 (0.038)
altavilla.Timing 0.001 (0.008) 0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.008)
altavilla.FG 0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.007)
altavilla.QE ≠0.024 (0.019) ≠0.025 (0.018) ≠0.024 (0.019)
lag_asset.sp500 ≠0.0001 (0.0001) ≠0.0001 (0.0001) ≠0.0001 (0.0001)
lag_asset.stoxx 0.0001ú (0.00004) 0.0001 (0.00004) 0.0001ú (0.00004)
MoodysA2 ≠0.049 (0.067) ≠0.045 (0.067) ≠0.046 (0.067)
MoodysA3 0.386úú (0.168) 0.393úú (0.170) 0.379úú (0.166)
MoodysBa1 0.063 (0.042) 0.075ú (0.044) 0.058 (0.041)
MoodysBa3 0.194 (0.120) 0.192 (0.121) 0.191 (0.117)
MoodysB1 0.154ú (0.089) 0.148 (0.090) 0.146ú (0.088)
MoodysB3 0.159ú (0.089) 0.157ú (0.089) 0.156ú (0.088)
MoodysCaa1 0.106 (0.106) 0.109 (0.104) 0.102 (0.106)
MoodysCaa2 0.186ú (0.108) 0.185ú (0.108) 0.181ú (0.107)
MoodysCaa3 0.083 (0.107) 0.090 (0.104) 0.080 (0.106)
MoodysCa 0.109 (0.207) 0.130 (0.206) 0.103 (0.205)
MoodysC ≠0.060 (0.139) ≠0.047 (0.131) ≠0.060 (0.139)
lag(spread10y_d, 1) 0.248úú (0.115) 0.249úú (0.115) 0.249úú (0.115)
presidentDuisenberg ≠0.091 (0.207) 0.027 (0.195) ≠0.073 (0.204)
presidentLagarde 0.087úú (0.042) 0.074ú (0.044) 0.084úú (0.041)
presidentTrichet ≠0.044 (0.197) ≠0.016 (0.192) ≠0.036 (0.196)
Constant ≠0.318 (0.283) ≠0.125 (0.235) ≠0.123 (0.267)
Observations 2,028 2,028 2,028
R2 0.116 0.113 0.116
F Statistic 10.529úúú 10.153úúú 10.101úúú
Note: Coe cients are estimated using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively.
The test statistics are calculated with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC)
standard errors.
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D APPENDIX: WHATEVER IT TAKES TO UNDERSTAND A CENTRAL
BANKER.
D.4.2 Application 3: Gender bias
As a robustness test we replicate the job example of Garg et. al (2018) using
female and male names. We use occupation data from Eurostat and match all
descriptions with Garg et. al’s (2018) pronouns. The following are the results:
Table D.4: Regression results - Gender Bias
Dependent variable:
Relative norm distance






Note: The RND measure is used as defined in Equation (4.6).
Higher values indicate closer association to female pronouns and
lower values closer association with make pronouns. The respective
pronouns can be found in Footnote 60. Coe cients are estimated
using an OLS regression. Standard errors are displayed in paren-
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